Straughn v. Berry

1937 OK 165, 65 P.2d 1203, 179 Okla. 364, 1937 Okla. LEXIS 277
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedMarch 9, 1937
DocketNo. 27378.
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 1937 OK 165 (Straughn v. Berry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Straughn v. Berry, 1937 OK 165, 65 P.2d 1203, 179 Okla. 364, 1937 Okla. LEXIS 277 (Okla. 1937).

Opinion

OSBORN, O. J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court of Payne county wherein the court ordered Harold W. Straughn, county treasurer of Payne county, hereinafter referred to as defendant, to accept payment of certain delinquent special assessments ’evied and assessed against certain real property in the city of Stillwater for the year 1932 and prior years without requiring payment of interest and penalties accrued thereon. The property owners, Thomas E. Berry and Sam M. Myers, Jr., will be hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs.

The cause was tried upon a stipulation of facts. It was stipulated that plaintiffs were the owners of certain vacant unimproved city lots in the city of Stillwater, located in street improvement districts Nos. 31 and 57; that said real estate was liable for the payment of certain .special assessments lev- *365 led against it as a portion of the costs of improving the adjacent streets; that installments for the year 1934 to 1935, inclusive, were unpaid. It was further stipulated :

“That said plaintiffs desire to pay said paving assessments, together with the delinquent ad valorem taxes on said real estate, together with penalties and redemption fees as provided by law, but that said county treasurer refuses to receive payment of said special assessments unless there is also paid penalties thereon from the delinquent date thereof.
“That it is the contention of said plaintiffs that all penalties, interest and costs which have accrued on said unpaid special assessment taxes for the year 1932 and all prior years, have been waived, canceled, and released and that said special assessments for the year 1932 and all prior years, not having been paid on or before December 1, 1935, at a rate of 12% per annum as provided by section 4 of article 15 of chapter 66, Session Laws of 1935.
“It is .stipulated and • agreed by and between the parties hereto that there are outstanding and unpaid the sum of $8,347.57 in street improvement bonds assessed against street improvement district No. 57 and $1,-000 in street improvement bonds assessed against street improvement district No. 31; which bonds are now held and owned by persons unknown to the parties hereto.
“It is the contention of the county treasurer that he has no right and that it is not his duty to accept payment of special assessment taxes in those cases where there are outstanding and unpaid street improvement bonds against any paving district unless the penalty thereon is paid in full from the delinquent date of each of said installments.
“It is also stipulated and agreed by and between the parties hereto that plaintiffs have heretofore tendered to the defendant, Harold W. Straughn. county treasurer of Payne county. Okla., all of the assessments heretofore referred to the sum of $2,362.99, less penalties attached thereto, and said defendant has refused to accept payment of same.”

When the districts were created and the bonds were issued, chapter 173, Session Laws 1923, was in effect. Section 25 of said act (sec. 6236, O. S. 1931) in part provides:

“In case any installment or interest is not paid when due, the installment so matured and unpaid and the unpaid interest thereon shall draw interest at the rate of twelve per cent. (12%) per annum from maturity until paid, except as hereinafter otherwise provided. All assessments and interest, whether collected by the city or town or the county treasurer. shnl1 be paid to the city or town treasurer who shall keep the same in a separate special fund for the purpose of paying the bonds and interest coupons thereon, issued against such assessments, and after the payment of all bonds and interest thereon, any surplus remaining in said fund shall be used for the pur-. pose of repairing and maintaining any improvement for which assessments have been levied, and for no other purpose whatsoever.”

On February S, 1935, article 15, ch. 66, Session Laws 1935, became effective. Section 4 of that act provides:

“All penalties, interest and costs that have ' accrued on unpaid special assessment taxes levied and assessed for the year 1932 and all prior years are hereby waived, canceled and released. If said special assessment taxes levied and assessed for said years are not paid on or before December 1, 1935, they shall again become delinquent and bear penalty from said date at the rate now prescribed and provided by law.”

It is the contention of plaintiffs that the above-quoted section is effective to waive and release the interest and penalties accumulated upon the assessments involved herein and that it was the duty of the county treasurer to accept payment of the principal amounts due without requiring payment of said interest and penalties, while defendant contends that said section is unconstitutional.

It has been held that laws existing at the time of the issuance of municipal bonds and under the authority of which they are issued enter into and become a part of the contract in such a way that the obligation of the contract cannot thereafter be in any way impaired or its fulfil’ment hampered or obstructed by a change in the law. McGrath v. Oklahoma City, 156 Okla. 34, 9 P. (2d) 711; Nelson v. Pitts, 126 Okla. 191, 259 P. 533, 53 A. L. R. 1137; Moore v. Otis (C. C. A. 8th) 275 Fed. 747. In the case of Brown-Crummer Inv. Co. v. City of Miami, 40 F. (2d) 508, complainant, as the holder of certain special assessment bonds issued on public improvement districts by the city of Miami, Okla., sought to enforce the application of certain funds collected as interest and penalties to the payment of the bonds. The city took the position that under the provisions of section 4623, C. O. S. 1921, the penalties became the property of the city and should go to the street repair fund. In this connection the court said:

“It is the contention of counsel for the defendant that the action of the city in plac; ing the penalties accruing on street improvement bonds in the street repair fund was *366 authorized by the last above-quoted statute. This contention ignores that part of tbe statute which provides that the fund created by the collection of penalties must first be used in retiring the bonds outstanding against the improvement district. It is only where a surplus accumulates over and above the amount necessary to retire due bonds, together with legal interest, that the city may use such fund for the improvement and repair of streets. A consideration of all the applicable provisions of the various statutes clearly evidences a legislative intention to first have tbe fund arising from the collection of penalties on past-due assessments used in the retirement of the bonds, together with accrued interest, before there would Be any surplus of such fund that the law would authorize to be placed in the street repair fund. The primary purpose of the fund was, first, to retire the bonds with accrued interest for which the assessments were authorized by the Legislature to be made and such bonds issued, and, secondly, that if there exists any surplus after the retirement of such bonds, that it be used for the repair of streets.

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Bluebook (online)
1937 OK 165, 65 P.2d 1203, 179 Okla. 364, 1937 Okla. LEXIS 277, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/straughn-v-berry-okla-1937.