Stone v. United States

196 F. Supp. 386, 1960 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2809
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedAugust 2, 1960
DocketCrim. No. 24234
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 196 F. Supp. 386 (Stone v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stone v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 386, 1960 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2809 (S.D. Cal. 1960).

Opinion

HALL, Chief Judge.

This is a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

The sole ground on which it is based is that the defendant (Petitioner) was insane at the time of entering his plea of guilty.

On April 27, 1955, the defendant was indicted in three counts for three separate bank robberies. In Count I it was charged that he put in jeopardy the life of Jerry Lee Caraco, and in Count III it was charged that he put in jeopardy the life of Leonore Rennie.

On arraignment on May 2, 1955, it appearing that the defendant was without funds or property with which to employ counsel of his own choosing, the Court appointed Mr. Maurice Goodstein as his counsel. Thereafter, upon observation by the Court of defendant, the Court suggested to Mr. Goodstein that he give consideration as to whether or not the defendant should be psychiatrically examined. After continuance of one week, the Court appointed Dr. Edwin McNeil, an able and competent psychiatrist of long and wide experience, to examine the defendant, and report concerning whether the defendant was then [387]*387presently insane, or unable to understand the proceedings against him, or unable to properly assist in his own defense. The examination was made on May 13, 1955, from 3:00 P.M. to 5:00 P.M.

The doctor reported his conclusions on May 16,1955, as follows:

“At the time I examined this man he was oriented. He answered questions promptly, relevantly and coherently. He was not suffering from any delusions or hallucinations. He was not pathologically elated or depressed. He had memory of the events which led up to his arrest. In my opinion, he gave some of the defensive type of rationalizations which individuals involved in criminal behavior often express. However, in my opinion, there was no evidence of any major mental disturbance or psychosis. “In my opinion, the defendant is presently mentally competent. In my opinion, the defendant is presently sane; the defendant is able to understand the proceedings against him; the defendant is able to properly assist in his own defense in Case No. 24,234-CD.”

The matter was put over from May 16, 1955 to May 23, 1955 to enable counsel for both sides to read the report and to interview the doctor if they desired.

On May 23, 1955 counsel for defendant indicated that he had read the report, and was ready to proceed with the plea of the defendant. Defendant thereupon pleaded guilty to all three counts of the Indictment, the Court interrogated the defendant, accepted his plea of guilty, and the matter was put over for sentence to June 30, 1955, at which time the defendant was sentenced.1

[388]*388A Reporter’s complete transcript of all proceedings to time of sentence is attached hereto and made a part hereof, and marked Exhibit “A”.

[389]*389Thereafter, the defendant was committed to the custody of the Attorney General at McNeil Island. On February 25, 1956, defendant was committed to the U. S. Medical Center at Springfield, Missouri, as a “certified psychotic,” where he has since been and still is. In January, 1959, defendant wrote a letter to the undersigned, which the Court considered as an effort to initiate proceedings under Section 2255 of Title 28 United States Code. The letter was called to the attention of the United States Attorney who corresponded with the authorities at Springfield, and thereafter Mr. Goodstein, counsel for defendant, was contacted, and he filed a formal motion under Section 2255 of Title 28 U.S.Code. The motion was set for hearing, and after several continuances it was heard on August 14,1959, without the presence of the defendant. At that time, there was introduced letters from the authorities at Springfield, including a report of a staff examination dated March 31, 1959, which concluded as follows:

“Recommendations: The NP staff is of the opinion that: (1) Gerald L. Stone has been seriously mentally ill for a long period of time. His illness is presently in remission to the extent that he can be regarded as competent to understand his present situation as a convicted person and to pursue an action in court seeking relief (understand the proceedings and assist counsel). (2) In the light of previous and present findings and the knowledge of his present and past mental status, Gerald L. Stone has probably been mentally ill for several years. There is reason to believe that he was probably mentally ill at the time of the commission of his offense for which he is currently serving a sentence, and that the acts of that offense were the product of his delusions. (3) Because of his delusions, Gerald L. Stone was very likely incompetent to stand trial because he was not able to properly assist his counsel in his own defense or understand the true nature of the proceedings against him.”

The questions then, are: (1) Whether or not such findings, vague and nebulous as they are, made four years after the defendant has pleaded, can impeach the judgment and finding of the Court made at the time of plea upon the uncontested evidence consisting of the report of a competent and qualified psychiatrist based upon an examination made at the time of plea, and the court’s own observations, and (2) whether or not such findings compel another hearing on that [390]*390issue. It is to be noted that counsel for defendant did not either contest the report or ask that the psychiatrist be produced for cross-examination.

In this connection, attention is called to the fact that the Court had an opportunity to observe the defendant, and questioned him at length on his plea of guilty, as will be seen from the transcript. His answers were intelligent and quickly given. His attitude was arrogant and boastful.

Where the question of the then sanity of a defendant, or his mental capacity to understand the proceedings against him and assist in his defense is raised before plea, and compliance is had with 18 U.S.C. § 4244, and the defendant then pleads guilty and the plea is accepted by the Court, and sentence imposed, the acceptance of the plea by the Court is a finding on such issues, and such finding is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus or proceedings under Section 2255 of Title 28 U.S.Code. Dodd v. United States, 10 Cir., 1952, 196 F.2d 190, certiorari denied 72 S.Ct. 1084, 96 L. Ed. 1374; 10 Cir., 1954, 343 U.S. 987, 213 F.2d 854; 10 Cir., 1955, 222 F.2d 175; Handlon v. United States, 6 Cir., 1957, 246 F.2d 866.

In the Dodd case, much the same procedure occurred as here: the Court appointed counsel and referred the matter to a qualified psychiatrist.

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Related

Gerald L. Stone v. United States
358 F.2d 503 (Ninth Circuit, 1966)
Sturrup v. United States
218 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. North Carolina, 1963)

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Bluebook (online)
196 F. Supp. 386, 1960 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2809, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stone-v-united-states-casd-1960.