J-A14043-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
STREAMLINE SOLUTIONS, LLC, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF STREAMLINE CONSTRUCTION : PENNSYLVANIA MANAGEMENT, LLC, STREAMLINE : GROUP, LLC, US CAPITAL : INVESTMENTS 7, LLC, LION : CONSTRUCTION, LLC, AND MICHAEL : STILLWELL : : Appellants : No. 2229 EDA 2024 : : v. : : : STUART GREEN AND MICHAEL : TRUMBO :
Appeal from the Order Entered August 19, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 230400946
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 4, 2025
Five corporate entities—Streamline Solutions, LLC; Streamline
Construction Management, LLC; Streamline Group, LLC; US Capital
Investments 7, LLC; and Lion Construction, LLC (collectively, the “Streamline
Entities”)—and Michael Stillwell (“Stillwell,” and together with the Streamline
Entities, “Appellants”) appeal from the order1 that, inter alia, sanctions ____________________________________________
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The order is dated August 14, 2024, and filed August 16, 2024. Nevertheless,
the docket notation, reflecting notice pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 236(b), was made on August 19, 2024. Therefore, the date of the (Footnote Continued Next Page) J-A14043-25
Appellants for discovery violations, requiring them to pay Stuart Green and
Michael Trumbo’s (together, “Buyers”) counsel fees in the amount of
$17,495.00. Appellants contend that the trial court abused its discretion in
sanctioning them without adducing any evidence and further abused its
discretion by denying them due process. We affirm.
As recounted by the trial court:
Buyers purchased a house [on] South Darien Street in Philadelphia on or around October 15, 2018. The house had been marketed, developed, constructed, warrantied, and sold by various entities owned by [] Stillwell and marketed under the “Streamline” brand.
After the house developed leaks, Buyers initiated an [American Arbitration Association] arbitration pursuant to the terms of the agreement of sale. An arbitration hearing took place over four days in December 2022. On January 27, 2023, the arbitrator entered a partial award in favor of Buyers, which was followed by a final award on March 8, 2023. The final award totaled $503,146.25 (the “Award”), and the arbitrator indicated that Buyers could recover from [both the Streamline Entities and Stillwell, who were jointly and severally liable].
On April 6, 2023, [Appellants] filed a petition to vacate or modify the Award in [the trial c]ourt, which Buyers answered on May 5, 2023. On June 20, 2023, [the trial c]ourt entered an order denying [Appellants’] petition and confirming the Award. On June 22, 2023, Buyers reduced the Award to a judgment. Thereafter, Buyers commenced discovery in aid of judgment execution. [Appellants have] repeatedly and consistently opposed those
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order for purposes of this appeal is August 19, 2024. See Pa.R.A.P. 108(b) (establishing that the date of entry of an order is the day on which the clerk makes the notation in the docket that Rule 236(b) notice was given). We have amended the caption accordingly.
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efforts.[2]
On December 5, 2023, [the trial c]ourt, in response to Buyers’ first motion to compel, ordered [Appellants] to provide complete answers and responses to [i]nterrogatories and [r]equests for [p]roduction of [d]ocuments. Buyers sought information related to the web of interconnected entities controlled by [] Stillwell. The [o]rder included an itemized list of categories of information and documents [Appellants] had to produce within [twenty] days of the [o]rder. The order deferred ruling on Buyers’ request for sanctions.
Buyers filed a second motion to compel and for sanctions on January 17, 2024, arguing that [Appellants] had failed to comply with [the trial c]ourt’s [o]rder. On June 21, 2024, [the trial c]ourt entered an [o]rder granting the motion, in part, and ordering [Appellants] to provide the requested information and documents within [seven] days. The [trial c]ourt scheduled a status hearing for July 9, 2024. In an [o]rder entered on July 12, 2024, the [trial c]ourt ordered [] Stillwell to sit for a deposition so that Buyers’ counsel could confirm whether there was any outstanding remaining discovery that was within [Appellants’] control, but had not been previously produced in response to [the trial c]ourt’s orders. The [trial c]ourt scheduled a hearing on Buyers’ request for sanctions for August 13, 2024, to coincide with the expected completion of [] Stillwell’s deposition.
At the August 13 sanctions hearing, counsel for Buyers represented that the testimony elicited at [] Stillwell’s deposition confirmed that there were items from the [trial c]ourt’s previous [o]rders that had still not been produced. Rather than rebutting Buyers’ representations, counsel for [Appellants] argued that the transcript from the deposition “ha[d] not been certified by the court reporter” and therefore could not “be used in th[e sanctions] proceeding.” The [trial c]ourt noted that counsel for Buyers could ____________________________________________
2 At or around the time Buyers commenced judgment execution proceedings,
Appellants appealed from the trial court’s June 20, 2023 order. Ultimately, on August 30, 2024, this Court affirmed the trial court’s order, which itself confirmed the arbitration award in Buyers’ favor. See Streamline Solutions, LLC v. Green, 2024 WL 4003288 (Pa. Super., filed Aug. 30, 2024) (unpublished memorandum).
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not unhear what she heard [] Stillwell testify to at the deposition, regardless of whether the transcript had been certified by the court reporter. The [trial c]ourt concluded that [Appellants] had failed to fully comply with [the trial c]ourt’s prior discovery [o]rders.
As a result, the [trial c]ourt made a preliminary finding that [Appellants were] obligated to reimburse Buyers for attorney’s fees and costs Buyers incurred due to [Appellants’] repeated failures to comply with prior discovery requests and court orders. Buyers were prepared to present testimony and evidence in support of their sanction request. Counsel for [Appellants], however, did not object to the amount sought by Buyers, which totaled $17,495.00. On August 14, 2024, [the trial c]ourt entered an [o]rder compelling [Appellants] to produce documents, which [Appellants], to date, had still not produced, and sanctioning [Appellants] in the amount of $17,495.50.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/9/24, 2-4 (record citations omitted).
Appellants timely appealed the sanctions order 3 and complied with
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). On appeal, they present
two issues for review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by sanctioning them for alleged discovery violations without any evidence-based factual findings supporting the sanctions award?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying them due process?
Appellants’ Brief, 5.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 3117(a) provides that a plaintiff “at
3 See Kine v. Forman, 194 A.2d 175, 177 n.2 (Pa. 1963) (indicating that sanctions for failure to comply with post-judgment discovery results in an appealable order).
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any time after judgment, before or after the issuance of a writ of execution,
may, for the purpose of discovery of assets of the defendant, take the
testimony of any person, including a defendant or a garnishee, upon oral
examination or written interrogatories as provided by the rules relating to
Depositions and Discovery.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 3117(a). To that point, our rules allow
for discovery “regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action[.]” Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.1(a).
To manage the flow of sought-after information, “[t]he trial court is
responsible for overseeing discovery between the parties[,] and therefore[,]
it is within that court’s discretion to determine the appropriate measures
necessary to insure adequate and prompt discovery of matters allowed by the
Rules of Civil Procedure.” Rohm and Haas Co. v. Lin, 992 A.2d 132, 143
(Pa. Super. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Sanctions
may be ordered, inter alia, when “a party or person otherwise fails to make
discovery or to obey an order of court respecting discovery.” Pa.R.Civ.P.
4019(a)(1)(viii).
In ascertaining the appropriateness of sanctions, “[g]enerally,
imposition of sanctions for a party’s failure to comply with discovery is subject
to the discretion of the trial court, as is the severity of the sanctions imposed.”
Lin, 992 A.2d at 142. “Discovery rulings are uniquely within the discretion of
the trial judge[] and will not be reversed unless they are deemed to represent
an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 143 (citation and internal quotation marks
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omitted); see also Christian v. Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility
Assigned Claims Plan, 686 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 1996) (“It is well-settled
that the specific sanctions imposed under Pa.R.C[iv].P. 4019 for violation of
discovery rules are left to the sole discretion of the trial court.”). On appellate
review,
the standard of review governing this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in [ordering sanctions]. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment. It requires a showing of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, ill-will, or such lack of support as to be clearly erroneous. Under this standard, the party challenging the trial court’s discretion on appeal bears a heavy burden.
Christian, 686 A.2d at 5 (citations omitted).
The court justified its imposition of sanctions as follows:
In response to Buyers’ first motion to compel, [the trial c]ourt ordered [Appellants] to produce discovery itemized in the December 5, 2023 [o]rder. [Appellants] did not do so, which prompted Buyers to file a second motion to compel, which [the trial c]ourt granted on June 21, 2024. The [c]ourt then scheduled a status hearing. At the July 9, 2024 hearing, in response to the representation from counsel for Buyers that [Appellants’] discovery remained incomplete and deficient, [the trial c]ourt ordered the deposition of [] Stillwell. At the August 13 hearing, which occurred after [] Stillwell’s deposition, counsel for Buyers confirmed that [Appellants’] discovery remained incomplete.
At no time did [Appellants] dispute that its discovery remained incomplete. Instead, [Appellants’] counsel offered a panoply of excuses bordering on the ridiculous, as exemplified by [Appellants’] counsel’s contention at the hearing that Buyers could not rely on [] Stillwell’s deposition transcript because the transcript had not yet been certified by the court reporter.
In all, [the trial c]ourt held three hearings related to these issues. Counsel for Buyers has consistently requested the discovery to which it is entitled, and [Appellants have] consistently failed to
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comply. [Appellants’] conduct has necessitated excessive litigation practice by Buyers. Moreover, [Appellants’] failure to comply cannot be viewed in a vacuum. As the Buyers pressed for discovery in 2023 and 2024, [Appellants have] repeatedly filed motions and appeals related to the underlying arbitration. Buyers have repeatedly had to expend time and resources responding to [Appellants’] filings. While [Appellants are] entitled to avail [themselves] of the rules of civil and appellate procedure, [Appellants’] conduct, when viewed globally, represents a concerted effort to delay and avoid the consequences of the arbitration award and judgment entered against it. [Appellants’] obdurate and vexatious conduct with respect to the discovery sought by Buyers is consistent with [Appellants’] course of conduct since it filed the petition to vacate.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/9/24, at 5-6.4
Appellants’ first and second issues essentially argue the same point: the
trial court erred by not conducting an evidentiary hearing to ascertain the
appropriateness of sanctions. See Appellants’ Brief, 12 (the sanctions order
was entered “without an evidentiary hearing, without any testimony of any
kind, without the cross-examination of witnesses, and without considering any
evidence proffered in [c]ourt[]”); id. at 14 (stating, almost verbatim from the
first argument section, that the court ordered sanctions “without conducting
a meaningful hearing, without testimony of any kind, without allowing for the
cross-examination of witnesses, and without considering any evidence[]”).
4 The trial court also wrote, inter alia, that Appellants did not object to the sanctions amount. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/9/24, 6-7, citing N.T. Sanctions Argument II, 8/13/24, 28. Nevertheless, Appellants claim that the court-imposed sanctions without conducting a hearing or relying on evidentiary support, irrespective of the amount.
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Appellants claim that, because a hearing was never held, the court did
not, nor could it, rely on “any admissible evidence” to support entry of its
sanctions order. Id. at 9. Appellants maintain that to the extent there was
any reliance by the court on Stillwell’s depositional testimony, such reliance is
misplaced because, under Rule 4017(c), he was permitted to review the
deposition’s transcript within thirty days of it being taken and further had the
ability to make “changes in form or substance” so long as he provided “a
statement of the reasons given . . . for making the changes.” Pa.R.Civ.P.
4017(c) (further indicating that if a deponent does not affirm contents of the
transcript, it may be used, under the circumstances defined by the rule, “as
fully as though signed”). When argument was held on August 13, 2024, it was
still within that thirty-day window. See Appellants’ Brief, 10 n.1; Pa.R.Civ.P.
4017(c). Nevertheless, in Appellants’ summation, the court proceeded to
order sanctions notwithstanding the dearth of admissible evidence and
Appellants’ on-the-record requests “to question witnesses” and “be heard.”
Appellants’ Brief, at 14, citing statements of Appellants’ counsel at the July
9, 2024 and August 13, 2024 argument sessions.
As best as can be discerned, Appellants’ argument is actually two-fold:
(1) the court never held a hearing to determine the appropriateness of
sanctions; however, (2) if the August 13, 2024 argument session is construed
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as a hearing, no admissible evidence was submitted or considered. 5
Appellants cite several cases in support of their underlying proposition,
all of which are distinguishable. In Springer v. George, 170 A.2d 367, 369
(Pa. 1961), although our Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s “refus[al] to admit into evidence the depositions of two out-of-
state witnesses offered in defense” because they were not signed in
accordance with Rule 4017(c), the “more important” conclusion was that the
content of such depositions was substantively “inadmissible.” 170 A.2d at 369.
Nevertheless, unlike the present matter, Springer deals with the admissibility
of depositions at trial rather than sanctions stemming from post-judgment
discovery violations.
Appellants also cite to Christian, supra, to demonstrate that a hearing
on sanctions was necessary. See 686 A.2d at 5. However, Christian, which
required this Court to review the trial court’s denial of sanctions, distinctively
addresses pre-pleading requests for admissions under Rule 4014 that could
later become sanctionable under the plain text of Rule 4019(d)(1). See id.
Appellants additionally rely on Cove Centre, Inc. v. Westhafer
Const., Inc., 965 A.2d 259 (Pa. Super. 2009), to support their averment that
the issuance of sanctions inherently requires an evidentiary hearing and
5 The parties and court, at times, appear to use “argument” and “hearing” interchangeably.
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creation of a factual record. In Cove Centre, the appellant failed to provide
pre-trial discovery. On appellee’s motion, the resulting discovery sanction
order terminated the underlying litigation. See id. at 261. This Court reversed,
finding that entry of that order “exceed[ed] the [trial] court’s discretion under
the circumstances.” Id. at 260. As dismissal is “the most severe sanction,”
Cove Centre compels a trial court, when considering this particular outcome,
to balance the equities by “emphasizing the nature and motive of the non-
compliant party’s conduct[.]” Id. at 261-62. However, the case also suggests
that sanctions-based dismissal could have been permissible had an “argument
or evidentiary hearing” been convened for the allegedly offending party to
explain its actions. Id. at 262. Moreover, unlike here, the appellee in Cove
Centre never filed a motion to compel “so as to invoke the trial court’s
authority in the interest of advancing the litigation and minimizing delay[.]”
Id. at 263.
Lastly, the final case relied upon by Appellants, Sutch v. Roxborough
Memorial Hosp., 142 A.3d 38 (Pa. Super. 2016), deals exclusively with
monetary sanctions after a finding of civil contempt, which is inapposite to
sanctions stemming from a discovery violation.
Having reviewed these four cases, we find that Appellants have failed to
demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in ordering sanctions. Buyers
have been seeking post-judgment discovery for approximately two years. As
early as December 5, 2023, Appellants were explicitly on notice that their
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failure to comply with the court’s discovery order, which itself was issued after
Buyers’ first motion to compel discovery and oral argument, “may result in
the imposition of sanctions, upon [a] properly filed motion.” Order, 12/5/23,
2 (unpaginated); see also N.T. Motion to Compel Argument, 12/5/23, 31 (The
court: “If I entered an order compelling discovery and then [Appellants] don’t
comply, then you come back and say, [‘j]udge, motion for sanctions. They
haven’t complied.[’]”).
On June 21, 2024, the court entered an order granting Buyers’ second
motion to compel. That order, inter alia, obligated the Appellants to comply
with the previous 2023 order and further scheduled a hearing for “counsel
fees and costs[.]” Order, 6/21/24. At the subsequent hearing, Buyers’ counsel
conveyed the extent to which Appellants had not complied with discovery
requests. See, e.g., N.T. Sanctions Argument I, 7/9/24, 7-8. Nevertheless,
the court deferred ruling on sanctions at this juncture, requiring Stillwell to sit
for a deposition to create “a more complete record.” Id. at 17. On July 11,
2024, the court ordered Stillwell to appear at a deposition to answer
discovery-related questions. See Order, 7/11/24. That order also scheduled a
hearing on “the imposition of counsel fees and/or sanctions[.]” Id.
At the August 13, 2024 sanctions hearing, with Stillwell’s deposition
having taken place, Buyers’ counsel proffered to the court that there were still
documents that had not been produced that were encompassed by both orders
granting the Buyers’ motions to compel. See N.T. Sanctions Argument II,
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8/13/24, 4-5. The trial court then indicated, in its summation, that there were
two “buckets” of discoverable information:
Bucket Number 2 does not appear to be an issue today because [Buyers’] counsel is going to send [Appellants’ counsel] a new letter regarding the new stuff that they say that your client should produce, so we’re going to keep that aside.
Bucket Number 1 would be everything previously covered – everything covered in [the court’s] previous orders.
And [the court] kept telling [Buyers’ counsel], “Depose [Stillwell] first to see if they exist.” There was a question whether it exists.
Now, in what they’re telling me, it exists[,] and [Buyers’ counsel] don’t have it.
Id. at 5-6. To the extent that Appellants argued the deposition’s contents
could not be used at that argument session to identify discoverable
information, the court stated that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4020
“allows the use of a deposition transcript at trial.” Id. at 9. However, the
Buyers were “not attempting to use the deposition transcript in lieu of trial
testimony or in some similar fashion. They [were] referring to what they heard
[Stillwell] say.” Id.
Regardless of Stillwell deposition’s “usability” at the second argument
session on sanctions,6 the court found Appellants’ actions over the course of
6 We emphasize that Appellants have pointed to no relevant authority establishing that depositions, and discovery-related information gleaned therefrom, cannot be used for the limited purpose in which it had been used by the trial court, notwithstanding the deposition being less than thirty days old at the time of its use. Furthermore, and more importantly, Appellants do (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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two years to warrant reimbursement of attorney’s fees in the form of
sanctions. See id. at 27 (court concluding that Appellants’ conduct, i.e., lack
of responsiveness to discovery requests, created the condition where they
should reimburse Buyers’ counsel). We emphasize that Appellants were before
the court three times to discuss Buyers’ discovery requests. Correspondingly,
the court entered two discovery orders, putting Appellants on notice that
noncompliance thereto could result in sanctions. While Appellants have
contested the procedure employed to sanction them, they have not brought
forth any argument related to their actual adherence to, or material
compliance with, those orders. The 2023 order created the mechanism from
which Buyers could seek sanctions, a process to which they availed
themselves several times, the last of which with success. As we find the court,
on the record before it, did not abuse its discretion in determining that
sanctions were warranted given its finding of Appellants’ multi-year discovery
transgressions, we affirm the order sanctioning Appellants.
Order affirmed.
not substantively contest the Buyers’ counsel’s recollection of the deposition’s contents.
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Date: 9/4/2025
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