Strickland v. Lambert

109 So. 2d 664, 268 Ala. 580, 1959 Ala. LEXIS 371
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedFebruary 19, 1959
Docket8 Div. 938
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 109 So. 2d 664 (Strickland v. Lambert) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Strickland v. Lambert, 109 So. 2d 664, 268 Ala. 580, 1959 Ala. LEXIS 371 (Ala. 1959).

Opinion

COLEMAN, Justice.

Appellee, complainant below, filed bill of complaint seeking to abate an alleged nuisance consisting of the raising and keeping of chickens by appellants, respondents below, as described in the bill. From decree overruling demurrer, the respondents appeal.

Appellants argue only one proposition, to wit, that if the conduct alleged constitutes a nuisance at all, it is a public nuisance, not a private one, and that the trial court erred in overruling those grounds of *582 demurrer taking the point that the hill fails to allege that complainant has suffered from the alleged nuisance a special injury, real and distinct from that suffered by the public, and, therefore, under §§ 1084, 1086, Title 7, Code 1940, complainant is not entitled to maintain this suit.

Sections 1084 and 1086 recite as follows:

“§ 1084. Nuisances are either public or private. A public nuisance is one which damages all persons who come within the sphere of its operation, though it may vary in its effects on individuals. A private nuisance is one limited in its injurious effects to one or a few individuals. Generally, a public nuisance gives no right of action to any individual, but must be abated by a process instituted in the name of the state. A private nuisance gives a right of action to the person injured.”
“§ 1086. If, however, a public nuisance causes a special damage to an individual, in which the public do not participate, such special damage gives a right of action.”

This court has said:

“ * * * Generally a public nuisance gives no right of action to an individual, but must be abated by process instituted in the name of the state. An individual complaining of a public nuisance must show some special injury to himself different from the common injury to the public. (Citations omitted.)” Scruggs v. Beason, 246 Ala. 405, 407, 20 So.2d 774, 775;

and also:

“It is established in this jurisdiction that equity may abate a public nuisance, and that a private person can maintain a bill for abatement of such nuisance when it is shown that such party has suffered a special injury therefrom, which is real and distinct from that suffered by him in common with the public at large, and is so continuous in nature that the legal remedy for damages would be inadequate. (Citations omitted.)” Hanna v. Harman, 230 Ala. 620, 621, 162 So. 109.

We think the allegations of the instant bill establish a private nuisance or a public one from which complainant suffers a special injury different in kind from that suffered by the public generally.

The bill alleges that complainant and respondents both own their respective dwelling houses situated in the City of Florence in an area zoned “B” residential; that complainant’s home is located on the south side of Henson Drive, a public road, and that respondents’ home is located on the north' side of said Drive facing the complainant; that respondents raise and keep chickens on their aforesaid premises; “That Complainant, in the summer of 1955, inspected the premises of the Respondents and discovered that Respondents allowed the manure droppings from the thousands of chickens to accumulate and stand for days and weeks at a time; that the Respondents did negligently allow water to mix with said chickens’ droppings and manure therefore making convenient breeding places for the said flies; that the said chicken droppings became several feet high before the Respondents would remove the same; that Respondents failed to spray or use any other proper preventive to abate the odor and said flies; and that Respondents on occasions would leave dead chickens lying about their premises and would burn chicken feathers on their said premises”; that in the summer of 1955, the odors from the poultry plant were manifest and permeated the entire area around complainant’s home; that: “In fact the odors became so strong that it became impossible for the Complainant and his family to properly enjoy their meals, and they had periods of nausea and sickness due to said odors. The odors so increased during the summer of 1955 that Complainant could not use and enjoy his back yard, and his children could not play in said *583 yard for any appreciable length of time, because of the said odors. The Complainant was prevented from having guest(s) and friends to his house because of said odors; that the presence of flies soon became intolerable; that great swarms of flies stayed in and about the complainant’s home and yards, and it was humiliating and embarrassing to the Complainant in attempting to entertain friends because of the presence of the flies and the said odor; that not only was there the odor of the manure and droppings of said chickens, but this was mingled with the odor of dead chickens and burnt feathers; that the flies present were not only the ordinary house flies, but larger and ‘green colored’ or ‘blow flies’ which stayed continually on the Complainant’s premises; that this condition has become increasingly worse, both in the summer of 1956 and in the summer of 1957. * * “That the Complainant in the summer of 1955 did complain to the Respondents about the condition of their premises, and Respondents refused to do anything about it. The Complainant and several of his neighbors did thereupon complain to the commissioners of the City of Florence, and to the Health Officials of Lauderdale County, and the said Commissioners did thereupon conduct a hearing in the City Hall of Florence in the summer of 1955 with the Respondents and the Complainant and several of the complaining neighbors in the neighborhood attending. At said hearing the Respondents did promise to spray and take the other necessary preventive measures to abate the odor and the presence of flies; however, the Respondents have not kept their promise in this regard, and have done nothing to abate the odor and the presence of said flies; that on numerous occasions since the summer of 1955 the health authorities of Lauderdale County, Alabama have visited the premises of the Respondents, and Respondents have promised on each occasion to take the proper measures to abate the odor and the said flies, and Respondents have further promised that they were going to move their chickens to a rural area near Cloverdale, Alabama, but the Respondents have failed and refused to carry out these promises. * * * ”

With respect to a poultry production operation in the City of Tuscaloosa, this court said:

“ * * * While the brooders described in the bill do not constitute a nuisance per se, they do constitute a nuisance when located and maintained and operated in the manner with the resultant effects alleged in the bill, interfering with the comfortable enjoyment of the property of others in the surrounding area. (Citations omitted.) The situation as alleged in the bill is not one which would affect only one of fastidious taste, but is such as would affect an ordinary reasonable man, and is accordingly a nuisance as described by § 1081. McClung v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 255 Ala. 302, 51 So.2d 371. But as pointed out, we need not limit the definition of a nuisance to the statutory definition contained in § 1081. Authorities, supra.” Duncan v. City of Tuscaloosa, 257 Ala. 574, 578, 60 So.2d 438, 441.

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Bluebook (online)
109 So. 2d 664, 268 Ala. 580, 1959 Ala. LEXIS 371, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/strickland-v-lambert-ala-1959.