Strand Square, LLC v. Digby Stridiron II

Opinion

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST CROIX

STRAND SQUARE LLC PLAINTIFF, Civil No SX 2020 CV 659 v i ACTION FOR DEBT DIGBY STRIDIRON 11 I {CITE AS 2022 v1 SUPER 7J0 DEFENDANT

Appearances Samuel T Grey, Esq GRONER & GREY P C Christiansted, St Croix For Hamil)?”

Digby Stridiron 11 For Defendant Pro Se

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

WILLOCKS Presiding Judge

1} 1 THIS MATTER is before the Court sua sponte for review

BACKGROUND

1] 2 On August 5, 2020, Plaintiff Strand Square LLC (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) filed a complaint

against Defendant Digby Stridiron II (hereinafter “Defendant”) in connection with a commercial

lease agreement executed between Plaintiff as landlord and Defendant as tenant Plaintiff did not

set forth any counts in separate numbered paragraphs with separate designation of the specific

names of each count in its two page complaint but indicated in the caption that this is an action for

debt In its complaint Plaintiff alleged Inter aha, that “Defendant has defaulted in the payment of

his obligations pursuant to the Lease and “[a]fter having deducted all credits is any due to the

Defendant the sum of $22,359 02 is past due and owing as of March 1, 2020 ” (Compl ‘ 7 )

Plaintiff did not make a demand for a jury trial in this matter

Strand Square, LLC v Srrtduon SX 2020 CV 659 Memorandum Opinion and Order 2022 V1 SUPER Lb Page 2 of 6

1| 3 On November 22, 2020, Plaintiff filed a notice of service advising the Court that Defendant

was served on November 19, 2020

14 On February 1 2021 Plaintiff filed a motion for entry of default On February 5 2021

Defendant filed a letter asking the Court for more time in this matter On February 24, 2021, the

Court entered an order whereby the Court, inter alia, denied Plaintiff‘s motion for entry of default

and granted Defendant an extension of thirty days to file a response to Plaintiff’s complaint 1

1| 5 On September 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment

1| 6 As of the date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Defendant has not filed a response

to Plaintiff’s complaint

DISCUSSION

1| 7 Upon review, it has come to the Court 5 attention that this matter is within the original

jurisdiction of the Magistrate Division of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands (hereinafter

“Magistrate Division”) Section 123 of Title 4 of the Virgin Islands Code (hereinafter “Section

123”) identifies the jurisdiction and powers of the Magistrate Division, which provides, mter aha,

' 1n the February 24 2021 order the Court explained that In this instance the Court finds that Defendant has appeared and ‘otherwise defended in this matter to wit Defendant 5 February 5, 202l letter asked the Court for more time in this matter, which indicates a clear intention on Defendant’s part to defend the lawsuit on the merits See Marsh Monsanto v Clarenbach 66 V I 366 376 (V l 2017) (quoting Appleton v Harrlgan 6| V l 262 267 (V I 20l4) (citation and intemal quotation marks omitted» (“it is our policy to give pro se litigants greater leeway in dealing with matters of procedure and pleading ) Moreover, ‘ [c]ourts prefer cases to be resolved on the merits and entering default against a defendant who appeared but failed to file an answer is generally reserved as a sanction for egregious behavior” and the Court does not find egregious behavior present here to warrant sanction by an entry of default Arno, 7| V I at 489 see also Sarauw, 66 V I at 265 (It is the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s longstanding instruction that the preference is to decide cases on their merits” and “that any doubts should be resolved in favor of this preference ’) Thus, the Court finds that an entry of default would be improper at this juncture Furthermore, based upon the substance of Defendant s letter, the Court will construe it as a motion for an extension of time See Rodriguez v Bureau of Corr 70 V I 924 928 n | (2019) (citing Joseph v Bureau ofCorrections 54 V I 644 648 n 2 (V I 2011) (“[T]he substance of a motion, and not its caption shall determine under which rule the motion is construed ’) (Feb 24 2021 Order p 3)(footnote omitted)

StrandSquare LLC v Strldlron SX 2020 CV 659 ‘0 Memorandum Opinion and Order 2022 VI SUPER 2 Page 3 of 6

that [e]ach magistrate judge may hear forcible entry and detainer and landlord and tenant

actions and hear all civil cases where the amount in controversy does not exceed $75 000 ”” Title

4 V I C § 123(a)(6) (7) “The first step when interpreting a statute is to determine whether the

language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning ” Miller v Pe0p1e ofthe VI 67 V I 827,

844 (V I 2017) It is well settled that when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, no

further interpretation is required See Thomas v People ofthe VI 69 VI 913 925 (V I 2018)

(noting that “because ‘the statutory language [of 14 V I C § 2101(a)] is plain and unambiguous,

no further interpretation is required”), see also Codrmgton v People ofthe VI , 57 V I 176, 185

(V I 2012) (“Accordingly, when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, a court does

not look beyond the language of the statute in interpreting the statute's meaning ”) “The Virgin

Islands Legislature has instructed that “[w]ords and phrases shall be read with their context and

shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the English language Title 1

V I C § 42 see Miller 67 V I at 844

11 8 The Court finds that the language of Section 123(a)(6) is plain and unambiguous Forcible

entry and detainer actions and landlord and tenant actions are two separate type of actions to wit,

forcible entry and detainer actions do not always involve landlord and tenant2 and landlord and

tenant actions do not always involve forcible entry and detainer The word “and’ between the

phrases “forcible entry and detainer” and “landlord and tenant actions” in Section 123(a)(6)

2 While forcible entry and detainer actions commonly commenced by landlords against their tenants under the statute a forcible entry and detainer action may be commenced by any person entitled to the possession of a premises against another person that is in unlawful possession of said premises See Title 28 V I C § 782(a)( When a forcible entry is made upon any premises or when an entry is made in a peaceable manner and the possession is held by force, the person entitled to the premises may maintain an action to recover the possession thereof ’); see also Title 28 V I C § 783 (‘ In an action under this [Forcible Entry and Detainer] subchapter it shall be sufficient to state in the complaint a description of the premises with convenient certainty, that the defendant is in possession thereof, that he entered upon the same with force, or unlawfully holds the same with force, as the case may be, and that the plaintiff is entitled to the possession thereof ’) (emphasis added)

Strand Square LLCv Strldlron iii‘iiflnfilfiiipmomdomr 2022 v. SUPER 2.50 Page 4 of6 indicates that the Legislature intended to grant the Magistrate Division the jurisdiction and power

over both type of actions If the drafters of the statute did not intend to grant the Magistrate

Division the jurisdiction and power over both type of actions, they clearly could have done so by

including either type of actions instead of both As such, the Court will give effect to the plain

words of the statute and hold that the Magistrate Division has jurisdiction and power over both

forcible entry and detainer actions and landlord and tenant actions The Court also finds that the

language of Section 123(a)(7) is plain and unambiguous As such, the Court will give effect to the

plain words of the statute and hold that the Magistrate Division hasjurisdiction and power over all

civil cases where the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000 Arguably, the magistrate

judge is not required to hear forcible entry and detainer actions and landlord and tenant actions or

civil cases where the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000 since Section 123(a) states

that ‘ the magistrate judge may ” and did not use the word “shall ” However the Virgin Islands

Supreme Court acknowledged In re the Estate ofSmall that “[u]nder section 123(a), the Legislature

provided the Magistrate Division the original jurisdiction to hear certain kinds of cases without the

oversight of a Superior Court judge [under Title 4 V I C § 123(a), including among other things,

traffic offenses, petty criminal offenses, small claims civil matters, landlord and tenant cases, and

probate matters]” and held that “the magistrate is the finder of fact for all section 123(a)(4) [of

Title 4 of the Virgin Islands Code] original jurisdiction cases ” 57 V I 416, 429 (V I 2012) The

Court see no reasons why the holding in Small would not extend to Section 123(a)(6) (7) See V I

Super Ct Rule 322(a) (“Final orders or judgments ofthe Magistrate Division resolving completely

the merits of cases which came before them pursuant to their original jurisdiction, as provided by 4

V I C § 123(a), are immediately appealable to judges of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands

as well as any interlocutory orders appealable by law ”)

Strand Square LLC v Strldlron SX 2020 CV 659 L Memorandum Opinion and Order 2022 VI SUPER 2 Page 5 of 6

1| 9 This matter is clearly a landlord and tenant action to wit, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in

connection with a commercial lease agreement executed between Plaintiff as landlord and

Defendant as tenant and a civil action where the amount in controversy does not exceed

$75 000 to wit, Plaintiff alleged that ‘the sum of $22,359 02 is past due and owing as of March

1, 2020 ” (Compl )Thus, this matter falls under the original jurisdiction of the Magistrate Division

See Title 4 V I C § 123(a)(6) (7) As such the Court will order the Clerk 3 Office to re assign this

matter to the Magistrate Division 3

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Clerk 5 Office RE ASSIGN this matter to the MAGISTRATE

DIVISION It is further

3 Irrespective of whether the Court orders this matter re assigned to the Magistrate Division, this matter is still heard in the Magistrate Division See Brown v Brown, 59 V l 583, 587 89 (V I 2013) (“When a senior judicial officer elects to hear a case that is traditionally within the purview of more junior judicial officers, the same procedural rules continue to apply The reasons for such a rule are clear litigants in domestic violence, small claims traffic, and other matters within the original jurisdiction of the Magistrate Division should not be subject to different procedural rules based on the rank of the judicial officer that hears their case ”) The implication is that this matter is appealable to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court unless an order is entered pursuant to Section 123(d) Section 123(d) provides that “[u]pon consent of the parties the magistrate judge may conduct all proceedings in a iury or non jury civil matter including trial and enter a judgment in the case and ‘[a]n order entered pursuant to this subsection is an Order of the Court appealable to the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands as any other Order Title 4 V I C § 123(d), see H&HAviomcs Inc v V] PortAuth 52 V l 458, 462 63 (V l 2009) (noting that ‘except for dispositive orders entered by magistrates in civil matters tried with the consent of the parties pursuant to 4 V l C § 123(d), orders entered by magistrates that have not been appealed to and reviewed by a Superior Court judge do not constitute final, appealable orders ) The Court recognizes that there may be conflicts between Section 123(a) and Section l23(d) in the event that the parties do not consent to the magistrate judge cond ucting all proceedings in a case that is under the original jurisdiction of the Magistrate Division In other words, if a case falls within the original jurisdiction of the Magistrate Division pursuant to Section 123(a) but the parties refuse to consent to the magistrate judge conducting all proceedings as required under Section l23(d), then who has jurisdiction over the case? On one hand the Superior Courtjudges cannot preside over such a case except sitting as 3 Superior Court magistrate judge in the Magistrate Division because the Magistrate Division has original jurisdiction under Section |23(a) On the other hand the Superior Court magistrate judges cannot preside over such a case because the parties did not consent as required under Section 123(d) At this juncture the Court need not address this issue since the parties have not indicated such refusal to consent

Strand Square LLC v Strldlron SX 2020 CV 659 (o Memorandum Opinion and Order 2022 VI SUPER 1 Page 6 of 6

ORDERED that a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order shall be served upon

(i) Samuel T Grey Esq electronically (ii) Defendant via (i) certified mail and regular First Class mail to P 0 Box 990, Christiansted, St Croix, VI 00820 and (ii) email to chefdigby@gmail com 4 And it is further

ORDERED that, within thirty (30) days from the date of entry of this Memorandum

Opinion and Order Plaintiff and Defendant shall each FILE A NOTICE advising the Court

whether Plaintiff or Defendant refuses to consent to the magistrate judge conducting all

proceedings in this matter, including trial and enter a judgment Failure for a party to file a notice

advising the Court of the party’s refusal to consent within the thirty day deadline SHALL

CONSTITUTE THE PARTY S CONSENT to the magistrate judge conducting all proceedings

in this matter including trial and enter a judgnJE/‘nt

DONF and so ORDERED this i"{ day of March 2022

ATTEST M Wfl Tamara Char es HAROLD W L WILLOCKS Clerk of th Presiding Judge of the Superior Court

By Clerk Supemsor fl

Dated é / 2 23

4 This is the information provided by Defendant in his February 5 202l letter

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS District of St. Croix

STRAND SQUARE, LLC, Case Number: SX-2020-CV-00659 Plaintiff Action: Debt v.

DIGBY STRIDIRON, II, Defendant.

NOTICE of ENTRY

of Order

To: Samuel T. Grey, Jr., Esq. Digby Stridiron, II Judges & Magistrates of Superior Court LawClerks, Law Library

Please take notice that on March 14, 2022 a(n) Memorandum Opinion and Order dated March 14, 2022 was/were entered by the Clerk in the above-titled matter.

Dated: March 14, 2022 Tamara Charles Clerk of the Court

By:

Sharisse Bascombe

Court Clerk II