Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. John Doe

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 14, 2019
Docket1:18-cv-01587
StatusUnknown

This text of Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. John Doe (Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. John Doe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. John Doe, (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -------------------------------------------------------------x : STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC, : Plaintiff, : 18-CV-1587 (VSB) (OTW) : -against- : OPINION & ORDER : JOHN DOE, subscriber assigned IP address : 68.174.161.182, : : Defendant. -------------------------------------------------------------x ONA T. WANG, United States Magistrate Judge: I. Introduction Plaintiff Strike 3 Holdings LLC brought this copyright infringement action against Defendant John Doe, who has been identified only by his alleged Internet Protocol (“IP”) address, 68.174.161.182. Presently before me is Defendant’s motion to quash Plaintiff’s third-party subpoena, which Plaintiff has served on Defendant’s Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) Spectrum and which would require the ISP to disclose Defendant’s name and address. See ECF 18 (Defendant’s notice of motion to quash); ECF 15 (Order granting leave for Plaintiff to serve third- party subpoena upon Defendant’s ISP). Defendant also requests that s/he be permitted to proceed anonymously in the litigation. For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion to quash is DENIED and Defendant’s request to proceed anonymously is GRANTED. II. Background Plaintiff owns adult motion pictures which it distributes through various subscription- based adult websites, DVDs and licensing agreements. (Compl. ¶¶ 2-3, 13). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, using the file-sharing network BitTorrent, illegally downloaded and distributed thirty- six (36) copyrighted motion pictures. (Id. ¶ 4). Plaintiff asserts that these works have either been

registered with the United States Copyright Office or have pending copyright registration and that Defendant obtained and distributed them without Plaintiff’s authorization. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 37). Plaintiff knows Defendant only by an IP address. (Id. ¶ 1). Plaintiff alleges that its investigator, IPP International U.G. (“IPP”), established direct connections with Defendant’s IP address through the BitTorrent file distribution network and downloaded from that IP address several digital media files containing Plaintiff’s motion pictures. (Id. ¶¶ 24-25). Plaintiff then

verified that each digital media file downloaded from Defendant’s IP address contains a digital copy of a motion picture that is “identical,” “strikingly similar,” or “substantially similar” to Plaintiff’s original copyrighted movies. (Id. ¶ 29). Plaintiff previously moved this Court for leave to subpoena Defendant’s name and address from his ISP in advance of a Rule 26(f) conference. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

26(d)(1). (ECF 7, 8). The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion on October 3, 2018. (ECF 15). In so doing, the Court imposed several procedural protections, including (1) the ISP must serve copies of the subpoena and the Order on Defendant within 15 days of service; (2) the ISP must permit Defendant 45 days from the date of service of the subpoena to contest the subpoena; (3) the ISP is prohibited from turning over Defendant’s identifying information until the expiration of that 45-day period; and (4) the ISP, once subpoenaed, must preserve any subpoenaed information

pending the resolution of any motion to contest the subpoena. (ECF 15, at 3-4). Plaintiff served the subpoena on Defendant’s ISP on or about October 17, 2018. (ECF 17). On December 17, 2018, Defendant moved to quash the subpoena. (ECF 18, 19). III. Discussion Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 allows a party to serve a subpoena for the production

of documents and other information from a non-party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1). The subpoena recipient may move to quash the subpoena if the subpoena “(i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; (ii) requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c); (iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or (iv) subjects a person to undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(i)-(iv). The party seeking to quash the subpoena bears the burden of persuasion. Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 169

F.R.D. 44, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The same standard applies in a case such as this where a person other than the subpoena recipient moves to quash the subpoena. Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, No. 18-CV-2648, 2019 WL 78987, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2019) (citing Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 15-CV-3504, 2016 WL 4444799, at *5-6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2016). Here, Defendant does not move to quash the subpoena on any of the grounds listed in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(3)(A). Instead, Defendant argues that many other individuals could have accessed Defendant’s wireless network. (Doe Decl. ¶ 1). Defendant lives in an apartment building with three non-family roommates and is the subscriber for their shared wireless internet service. (Id.). Defendant’s apartment building has 60 units. (Id.). Further, the IP address being subpoenaed is not Defendant’s current IP address. Defendant had to replace a prior modem due to connection problems. (Id.).

Defendant’s arguments—which go to the merits of the parties’ case—are premature. See Strike 3 Holdings, 2019 WL 78987, at *2 (quoting Achte/Neune Boll Kino Beteiligungs Gmbh & Co. v. Does 1-4577, 736 F. Supp. 2d 212, 215-16 (D.D.C. 2010)) (“the merits of [a party’s] case are not relevant to the issue of whether [the party’s] subpoena is valid and enforceable.”); Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 14-CV-4808, 2016 WL 4574677, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2016) (“whether

Defendant ultimately has meritorious defenses to Plaintiff’s claim is not relevant for purposes of the instant motion to quash or Plaintiff’s ability to obtain the discovery sought in the . . . Subpoena.”); Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-5000, 818 F. Supp. 2d 28, 35 (D.D.C. 2011) (“A general denial of liability . . . is not a basis for quashing” a subpoena). Instead, subpoenas issued pursuant to Rule 45 may obtain discovery regarding “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to [a] party’s claim or defense.” Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe,

No. 15-CV-3147, 2016 WL 5478433, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016) (quoting In re Refco Sec. Litig., 759 F. Supp. 2d 342, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). Relevance is to be “’construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on’ any party’s claim or defense.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fayda, No. 14-CV-9792, 2015 WL 7871037, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.

3, 2015) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)). The information sought in this subpoena is relevant. Identifying the name and address of Defendant will allow this case to proceed with service of a Complaint and summons.

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Related

Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders
437 U.S. 340 (Supreme Court, 1978)
In Re Refco Securities Litigation
759 F. Supp. 2d 342 (S.D. New York, 2011)
Achte/Neunte Boll Kino Beteiligungs Gmbh & Co. v. Does 1-4,577
736 F. Supp. 2d 212 (District of Columbia, 2010)
Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-5
818 F. Supp. 2d 28 (District of Columbia, 2011)
Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1-5
285 F.R.D. 273 (S.D. New York, 2012)
Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe 1
288 F.R.D. 233 (E.D. New York, 2012)
Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp.
169 F.R.D. 44 (S.D. New York, 1996)

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Bluebook (online)
Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. John Doe, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/strike-3-holdings-llc-v-john-doe-nysd-2019.