Strickland v. Dobbs

Court of Appeals of Texas

Strickland v. Dobbs

200 S.W. 1125, 1918 Tex. App. LEXIS 94

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas

DecidedJanuary 24, 1918

DocketNo. 1886.

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 200 S.W. 1125 (Strickland v. Dobbs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Strickland v. Dobbs, 200 S.W. 1125, 1918 Tex. App. LEXIS 94 (Tex. Ct. App. 1918).

Pincite

Opinion

WILLSON, O. J.

(after stating the facts as above). The contention that the mortgage to secure the payment of the purchase price of the furniture was void because it was not signed and acknowledged by appellant’s wife is predicated upon section 11 of Act March 1, 1915 (General Laws, p. 48 [Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918, art. 6171 j]), known as the “Loan Brokers’ Law.” If that act applies to mortgages to persons not engaged, and appellee was not, in the business of lending money on interest, it nevertheless did not apply to the mortgage in question. The statute was intended to apply only to arcase where the husband, owning household or kitchen furniture, undertakes to mortgage it to secure the repayment of money loaned to him. In that kind of a case a mortgage by the husband is, by the terms of the act, void unless signed and acknowledged by the wife. The mortgage to appellee was not to secure a loan. It was to secure the payment of the purchase money of the identical property it covered.

The judgment is affirmed.

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WILLSON, O. J.

(after stating the facts as above). The contention that the mortgage to secure the payment of the purchase price of the furniture was void because it was not signed and acknowledged by appellant’s wife is predicated upon section 11 of Act March 1, 1915 (General Laws, p. 48 [Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918, art. 6171 j]), known as the “Loan Brokers’ Law.” If that act applies to mortgages to persons not engaged, and appellee was not, in the business of lending money on interest, it nevertheless did not apply to the mortgage in question. The statute was intended to apply only to arcase where the husband, owning household or kitchen furniture, undertakes to mortgage it to secure the repayment of money loaned to him. In that kind of a case a mortgage by the husband is, by the terms of the act, void unless signed and acknowledged by the wife. The mortgage to appellee was not to secure a loan. It was to secure the payment of the purchase money of the identical property it covered.

The judgment is affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

200 S.W. 1125, 1918 Tex. App. LEXIS 94, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/strickland-v-dobbs-texapp-1918.

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