Stranahan, Individually, Stranahan Trust B, Decedent's Trust, Leona Jean Mashtare, Individually, Mashtare, Inc., D/B/A Era Paradise Realty v. Bobby J. Lay and Debra L. Lay

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: November 27, 2002
• Docket: 13-02-00287-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

                                   NUMBER 13-02-287-CV

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                                CORPUS CHRISTI

EDWINA D. STRANAHAN,

INDIVIDUALLY, STRANAHAN

TRUST B, DECEDENT'S TRUST,

LEONA JEAN MASHTARE,

INDIVIDUALLY, MASHTARE, INC.,

D/B/A ERA PARADISE REALTY,                                            Appellants,

                                                   v.

BOBBY J. LAY AND DEBRA L. LAY,                                        Appellees.

                         On appeal from the 36th District Court

                                 of Aransas County, Texas.

                                   O P I N I O N

        Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Dorsey and Rodriguez

                                  Opinion by Justice Dorsey

By this accelerated interlocutory appeal, appellants seek to set aside a temporary injunction granted by the 36th Judicial District Court.  The injunction prohibited appellants from prosecuting their forcible detainer suit against appellees in justice of the peace court, pending the outcome of appellees= suit for legal title to the home, the property subject to the forcible detainer suit.  We dismiss the appeal as moot.

                                          I. Factual Background

                                        And Procedural History

On February 17, 2000, Bobby and Debra Lay executed a residential lease agreement on a home in Rockport, Texas.  Appellant, Stranahan Trust B, Decedent=s Trust (the ATrust@) owned the home, and Edwina Stranahan was the trustee.  In conjunction with the lease, the Lays executed a sales contract on the home.  While the Lays were tenants in possession of the home, but prior to the closing date of the sales contract, a dispute arose between the Lays and Stranahan concerning a casualty loss to the home.  When Stranahan failed to either repair the home or assign the insurance proceeds, the Lays stopped making the $900 monthly rent payments as required by the residential lease agreement.^[1]

In October 2001, the Trust filed a forcible detainer suit against the Lays in justice court, seeking to evict them for failing to pay rent.  The Lays, in turn, sued appellants in the 36th Judicial District Court for legal title to the home.  They also filed an AApplication to Enjoin Further Proceedings in Subsequent Suit,@ alleging that the 36th Judicial District Court had exclusive jurisdiction of the matters raised in the forcible detainer suit.  After a hearing, the trial court granted a temporary injunction enjoining appellants from interfering with the Lays= right of possession, pending the outcome of the Lays= suit for legal title to the home.

The Lays tried their suit for legal title to a jury, which found that appellants complied with the residential lease agreement and that the Lays failed to comply with the residential lease agreement.  The district court signed a final judgment in the case on October 28, 2002.  Thus, the issue is whether entry of the final judgment has rendered this appeal moot.

                                                     II. Analysis

The Texas Supreme Court has stated that if, during the pendency of the appeal of the granting or denying of the temporary injunction, the trial court renders final judgment, the case on appeal becomes moot.  Isuani v. Manske‑Sheffield Radiology Group, P.A., 802 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1991).  When a case becomes moot on appeal, all previous orders pertaining to the temporary injunction are set aside by the appellate court, and the case is dismissed.  Id. (citing Texas Foundries, Inc. v. International Moulders & Foundry Workers' Union, 151 Tex. 239, 248 S.W.2d 460, 461 (Tex. 1952)).  The rules of law concerning dismissal of an appeal from a temporary injunction after it has been rendered moot by a final judgment are necessary to prevent premature review of the merits of the case.  Isuani, 802 S.W.2d at 236.  See Iranian Muslim Org. v. City of San Antonio, 615 S.W.2d 202, 208 (Tex. 1981) (ruling on temporary injunction by appellate court may not be used to obtain advance ruling on merits of case concerning permanent injunction); Brooks v. Expo Chem. Co., 576 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tex. 1979) (it will not be assumed that evidence taken at preliminary hearing on temporary injunction will be same as evidence developed at trial on merits); Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. 1978) (effect of premature review of merits is to deny opposing party right to trial by jury).

We DISMISS the appeal as moot.

J. BONNER DORSEY

Justice

Do not publish.

Tex. R. App. P. 47.3(b).

Opinion delivered and filed

this 27th day of November, 2002.

---

^[1]The lease agreement was to cover the Lays= occupancy of the home up to March 1, 2001, the closing date for the sales contract.