Stoutenburgh v. Hopkins

43 N.J. Eq. 577
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedOctober 15, 1887
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 43 N.J. Eq. 577 (Stoutenburgh v. Hopkins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stoutenburgh v. Hopkins, 43 N.J. Eq. 577 (N.J. Ct. App. 1887).

Opinion

The Ordinary.

This appeal is from a decree of the orphans court of Sussex county, which directs that the writing, hereinafter mentioned, be admitted to probate as the last will of Martha Stoutenburgh,. deceased.

The appellant, who was the husband of Mrs. Stoutenburgh, was the caveator below. Mr. and Mrs. Stoutenburgh were married in February, 1879, she being then about thirty-nine years of age, and he being about twenty-five years her senior. It was her first, and his third, marriage. He had three children by a former wife, all of whom, at the time of this marriage, were grown and independent. He had been pastor of a Congregational church for some years, but, because of a bronchial affection, had given up preaching and taken charge of an educational institute at Schooley’s Mountain. He had some property, chiefly mining land. Mrs. Stoutenburgh had inherited a considerable fortune from her father, and, during her marriage and at her death, was worth about $40,000. She objected to engaging in the management of the school with which her husband was connected, and consequently induced him to change his residence to Newton, in Sussex county, and live there in her house.

In the fall of 1885 Mrs. Stoutenburgh’s health began to fail, but it was not until March or April of the following year that the causes of this decline were ascertained to be uterine tumors and cancer of the stomach.

She died on Thursday, May 13th, 1886, having, two days before, executed the paper which is the subject of this controversy.

This writing purports to be her will. It provides an annuity of $500 m favor of her husband, for his life, and divides the remainder of her estate, in equal shares, among her three sisters.

The appellant presents five reasons why the paper should not be admitted to probate:

[579]*579First. Because Mrs. Stoutenburgh was a married woman, and as such had no power to make a will which disposed of her •estate without her husband’s consent.

Second. Because the paper offered for probate was not executed in compliance with the requirement of the statute concerning wills.

Third. Because Mrs. Stoutenburgh lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the paper.

Fourth. Because the writing was induced by undue influence.

Fifth. Because the paper was procured by direct fraud.

The first of these objections was merely stated by counsel, •and left, without argument, to be disposed of by me.

At common law, a married woman could not devise real estate, and was incapable of disposing of her chattels by will, without the consent of her' husband. Van Winkle v. Schoonmaker, 8 McCart. 384.

The supplement to the act concerning wills, which was approved April 12th, 1864 (P. L. p. 698), empowered such a woman, .when above the age of twenty-one years, to thereafter dispose of all her real and personal property by will, provided that such disposition should not include any interest the husband then had, or, at the wife’s death, would have, in her real or personal estate. By the Revision of 1874, now in force (Rev. p. 688 § 9), the authority of the wife in this respect was further •extended, so that she may now, by will, dispose of her entire property, except such interest as her husband would, at her «death, be entitled to in her real estate.

It has been held, as to the first of these statutes (and the reasoning will apply to both), that, being in derogation of the common law, it must be strictly construed (Compton v. Pierson, 1 Stew. Fq. 229), but the validity of the legislation • to empower the wife to make a will, to the extent that the language of the statute authorizes, has always been recognized in this state. Vreeland v. Ryno, 11 C. E. Gr. 160; Beal v. Storm, 11 C. E. Gr. 372; Webb v. Jones, 9 Stew. Eq. 163.

This marriage was subsequent to these statutes.

I fail to perceive, and counsel does not suggest, a reason why [580]*580they do not fully authorize the making of such a paper as that which is in dispute.

As the birth of issue alive is a requisite to the husband’s estate by curtesy, and as that requisite is absent in the case under consideration, Mr. Stoutenburgh had no interest in his wife’s lands at her death. Then, if the will shall be established, whatever he takes from her property must be that which the will gives him; but, if the will shall not be established, he will be entitled, jure viariti, to her entire personal estate. Donninqton v. Mitchell, 1 Gr. Ch. 243.

As to the second ground upon which this paper is assailed. It is admitted by the appellant that if Francis J. Swayze, one of the testamentary witnesses, can be relied upon, the writing was executed as the statute requires that a will shall be executed.

Not only the testimony of Mr. Swayze, but also that of John N. Roof, the other testamentary witness, fully establishes a strict compliance with the statute.

The attestation clause also recites the full performance of all that the statute requires, and is itself prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it. Ayres v. Ayres, 16 Stew. Eq. 565.

This objection to the probate of the paper has not been seriously urged, and may be dismissed without further remark.

Under the third objection to the paper in question, it is hardly pretended that Mrs. Stoutenburgh was absolutely without testamentary capacity; but it is earnestly contended that she was in such physical and mental condition that she had become a fit subject upon which imposition and fraud might be practised. ■

The evidence of her attending physician establishes that, although she was emaciated, weak, nervous and irritable, she was yet in possession of-her mental faculties.

Because of the cancer,, she could not be adequately nourished, and died, not alone from the direct influence of the disease upon her system, but principally from gradual starvation. The physician testifies that she was never delirious, and gives it as his opinion that she was competent to transact business, but was not competent to withstand undue influences.

[581]*581The standard of testamentary capacity, in this state, is given by Mr. Justice Depue, in Rusling v. Rusling, 9 Stew. Eq. 603, 607, in his remark: “• His power to recollect his nearer kindred, and appreciate their claims upon him, to comprehend the amount and character of his estate, and to intelligently direct its distribution, does not appear to have been seriously impaired. Such capacity is sufficient for the making of a will.”

The testimony to which I feel constrained to hereafter revert, abundantly satisfies me that Mrs. Stoutenburgh had sufficient capacity to make the instrument in dispute. I, however, share with her physician the opinion that one of the natural consequences of her weakness and sufferings would be the impairment of her ability to withstand improper influences and guard against fraud; and I do not lose sight of .this important circumstance in the consideration of the remaining questions in this case.

We are indebted to Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet for a most excellent definition of that which is denominated undue influence. In Earle v. Norfolk, 9 Stew. Eq.

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