Strickler v. McElroy

45 Pa. Super. 165, 1911 Pa. Super. LEXIS 16
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 3, 1911
DocketAppeal, No. 29
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 45 Pa. Super. 165 (Strickler v. McElroy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Strickler v. McElroy, 45 Pa. Super. 165, 1911 Pa. Super. LEXIS 16 (Pa. Ct. App. 1911).

Opinion

Opinion bt

Henderson, J.,

The Wrightsville Hardware Company was a Pennsylvania corporation the capital stock of which was originally $5,000 divided into 500 shares. In February, 1892, the stockholders authorized an increase of the capital by an addition of 2,000 shares of the par value of $10.00 each. All of this increase of stock was issued prior to March 12, 1901, except 172 shares. Just when the shares were so [169]*169issued does not appear from the evidence but it was presumably soon after the increase was authorized. About March 12, 1901, the directors of the company entered into an arrangement among themselves in which they agreed to issue the 172 shares and divide it among themselves at the par value of the stock and on that day a resolution was accordingly passed at a meeting of the board directing that certificates for the stock be issued in the proportions agreed upon. The certificates were delivered April 2, 1901, to the members of the board to whom they were allotted and a check of one of them for $1,720 was paid into the treasury for the stock. This action was taken without notice from the board of the intention to issue the shares and without an opportunity after the adoption of the resolution to any other stockholders to take stock by right of preemption or by purchase. The evidence tends to show that at this time the stock was worth more than $30.00 per share and it was' sold by the respective owners in 1906 for $40,00 per share, dividends having been paid thereon in the meantime to the amount of $3.50 on each share. The plaintiff was at that time the owner of 152 shares of the stock of the company and this action was brought to recover his proportion of the profit derived by the defendants from the sale of the stock to themselves. To support his claim he relies on the generally accepted principle relating to the administration of the business of a corporation that where the capital stock is increased and is about to be issued every existing stockholder then has the right to subscribe át par for such a proportion of the stock to be issued as his holdings bear to the amount of stock then outstanding. The rule is thus stated by some of the text writers: “If the capital stock is increased by the proper authorities the right to take the additional shares vests in the stockholders pro rata: ” Taylor on Corporations, sec. 569 (5th ed.). “When the capital stock of a corporation is increased by the issue of new shares, each holder of the original stock has a right to offer to subscribe for and demand from the corporation such a proportion of [170]*170the new stock as the number of shares already owned by bim bears to the whole number of shares before the increase: ” 1 Cook on Corporations sec. 286 (6th ed.). And this applies to such part of the original capital stock as is issued long after business is commenced by the company. “Those who are shareholders when an increase of the capital stock is effected enjoy a right to subscribe to the new stock in proportion to their shares and before subscriptions may be received from outsiders: ” 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 853. This principle was recognized in Reese v. Bank of Montgomery County, 31 Pa. 78, and applied in Morris v. Stevens, 178 Pa. 563 and Electric Company v. Electric Company, 200 Pa. 516. We do not understand that the appellants controvert the doctrine thus set forth. They present four grounds of defense on which they rely for relief from the judgment of the court below. The first is that the capital stock was increased in February, 1892, and that the plaintiff did not prove that he was at that time a stockholder. It did appear from the evidence, however, that he was the owner of 152 shares at the time when the defendants allotted the stock to themselves. The increasé authorized by the stockholders in February, 1892, was 2,000 shares, but of this authorized issue the 172 shares remained in the corporation until the directors by their action on March 12, 1901, divided it among themselves. Up to this time there was not an actual increase of the capital stock as to these shares. There was merely the right to issue; a franchise then existing in the corporation. The shares became stock of the company when they were regularly issued. The statement of the right of preemption given by Chief Justice Sterrett in Morris v. Stevens, 178 Pa. 563, is “In general the present holders of stock have a primary right to subscribe in proportion to their holdings for any new issue.” This indicates that the persons entitled to participate in the distribution of the new stock are those who are stockholders at the time the stock actually goes out and this would cover the plaintiff’s case. He was a stockholder and had been for a long time before the last [171]*171issue was made. But the plaintiff is not driven to the necessity of showing that he was a stockholder at the time the increase of the capital stock was authorized, for the directors were trustees of all of the stockholders and were bound by legal and moral obligation to manage the business of the company with a view to advance the interests of such shareholders and were forbidden by the same obligation to derive personal profit by the exercise of their authority as directors. They are presumed to have better understood the financial condition of the company than their coshareholders because they were actively engaged in its management and if, as seems to be proved, the stock was worth three or four times the price at which they took it themselves it would be a manifest wrong to the other shareholders to permit such disposal of the stock. When by reason of the prosperity of the company or the prospect of an advantageous sale of all the stock to another company there was a greatly increased value of the shares the directors could not issue and appropriate to themselves the unsubscribed stock at a price greatly below its known value. The stock when issued became a charge against the company and it was the right of the plaintiff to insist that if it was not to be equitably divided under the right of preemption it should be disposed of at its market value. The directors owned a majority of the stock of the corporation and thereby controlled it and however well intended may have been their action the law forbids that they should take advantage of the power which they had to elect themselves directors and issue stock to themselves at a price greatly below its value.

But, say the defendants, the right to subscribe for any part of the unissued stock was waived by the stockholders because in their action authorizing the increase of stock in February, 1892, a resolution was passed providing that the stock that day authorized and remaining undisposed of should issue thereafter upon such terms and in such manner as the board of directors might direct. This resolution was evidently intended to give the di[172]*172rectors power to sell to persons not then stockholders as much of the stock as was not subscribed for by the then existing stockholders, but it cannot be presumed that it was the intention of the stockholders that if by reason of changed conditions nine years afterward the stock became worth three or four times as much as it was in 1892 the directors were by this resolution empowered to take the unissued shares themselves at par. The resolution of the stockholders was passed with the implied understanding that the directors would dispose of the stock in the interest of the corporation and not for their individual advantage.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
45 Pa. Super. 165, 1911 Pa. Super. LEXIS 16, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/strickler-v-mcelroy-pasuperct-1911.