Strickland v. O'Malley

District Court, S.D. California·Decided April 25, 2025·No. 3:24-cv-01057·Unknown

Opinion

CURTIS RYAN S., Case No.: 24-CV-1057-W-KSC

Plaintiff, REPORT & RECOMMENDATION v. TO REMAND CASE FOR FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS LELAND DUDEK, Acting Commissioner

of Social Security1, DOC. NOS. 9, 11-12 Defendant.

Plaintiff Curtis Ryan S. seeks review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of disability benefits. Doc. No. 1. The parties have filed briefs for review of the denial. Doc. Nos. 9, 11-12. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS the denial be REVERSED IN PART and AFFIRMED IN PART and the case be REMANDED for further proceedings. / / / / 1 Leland Dudek became Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 19, 2025, On September 15, 2021, plaintiff, a male who was then forty-four years of age, applied for disability insurance benefits claiming disability beginning September 1, 2020. AR 192–93.2 The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied plaintiff’s claim and denied reconsideration. AR 100–05, 107–12. Plaintiff requested a hearing, which an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held on April 25, 2023. AR 35–60, 113–14. On September 28, 2023, the ALJ issued a decision finding plaintiff not disabled. AR 18–34. The Appeals Counsel denied plaintiff’s request for review on May 1, 2024. AR 1–6. Plaintiff then filed this case. Doc. No. 1. The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). At step one, the ALJ found plaintiff had “not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 1, 2020.” AR 23. At step two, the ALJ found the following severe medically determinable impairments: “nonalcoholic steatohepatitis (NASH) with cirrhosis; type II diabetes mellitus with chronic kidney disease; peripheral vascular disease; hypertension; hyperlipidemia; degenerative joint disease of the bilateral knees; and obesity.” AR 23. The ALJ then found plaintiff’s “history of other multiple medical problems, including peripheral venous insufficiency and vitamin D insufficiency” were not severe impairments. AR 24. At step three, the ALJ found plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of those in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. AR 24–25. 2 “AR” refers to the Administrative Record lodged on August 19, 2024. Doc. No. 6. The Court’s citations to the AR use the page references on the original document rather than the page numbers designated by the Court’s case management/electronic case filing system (“CM/ECF”). For all other documents, the Court’s citations are to the page numbers Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with the following limitations: [plaintiff] can lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; can stand and/or walk for 4 hours in an 8 hour workday; can sit for 6 hours in an 8 hour workday; must use a handheld assistive device for ambulation; can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and stairs; and must avoid even moderate exposure to workplace hazards, such as dangerous machinery and unprotected heights. AR 25 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b)). At step four, the ALJ found plaintiff “is capable of performing past relevant work as a Dispatcher, Bus and Trolley” and concluded plaintiff was not disabled. AR 30. The ALJ, therefore, did not proceed to step five. Id. The Court reviews the ALJ’s decision to determine whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standards and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted), superseded by regulation on other grounds as stated in Thomas v. Saul, 830 Fed. App’s 196, 198 (9th Cir. 2020). It is “more than a mere scintilla but, less than a preponderance . . . .” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007)). The Court “must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). The Court may not impose its own reasoning to affirm the ALJ’s decision. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010. “[I]f evidence exists to support more than one rational interpretation, [then the Court] must defer to the [SSA]’s decision.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Morgan v. Comm’r of the SSA, 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court will not reverse the ALJ's decision if any error is harmless. Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1173 (2015) (“ALJ errors in social security cases are harmless if they are inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination and . . . a reviewing court cannot consider [an] error harmless unless it can confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ . . . could have reached a different disability determination.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Plaintiff contends the ALJ committed two errors: (1) not providing “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for discounting plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony; and (2) not “properly evaluat[ing] the examining medical source opinion of the consultative internal medicine doctor, Vakas Dial, M.D.” Doc. No. 9 at 3, 10. The Court addresses these claimed errors in turn. A. The ALJ Erred in Evaluating Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom Testimony Plaintiff argues the ALJ “failed to provide specific, clear and convincing reasons” for discounting plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. Doc. No. 9 at 3. The Court agrees the ALJ’s decision does not meet the applicable legal standards. Evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony requires a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Second, “[i]f the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of the symptoms if she gives specific, clear and convincing reasons for the rejection.” Id. (internal quotation omitted); see also Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[U]nless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering based on affirmative evidence thereof, he or she may only find an applicant not credible by making spec

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Strickland v. O'Malley, (S.D. Cal. 2025).

Strickland v. O'Malley (Strickland v. O'Malley) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

United States v. Guerra-Garcia
336 F.3d 19 (First Circuit, 2003)
United States v. Malouf
466 F.3d 21 (First Circuit, 2006)
Francisco Sanchez v. Esso Standard Oil Co.
572 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2009)
Molina v. Astrue
674 F.3d 1104 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Lingenfelter v. Astrue
504 F.3d 1028 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Vasquez v. Astrue
572 F.3d 586 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Karen Garrison v. Carolyn W. Colvin
759 F.3d 995 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Jasim Ghanim v. Carolyn W. Colvin
763 F.3d 1154 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Naomi Marsh v. Carolyn Colvin
792 F.3d 1170 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Kim Brown-Hunter v. Carolyn W. Colvin
806 F.3d 487 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Reddick v. Chater
157 F.3d 715 (Ninth Circuit, 1998)
Trevizo v. Berryhill
871 F.3d 664 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)