Straehle v. INA Life Ins. Co. of New York

392 F. Supp. 2d 448, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42617, 2005 WL 2436450
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 30, 2005
DocketCV-01-7180(FB)(RML)
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 392 F. Supp. 2d 448 (Straehle v. INA Life Ins. Co. of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Straehle v. INA Life Ins. Co. of New York, 392 F. Supp. 2d 448, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42617, 2005 WL 2436450 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BLOCK, District Judge.

Plaintiff Julie Straehle (“Straehle”) filed suit pursuant to § 1132(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., alleging that defendant CIGNA Life Insurance Company (“CIGNA”) wrongfully denied her claim for long-term disability benefits. For the reasons set forth below, the Court disagrees and grants judgment for defendant.

The long-term disability policy (the “Policy”) issued by CIGNA to Straehle’s employer, NEC America (“NEC”), provides that CIGNA “will begin paying monthly benefits ... when it receives due proof that (1) the employee became Disabled while insured for this Long Term Disability Insurance.” A.R. 17. 1 Under the Policy, “[a]n Employee will be considered Disabled “if because of Injury or Sickness ... [s]he is unable to perform all the material duties of h[er] regular occupation; and after Monthly Benefits have been payable for 24 months, [s]he is unable to perform all the material duties of any occupation for which [s]he is or may reasonably become qualified based on h[er] education, training or experience.” A.R. 7. The policy defines “Injury” as “an accidental bodily injury”; “Sickness” is defined as “a physical or mental illness.” A.R. 5. 2 An “Employee” who is eligible for benefits under the Policy is defined as “a full-time Employee of the Employer.” A.R. 5. CIG-NA’s long-term benefits application asks claimants to describe both “what prevents you from performing YOUR occupation,” and “what prevents you from engaging in ANY gainful employment.” A.R. 149.

CIGNA reviews applications for disability benefits according to a two-step process. At the initial level, a CIGNA case manager collects information and medical evidence from the claimant, and renders a determination regarding the claimant’s eligibility for benefits based upon a review of all the evidence in the claimant’s file. 3 A claimant whose application is denied may request a review within 60 days by submitting a written request to the claimant’s case manager, along with any additional documentation pertinent to her claim. On appeal, the entire file, which may include medical evidence collected after the case manager’s *450 denial, is reviewed by a CIGNA appeals claim examiner, after which the examiner renders a decision affirming or reversing the denial. 4

CIGNA’s denial of Straehle’s application by her case manager on February 8, 1999, less than a year following the onset of her alleged disability in March 1998, addressed only the issue of whether Straehle was disabled from performing her own occupation. Concluding that Straehle was “unable to establish the existence of a disabling condition that prevented [her] from performing the duties of [her] occupation as a Senior Quality Assurance Engineer,” A.R. 45, CIGNA’s case manager did not address the question of whether — under the policy’s definition of disability extending beyond 24 months-she was disabled from any occupation.

Instead of appealing pursuant to CIG-NA’s appeals process, Straehle initiated an action against CIGNA in state court on September 28, 2000, about a year and a half after the case manager’s decision. CIGNA removed the action to federal court in October 2001, and on February 2, 2002, the parties entered into a stipulation administratively closing the case until Straehle exhausted her administrative remedies with CIGNA. The CIGNA appeals claim examiner thereafter considered documentation and medical evidence submitted by Straehle, which covered the period from March 1998 through April 2002; on August 13, 2002, the appeals examiner affirmed the case manager’s determination that Straehle had not demonstrated her inability to perform her past occupation and, therefore, was not entitled to disability benefits under the Policy. In its letter notifying Straehle of its final determination, CIGNA did not “suggest no one could be disabled without objective medical evidence,” but stated that Straehle “is not a reliable source of information about the extent of her injuries or her ability to work,” and that the objective medical evidence, which was particularly important under these circumstances, did “not ... support[] [Straehle’s] claim.” A.R. 994.

Returned to this Court, both parties moved for summary judgment on the administrative record. Following oral argument on January 13, 2004, the Court denied the motions, finding that there were issues of fact regarding whether Straehle was disabled under the terms of the Policy. A bench trial was thereafter held on December 16 and December 20, 2004, during which the Court heard testimony from Straehle and her current treating physician, Dr. Sheldon Zuckerman; although the Court allowed Straehle to present evidence regarding her eligibility for benefits both prior to and following the initial 24-month period established by the Policy, the Court did not rule on whether it would consider any of the evidence received at the hearing. 5

*451 Because CIGNA determined that Straehle was capable of performing her past occupation, it did not address the more restrictive standard governing entitlement to benefits beyond 24 months by reason of an inability to perform any occupation; consequently, the latter issue is not ripe for review and the Court addresses only Straehle’s eligibility for disability benefits for the first 24 months following the onset of her alleged disability. See Peterson v. Continental Casualty Co., 282 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir.2002) (“Absent a decision by the plan administrator, district courts have no jurisdiction to make an assessment of a beneficiary’s eligibility for benefits.... Since the plan had yet to decide whether the plaintiff deserved benefits for the post-twenty-four-month period, the plaintiff had not suffered an actual or threatened injury.”).

Furthermore, although the Court acknowledges an inherent conflict due to CIGNA’s dual status as both administrator and claims payor, Straehle has failed to demonstrate the existence of any additional factors that would constitute good cause to consider evidence outside the administrative record. See Locher v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 389 F.3d 288, 294-295 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that a conflict of interest created by an administrator’s dual status as claims reviewer and claims payor “does not per se constitute ‘good cause’ to consider evidence outside of the administrative record,” but that such a conflict of interest, in combination with other factors such as insufficient procedures for initial or appellate review or the failure of an insurer to include a claimed reason for denying benefits in its notices to a claimant, may constitute good cause for expanding the record upon review).

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392 F. Supp. 2d 448, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42617, 2005 WL 2436450, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/straehle-v-ina-life-ins-co-of-new-york-nyed-2005.