Strauss v. I.K.M.J. Joint LLC

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedAugust 8, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-00439
StatusUnknown

This text of Strauss v. I.K.M.J. Joint LLC (Strauss v. I.K.M.J. Joint LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Strauss v. I.K.M.J. Joint LLC, (D. Nev. 2023).

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 BRITTANY STRAUSS, et al., Case No. 2:23-cv-00439-MMD-EJY

7 Plaintiffs, ORDER v. 8 I.K.M.J. JOINT LLC d/b/a GIRL 9 COLLECTION, et al.,

10 Defendants.

11 12 I. SUMMARY 13 Plaintiffs Brittany Strauss and Jasmine Woodward sues Defendants I.K.M.J. Joint 14 LLC d/b/a Girl Collection (“Girl Collection”) and Floyd Mayweather (collectively, 15 “Defendants”) to recover unpaid wages for their previous work as exotic dancers. (ECF 16 No. 13 (“FAC”).) Before the Court is Girl Collection’s motion to remand (ECF No. 19 17 (“Motion”)).1 As further explained below, the Court denies the Motion. 18 II. BACKGROUND 19 The following allegations are adapted from the FAC (ECF No. 13). 20 Plaintiffs worked for several years as exotic dancers at Girl Collection,2 an adult 21 dance entertainment venue, in Las Vegas, Nevada. (Id. at 2.) While working for Girl 22 Collection, Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs or other dancers the minimum wages 23 24 1Plaintiffs responded (ECF No. 20), and Defendants replied (ECF No. 21). 25 Moreover, the Court grants Defendant Floyd Mayweather’s motion to join in Girl Collection’s motion to remand (ECF No. 26). See Vazquez v. Central States Joint Bd., 26 547 F. Supp. 2d 833, 867 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“It is permissible for a party to adopt the motion of another party when the facts between the parties are essentially the same and the 27 adoption would promote judicial efficiency.”) (internal citations omitted).

28 2As alleged in the FAC, Defendant Mayweather is an owner-operator of Girl Collection, where he “directs the operations of [the] business and is directly involved in 2 dancers as independent contractors rather than employees, Plaintiffs instead “receive[d] 3 compensation only in the form of gratuities from patrons . . . and only in the amounts that 4 Defendants unilaterally determine[d].” (Id. at 2, 6.) “Plaintiffs and other dancers have been 5 required to share a portion of all of their tips with the club” as well as managers and other 6 employees, such as “house moms” and disc jockeys. (Id. at 6.) Additionally, Plaintiffs must 7 pay Defendants “house fees,” which total “between $100 and $200 for every shift, 8 depending on what time they arrive.” (Id.) 9 In the FAC, Plaintiffs allege in pertinent part that Defendants have misclassified 10 exotic dancers as independent contractors and violated the Fair Labor Standards Act 11 (“FLSA”) and Nevada law by failing to pay them minimum wage and by retaining portions 12 of their tips. Plaintiffs bring these claims individually, as a putative collective action under 13 the FLSA, and as a putative class action under Nevada law. In their individual capacities, 14 Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants retaliated against them for their participation in this 15 lawsuit, in violation of both the FLSA and Nevada law. (Id. at 7-10.) 16 III. DISCUSSION 17 A. Motion to Remand 18 Girl Collection titles its Motion as a “motion to remand to state court” and “requests 19 that this matter be remanded to the Nevada State Court” as contractually required. (ECF 20 No. 19 at 1, 3, 6.) However, as Plaintiffs point out, it is unclear whether Girl Collection 21 seeks a remedy of remand or transfer through its Motion. (ECF No. 20 at 2, 6-7.) Girl 22 Collection in gist wants to litigate this action in the Eighth Judicial District Court in and for 23 the County of Clark (“State Court”), citing a forum-selection clause within the independent 24 contractor agreements (“ICA”) signed by Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 19 at 5-6.) 25 In any event, the Court denies the Motion to the extent Girl Collection seeks 26 remand to state court. This case did not originate in State Court and was never removed 27 to this Court. Remand is not an available remedy here because there is nowhere to “send 28 back” this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(a); see also Wittner v. Banner Health, 720 F.3d 2 removed to federal court, it cannot be ‘remanded’—only cases that have been removed 3 from a given court can be remanded to that court.”). 4 B. Transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 5 Girl Collection also appears to seek transfer of this case under 28 U.S.C. § 6 1404(a)—a remedy that, they argue, the ICA forum-selection clause requires. (ECF No. 7 19 at 4-6.) Plaintiffs argue that transfer is not appropriate here because Section 1404(a) 8 “applies only to a transfer between two federal courts, not from federal court to state 9 court.” (ECF No. 20 at 6 n.5.) The Court agrees with Plaintiffs. 10 Section 1404(a) “provides a mechanism for enforcement of forum-selection 11 clauses that point to a particular federal district.” Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. 12 Ct. for W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 59 (2013) (emphasis added). On the other hand, “the 13 appropriate way to enforce a forum-selection clause pointing to a state or foreign forum 14 is through the doctrine of forum non conveniens.” Id. at 60 (“Section 1404(a) is merely a 15 codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens for the subset of cases in which the 16 transferee forum is within the federal court system; in such cases, Congress has replaced 17 the traditional remedy of outright dismissal with transfer.”) (internal citations omitted); see 18 also Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Co., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007) 19 (recognizing in pertinent part that the forum non conveniens doctrine applies “perhaps in 20 rare instances where a state or territorial court serves litigational convenience best”) 21 (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court denies the Motion to the extent Girl 22 Collection seeks transfer of this action to State Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 23 C. New Arguments Raised in Girl Collection’s Reply Brief 24 After Plaintiffs note Girl Collection’s procedural errors, Girl Collection replies by 25 arguing that instead of remand or transfer, it seeks dismissal of this action on forum non 26 conveniens grounds. (ECF No. 21 at 3-4.) 27 The Court, however, will disregard Girl Collection’s reply brief arguments to the 28 extent it urges dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds—in line with the Ninth Circuit’s 1 || “general rule” that parties “cannot raise a new issue for the first time in their reply briefs.” 2 || Eberle v. City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citation and 3 || quotation marks omitted); Pacquiao v. Mayweather, Case No. 2:09-cv-2448-LRH-RJJ, 4 || 2010 WL 3271961, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 13, 2010) (“[T]o the extent that a party raises a 5 || new argument or proffers new evidence and information in a reply brief, that argument or 6 || evidence is improper because the opposing party is deprived of an opportunity to 7 || respond.”) (citing Tovar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 3 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993)). The 8 || Court therefore disregards sections II and III of Girl Collection’s reply brief. (ECF No.

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