1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC, Case No.: 21-CV-00067-JLS-BGS
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING EX PARTE 13 v. APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO SERVE THIRD PARTY SUBPOENA 14 JOHN DOE, subscriber assigned IP PRIOR TO RULE 26(F) address 99.74.219.118, 15 CONFERENCE Defendant. 16 [ECF No. 4] 17 18 19 Before the Court is Plaintiff Strike 3 Holdings, LLC’s (“Plaintiff”) Ex Parte 20 Application for Leave to Serve a Third-Party Subpoena Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference. 21 (ECF No. 4.) Since no defendant has been named or served, there have been no opposition 22 or reply briefs filed. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s 23 application. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 On January 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed its Complaint against Defendant John Doe 26 subscriber assigned Internet Protocol (“IP”) address 99.74.219.118 (“Doe Defendant”) for 27 copyright infringement. (ECF No. 1.) On January 27, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte 28 1 Application seeking leave to serve a third-party subpoena to ascertain the identity of the 2 Doe Defendant. (ECF No. 4.) 3 In its Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant is liable for direct copyright 4 infringement. (ECF No. 1 at 7–8.) Plaintiff alleges it owns the copyrights for movies it 5 distributes through adult websites and DVD sales. (Id. at 1–4.) Plaintiff alleges Doe 6 Defendant used BitTorrent, a peer-to-peer file sharing system, to copy and distribute its 7 movies without consent. (Id. at 4–7.) As discussed further below, to identify the IP address 8 that was illegally distributing its works, Plaintiff utilized its proprietary forensic software, 9 VXN Scan (“VXN”). (Id. at 5–6; ECF No. 4-1 at 7.) 10 As it can only identify the Doe Defendant by the IP address used, Plaintiff requests 11 permission to serve a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 subpoena on the Internet Service 12 Provider (“ISP”), AT&T U-Verse, that issued the IP address to Doe Defendant. (ECF No. 13 4-1 at 7–8.) The proposed subpoena only demands the name and address of Doe 14 Defendant, and Plaintiff indicates it will only use this information to prosecute claims in 15 the Complaint. (Id. at 8.) 16 Plaintiff claims good cause exists to grant the Ex Parte Application because: 17 (1) Plaintiff has identified Doe Defendant with sufficient specificity through geolocation 18 technology and forensic investigation; (2) Plaintiff has identified all previous steps taken 19 to locate Doe Defendant; (3) Plaintiff’s Complaint could withstand a motion to dismiss; 20 and (4) Plaintiff has established that there is a reasonable likelihood that Plaintiff can 21 identify the Doe Defendant and effectuate service. (Id. at 11–18.) 22 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 23 Absent a court order, discovery is generally not allowed prior to the parties’ Federal 24 Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) conference. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). Early discovery 25 to identify a defendant may be warranted given “a plaintiff cannot have a discovery 26 planning conference with an anonymous defendant.” UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Doe, No. 27 C-08-03999-RMW, 2008 WL 4104207, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2008). To determine if early 28 discovery is warranted in a particular case, the court applies a “good cause” test by 1 weighing the need for discovery to further justice against the prejudice it may cause the 2 opposing party. Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D. Cal. 3 2002); see also Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, No. 17-CV-2317-JAH-BLM, 2017 WL 4 6389848, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 2017) (citing Semitool, 208 F.R.D. at 274). 5 The Ninth Circuit has held that when a defendant’s identity is unknown at the time 6 a complaint is filed, courts may grant a plaintiff leave to take early discovery to determine 7 the defendant’s identity “unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identit[y], 8 or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 9 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). In determining whether to grant leave for early discovery 10 to ascertain a defendant’s identity, district courts consider: (1) whether the plaintiff can 11 “identify the missing party with sufficient specificity such that the defendant is a real 12 person or entity who could be sued in federal court”; (2) whether the plaintiff has described 13 “all previous steps taken to locate the elusive defendant”; (3) whether the “suit against 14 defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss”; and (4) whether there “is a reasonable 15 likelihood that the requested discovery process [proposed] will lead to identifying 16 information about defendant that would make service of process possible.” Columbia Ins. 17 Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578–80 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 18 III. DISCUSSION 19 A. Identification of the Doe Defendant with Sufficient Specificity 20 Plaintiff has identified the Doe Defendant with sufficient specificity to enable the 21 Court to determine if Doe Defendant is a real person, subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. 22 Columbia Ins., 185 F.R.D. at 578; see also Distinct Media Limited v. Doe Defendants 1- 23 50, Case No. 15-cv-3312-NC, 2015 WL 13389609, *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2015). To 24 determine whether a doe defendant has been identified with sufficient specificity, courts 25 look to whether a plaintiff provided “the unique IP address[ ] assigned to an individual 26 defendant on the day of the allegedly infringing conduct” and used “‘geolocation 27 technology’ to trace the IP addresses to a physical point of origin.” 808 Holdings, LLC v. 28 Collective of Dec. 29, 2011 Sharing Hash, Case No. 12CV00186-MMA-RBB, 2012 WL 1 12884688, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 2012) (collecting cases) (citing OpenMind Sols., Inc. v. 2 Does 1-39, No. C-11-3311-MEJ, 2011 WL 4715200, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2011). 3 Identifying the unique IP address and location of the IP address has been shown to meet 4 the requirement for identifying a doe defendant with sufficient specificity. Id. 5 Plaintiff has submitted several declarations in support of its request to serve a Rule 6 45 subpoena: David Williamson, Plaintiff’s Chief Technology Officer; Patrick Paige of 7 Computer Forensics LLC, retained to analyze forensic evidence captured by Plaintiff’s 8 infringement detection system; Susan B. Stalzer, an employee of Plaintiff that verifies 9 infringing files are identical or strikingly similar to Plaintiff’s works; and Emile Kennedy, 10 Plaintiff’s in-house General Counsel who verifies the infringing IP address traces to San 11 Diego. (Ex Parte Appl, Exs. A (“Williams Decl.”), B (“Paige Decl.”), C (“Stalzer Decl.”), 12 and D (“Kennedy Decl.”) [ECF No. 4-2].) 13 Here, Plaintiff has identified the Doe Defendant with sufficient specificity. Mr. 14 Williamson’s declaration explains that he “oversaw the design, development, and overall 15 creation of the infringement detection system called VXN Scan[,] which [Plaintiff] both 16 owns and uses to identify the IP addresses used by individuals infringing Plaintiff’s movies 17 via the BitTorrent protocol.” (Williamson Decl. at ¶ 40.) One part of the VXN Scan system 18 involves the development of a proprietary BitTorrent client that emulates the behavior of a 19 standard BitTorrent client by repeatedly downloading data pieces from peers within the 20 BitTorrent network that are distributing Plaintiff’s movies. (Id. at ¶¶ 52–55.) Mr.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC, Case No.: 21-CV-00067-JLS-BGS
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING EX PARTE 13 v. APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO SERVE THIRD PARTY SUBPOENA 14 JOHN DOE, subscriber assigned IP PRIOR TO RULE 26(F) address 99.74.219.118, 15 CONFERENCE Defendant. 16 [ECF No. 4] 17 18 19 Before the Court is Plaintiff Strike 3 Holdings, LLC’s (“Plaintiff”) Ex Parte 20 Application for Leave to Serve a Third-Party Subpoena Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference. 21 (ECF No. 4.) Since no defendant has been named or served, there have been no opposition 22 or reply briefs filed. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s 23 application. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 On January 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed its Complaint against Defendant John Doe 26 subscriber assigned Internet Protocol (“IP”) address 99.74.219.118 (“Doe Defendant”) for 27 copyright infringement. (ECF No. 1.) On January 27, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte 28 1 Application seeking leave to serve a third-party subpoena to ascertain the identity of the 2 Doe Defendant. (ECF No. 4.) 3 In its Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant is liable for direct copyright 4 infringement. (ECF No. 1 at 7–8.) Plaintiff alleges it owns the copyrights for movies it 5 distributes through adult websites and DVD sales. (Id. at 1–4.) Plaintiff alleges Doe 6 Defendant used BitTorrent, a peer-to-peer file sharing system, to copy and distribute its 7 movies without consent. (Id. at 4–7.) As discussed further below, to identify the IP address 8 that was illegally distributing its works, Plaintiff utilized its proprietary forensic software, 9 VXN Scan (“VXN”). (Id. at 5–6; ECF No. 4-1 at 7.) 10 As it can only identify the Doe Defendant by the IP address used, Plaintiff requests 11 permission to serve a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 subpoena on the Internet Service 12 Provider (“ISP”), AT&T U-Verse, that issued the IP address to Doe Defendant. (ECF No. 13 4-1 at 7–8.) The proposed subpoena only demands the name and address of Doe 14 Defendant, and Plaintiff indicates it will only use this information to prosecute claims in 15 the Complaint. (Id. at 8.) 16 Plaintiff claims good cause exists to grant the Ex Parte Application because: 17 (1) Plaintiff has identified Doe Defendant with sufficient specificity through geolocation 18 technology and forensic investigation; (2) Plaintiff has identified all previous steps taken 19 to locate Doe Defendant; (3) Plaintiff’s Complaint could withstand a motion to dismiss; 20 and (4) Plaintiff has established that there is a reasonable likelihood that Plaintiff can 21 identify the Doe Defendant and effectuate service. (Id. at 11–18.) 22 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 23 Absent a court order, discovery is generally not allowed prior to the parties’ Federal 24 Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) conference. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). Early discovery 25 to identify a defendant may be warranted given “a plaintiff cannot have a discovery 26 planning conference with an anonymous defendant.” UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Doe, No. 27 C-08-03999-RMW, 2008 WL 4104207, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2008). To determine if early 28 discovery is warranted in a particular case, the court applies a “good cause” test by 1 weighing the need for discovery to further justice against the prejudice it may cause the 2 opposing party. Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D. Cal. 3 2002); see also Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, No. 17-CV-2317-JAH-BLM, 2017 WL 4 6389848, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 2017) (citing Semitool, 208 F.R.D. at 274). 5 The Ninth Circuit has held that when a defendant’s identity is unknown at the time 6 a complaint is filed, courts may grant a plaintiff leave to take early discovery to determine 7 the defendant’s identity “unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identit[y], 8 or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 9 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). In determining whether to grant leave for early discovery 10 to ascertain a defendant’s identity, district courts consider: (1) whether the plaintiff can 11 “identify the missing party with sufficient specificity such that the defendant is a real 12 person or entity who could be sued in federal court”; (2) whether the plaintiff has described 13 “all previous steps taken to locate the elusive defendant”; (3) whether the “suit against 14 defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss”; and (4) whether there “is a reasonable 15 likelihood that the requested discovery process [proposed] will lead to identifying 16 information about defendant that would make service of process possible.” Columbia Ins. 17 Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578–80 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 18 III. DISCUSSION 19 A. Identification of the Doe Defendant with Sufficient Specificity 20 Plaintiff has identified the Doe Defendant with sufficient specificity to enable the 21 Court to determine if Doe Defendant is a real person, subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. 22 Columbia Ins., 185 F.R.D. at 578; see also Distinct Media Limited v. Doe Defendants 1- 23 50, Case No. 15-cv-3312-NC, 2015 WL 13389609, *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2015). To 24 determine whether a doe defendant has been identified with sufficient specificity, courts 25 look to whether a plaintiff provided “the unique IP address[ ] assigned to an individual 26 defendant on the day of the allegedly infringing conduct” and used “‘geolocation 27 technology’ to trace the IP addresses to a physical point of origin.” 808 Holdings, LLC v. 28 Collective of Dec. 29, 2011 Sharing Hash, Case No. 12CV00186-MMA-RBB, 2012 WL 1 12884688, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 2012) (collecting cases) (citing OpenMind Sols., Inc. v. 2 Does 1-39, No. C-11-3311-MEJ, 2011 WL 4715200, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2011). 3 Identifying the unique IP address and location of the IP address has been shown to meet 4 the requirement for identifying a doe defendant with sufficient specificity. Id. 5 Plaintiff has submitted several declarations in support of its request to serve a Rule 6 45 subpoena: David Williamson, Plaintiff’s Chief Technology Officer; Patrick Paige of 7 Computer Forensics LLC, retained to analyze forensic evidence captured by Plaintiff’s 8 infringement detection system; Susan B. Stalzer, an employee of Plaintiff that verifies 9 infringing files are identical or strikingly similar to Plaintiff’s works; and Emile Kennedy, 10 Plaintiff’s in-house General Counsel who verifies the infringing IP address traces to San 11 Diego. (Ex Parte Appl, Exs. A (“Williams Decl.”), B (“Paige Decl.”), C (“Stalzer Decl.”), 12 and D (“Kennedy Decl.”) [ECF No. 4-2].) 13 Here, Plaintiff has identified the Doe Defendant with sufficient specificity. Mr. 14 Williamson’s declaration explains that he “oversaw the design, development, and overall 15 creation of the infringement detection system called VXN Scan[,] which [Plaintiff] both 16 owns and uses to identify the IP addresses used by individuals infringing Plaintiff’s movies 17 via the BitTorrent protocol.” (Williamson Decl. at ¶ 40.) One part of the VXN Scan system 18 involves the development of a proprietary BitTorrent client that emulates the behavior of a 19 standard BitTorrent client by repeatedly downloading data pieces from peers within the 20 BitTorrent network that are distributing Plaintiff’s movies. (Id. at ¶¶ 52–55.) Mr. 21 Williamson’s declaration also explains that another component of the VXN Scan system 22 is the PCAP1 Recorder that uses a PCAP Capture Card, which can record the IP addresses 23 connecting to the Proprietary Client and sending the infringed copies of Plaintiff’s work to 24 the Proprietary Client through the BitTorrent network. (Id. at ¶¶ 57–59.) A PCAP contains 25 the IP addresses used in the network transaction, the port number and BitTorrent client 26 27 28 1 1 used to accomplish each transaction, and the “Info Hash” associated with the infringing 2 computer file, which identifies the data that was shared in the recorded transaction as part 3 of the specific digital media file, i.e., an infringing copy of Plaintiff’s copyrighted works. 4 (Id. at ¶¶ 61–62.) The PCAP Capture Card records perfect copies of every network packet 5 received by the Proprietary Client. (Id. at ¶ 65.)2 6 Mr. Paige’s declaration explains that the VXN Scan recorded numerous BitTorrent 7 computer transactions with IP address 99.74.219.118 in the form of PCAPs. (Paige Decl. 8 at ¶¶ 13–16.) Mr. Paige then reviewed the PCAP to confirm that it evidences a recorded 9 transaction with that IP address on December 31, 2020 at 06:25:24 UTC involving the IP 10 address uploading a piece or pieces of a file corresponding to a specific hash value to VXN 11 Scan. (Id. at ¶¶ 16–18.) He then explains that based on his experience in similar cases, 12 Defendant’s ISP is the only entity that can correlate the identified IP address to its 13 subscriber to pinpoint Defendant’s identity. (Id. at ¶ 28.) 14 Ms. Stalzer’s declaration explains that she viewed the unauthorized motion pictures 15 corresponding with the file hashes side-by-side with Plaintiff’s original movies and verified 16 that each digital media file obtained from the VXN’s Torrent Collector and Downloader 17 components is a copy of one of Plaintiff’s copyrighted works. (Stalzer Decl. at ¶¶ 10–11.) 18 Ms. Stalzer then confirmed that ISP AT&T U-Verse did own Defendant’s IP address at the 19 time of the infringements by using the American Registry for Internet Numbers. (Id. at ¶ 20 12.) And finally, Ms. Kennedy’s declaration explains that she used Maxmind’s 21 Geolocation Database to trace the infringing IP address to Solana Beach, California, within 22 this Court’s jurisdiction, on January 21, 2021. (Kennedy Decl. at ¶¶ 4–7.) 23 Plaintiff has identified the missing party with such “sufficient specificity” so as to 24 assure the Court that the Doe Defendant is real, subject to the Court’s jurisdiction, and able 25 to be sued. Columbia Ins., 185 F.R.D. at 578. 26
27 2 Mr. Williamson’s declaration sets forth additional in-depth details regarding all 28 1 B. Previous Steps Taken to Locate Doe Defendant 2 Plaintiff has sufficiently described all prior attempts it has made to identify Doe 3 Defendant. Columbia Ins., 185 F.R.D. at 579. This element is aimed at ensuring that 4 “plaintiffs make a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of service of process 5 and specifically identify defendants.” Id. In addition to the efforts described above to trace 6 the infringing activity to the IP address, Plaintiff has asserted that it has searched for Doe 7 Defendant’s IP address “on various web search tools [and] review[ed] numerous sources 8 of authority,” including technology guides and agency websites, but has not been able to 9 identify Defendant. (ECF No. 4-1 at 14.) Further, Plaintiff has “discussed the issue at 10 length with computer investigators and cyber security consultants [and] does not know how 11 else it could possibly enforce its copyrights from illegal piracy over the Internet.” (Id.) 12 Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has made a good faith effort to identify the Doe 13 Defendant. 14 C. Ability to Withstand a Motion to Dismiss 15 Plaintiff has also demonstrated that its claim could withstand a motion to dismiss. 16 This requires Plaintiff to “make some showing that an act giving rise to civil liability 17 actually occurred and that the discovery is aimed at revealing specific identifying features 18 of the person or entity who committed that act.” Columbia Ins., 185 F.R.D. at 580. 19 A claim may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b) for lack of subject matter 20 jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6). To prevail on 21 a copyright infringement claim, Plaintiff must show: “(1) ownership of a valid copyright; 22 and (2) that the defendant violated the copyright owner’s exclusive rights under the 23 Copyright Act.” Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 17 24 U.S.C. § 501(a)); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 2017). 25 “Direct infringement requires the plaintiff to show causation (also referred to as ‘volitional 26 conduct’) by the defendant.” Perfect 10, 847 F.3d at 666. 27 Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 28 § 1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (jurisdiction over copyright actions). (ECF 1 No. 1 at 2.) Further, Plaintiff provides evidence that it is the exclusive rights holder of the 2 copyrighted works at issue. (See ECF Nos. 1-2, 1-3.)3 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 3 infringed Plaintiff’s copyrighted work via the BitTorrent file distribution network. (ECF 4 Nos. 1 at 7–9, 1-2 at 1–4.) Plaintiff also alleges that it did not permit or consent to Doe 5 Defendant’s copying or distribution of this work. (ECF No. 1 at 7–8.) Accordingly, 6 Plaintiff has alleged the prima facie elements of direct copyright infringement and could 7 withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Columbia Ins., 185 F.R.D. 8 at 579–80. Additionally, the Court finds the Complaint could withstand a challenge based 9 on personal jurisdiction or venue. As discussed at length above, Plaintiff has traced the 10 infringing conduct to this district. (See Section III.A.) 11 D. Requested Discovery Will Lead to Identifying Information 12 Finally, Plaintiff has satisfied the last element required in Columbia Insurance by 13 demonstrating the requested discovery will lead to identifying information about Doe 14 Defendant that would make service of process possible. Columbia Ins., 185 F.R.D. at 580. 15 As explained above, Plaintiff’s investigation has revealed a unique IP address. Due to the 16 fact that the only entity able to correlate an IP address to a specific individual is the ISP, 17 AT&T U-Verse, the requested Rule 45 subpoena would lead to information making 18 physical service of process possible. 19 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 20 The Ex Parte Application (ECF No. 4) is GRANTED. Accordingly, IT IS 21 HEREBY ORDERED that: 22 1. Plaintiff may serve AT&T U-Verse with a Rule 45 subpoena commanding the 23 ISP to provide Plaintiff with the true name and address of the subscriber assigned 24 the IP address 99.74.219.118. Plaintiff may not subpoena additional information 25
26 27 3 Exhibit A is a chart containing United States Copyright Office registration information. In its Complaint, Plaintiff states that it “owns the copyrights to the Works and the Works 28 1 about the subscriber and Plaintiff may only use the disclosed information to 2 protect its copyrights in pursing this litigation. 3 2. Plaintiff shall attach a copy of this Order to any Rule 45 subpoena issued pursuant 4 to this Order and the ISP must also provide a copy of this Order along with the 5 required notice to the subscriber whose identify is sought. 6 3. Within fourteen (14) calendar days after the service of the subpoena, the ISP 7 shall notify the subscriber that its identity has been subpoenaed by Plaintiff. 8 4. The subscriber whose identity has been subpoenaed shall have thirty (30) 9 calendar days from the date of such notice to seek a protective order or challenge 10 the disclosure by filing an appropriate pleading with this Court contesting the 11 subpoena. The subscriber may proceed anonymously as a Doe Defendant until 12 the Court orders otherwise.* 13 5. If the ISP wishes to move to quash the subpoena, it shall do so before the return 14 date of the subpoena. The return date of the subpoena must allow for forty-five 15 (45) calendar days from service to production. If a motion to quash or other 16 customer challenge is brought, the ISP shall preserve the information sought by 17 Plaintiff in the subpoena pending resolution of such motion or challenge. 18 19 Dated: February 24, 2021 p / / 20 on. Bernard G. Skomal 21 United States Magistrate Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 * Plaintiff's Ex Parte Application specifically states that Plaintiff is not opposed and “in fact welcomes” allowing Defendant to proceed anonymously. (ECF No. 4-1 at 18.)