Stone v. Tavares

8 Mass. L. Rptr. 192
CourtMassachusetts Superior Court
DecidedFebruary 25, 1998
DocketNo. 952660A
StatusPublished

This text of 8 Mass. L. Rptr. 192 (Stone v. Tavares) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stone v. Tavares, 8 Mass. L. Rptr. 192 (Mass. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

Toomey, J.

This case arrives before the court on Defendant’s, Century 21 Henderson Realtors (Century 21), Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs, Douglas W. Stone and Suzanne Stone (collectively Stones), instituted action against Century 21, et al, seeking damages arising out of their purchase of certain real property in Northbridge. The Stones allege that a Century 21 broker (“Anderson”) negligently represented that a Massachusetts Electric Company (Mass. Electric) easement would not interfere with their enj oyment of the property. They claim that Century 21 asserted that the easement was sixty feet wide when, in fact, the easement has an eighty foot width. Century 21 now pursues summary judgment, arguing that its broker reasonably relied on a survey prepared by an independent, certified surveyor and that, therefore, Century 21 cannot, as a matter of law, be held liable for the statements. For the reasons that follow, Century 21’s motion for summary judgment will be DENIED.

BACKGROUND

In March 1993, the Stones commenced discussions with Robert Anderson, a Century 21 real estate broker, concerning the purchase of a single family home in a new residential locus, Highland Hills, in Northbridge. The discussions occurred in the Century 21 office trailer at the Highland Hills location. At the time, Highland Hills was an undeveloped subdivision and Century 21’s office contained plot plans showing subdivision lots and individual house plans.

Anderson showed the Stones a plot plan for lot 73 in the subdivision. The lot had a Mass. Electric easement running through it. The Stones contend that the plot plan depicted the easement as running through the properly, but not running through the house. The Stones further allege that Anderson represented that electric lines would not run with the easement, that the easement would not interfere with the use of the proposed house, and that the house would not be situated within the easement. Finally, the Stones allege that Anderson represented that the easement was sixty feet wide. In reality, the easement was eighty feet wide.

In the matter now at bar, Century 21 asserts its entitlement to summary judgment on the grounds that its representations concerning lot 73 violated no duty to the Stones. Arguing that it had no obligation to undertake a title examination, Century 21 rejects the proposition that it breached a duty to the Stones by failing to research and verify the actual width of the easement. Moreover, Century 21 asserts, its reliance upon a plan provided it by Land Planning, Engineering & Surveyors, a registered property surveyor and co-defendant insulates Century 21 from liability. At bottom, then, the summary judgment issue before this court is whether, as a matter of law, Century 21 can be held liable for the representations of its agent made in reliance upon the survey prepared by Land Planning, Engineering & Survey.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment shall be granted where there are no genuine issues of material fact on any relevant issue raised by the pleadings and the moving party is entitled to judgment as amatter of law. Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c); McNeil v. Metropolitan Property & Liability Ins. Co., 420 Mass. 587, 598 (1995). The moving party bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the [193]*193absence of a triable issue and that the summary judgment record entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 16-17 (1989). If the moving party demonstrates the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must, in order to defeat the motion, present specific references to the record establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 17. The opposing party cannot, however, rest only upon his or her pleadings or upon mere assertions of disputed facts to defeat the motion for summary judgment. LaLonde v. Eissner, 405 Mass. 207, 209 (1989).

Century 21 argues that the Stone’s allegations would impose upon it a duty unrecognized by Massachusetts law. The realtor asserts that Anderson reasonably relied on a plan prepared by a registered surveyor when Anderson described the easement, and its likely implications for the property, to the Stones. Any imposition of liability for these statements, Century 21 suggests, will amount to a holding that the realtor owed the Stones a duty itself to conduct a title search. Century 21 concludes that such a duty does not exist in Massachusetts and that, therefore, summary judgment in Century 21’s favor is appropriate.

The Stones respond to Century 21’s contentions by arguing that Century 21 failed in its duty adequately to research the accuracy of the statements made by Anderson before the comments were conveyed to the Stones. Additionally, the Stones argue that their reliance upon Anderson’s statements for their decision to purchase was reasonable in view of Anderson’s professed knowledge of the easement and Century 21’s special relationship to the property.3 Accordingly, the Stones contend that a number of fact issues remain, particularly those relating to Century 21’s duty to the Stones, and those issues preclude the entry of summary judgment for Century 21.

The Appeals Court teaches that “[a] claim for misrepresentation requires that the plaintiff show a false statement of material fact made to induce the plaintiff to act and reliance on the false statement by the plaintiff to his detriment.” McEneaney v. Chestnut Hill Realty Corp., 38 Mass.App.Ct. 573, 575 (1995). Even if the speaker does not know the statement is false, liability will attach where the speaker could have obtained accurate facts through the exercise of a modicum of diligence. See Zimmerman v. Kent, 31 Mass.App.Ct. 72, 77 (1991). In that regard, the court has upheld liability imposed on real estate brokers for misrepresentations that induced property buyers to purchase the subject property. See McEneaney, 38 Mass.App.Ct. at 576. Conversely, where the real estate broker demonstrated reasonable diligence and then innocently misrepresented a material fact, liability has been held not to attach. See Lawton v. Dracousis, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 164, 171 (1982) (broker exercised reasonable care by taking buyer to building inspector’s office and relying on inspector’s erroneous statement that no building code violations existed). In sum, genuine issues of material fact are not uncommon in broker-misrepresentation litigation.

The facts underlying the case at bar are largely undisputed. Anderson informed the Stones that the Mass. Electric easement spanned only sixty feet and that the house would not be located within the easement. Both of the statements were inaccurate. Additionally, there is no contest, at least for purposes of summary judgment, that Anderson’s comments induced the Stones to purchase the particular lot in question. The ultimate issue for the court’s resolution, then, is whether Century 21 incurs liability for Anderson’s misrepresentations even though Anderson believed the statements to be true when were made and even though Anderson relied upon a survey produced by a certified surveyor.

Based on the facts established in the summary judgment record, the court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that Century 21 launched a sufficient inquiry into the size and effect of the Mass. Electric easement to warrant the entry of summary judgment on its behalf. In Sheehy v. Upton Indus., Inc., 24 Mass.App.Ct.

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Related

Pederson v. Time, Inc.
532 N.E.2d 1211 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1989)
LaLonde v. Eissner
539 N.E.2d 538 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1989)
Sheehy v. Lipton Industries, Inc.
507 N.E.2d 781 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1987)
Zimmerman v. Kent
575 N.E.2d 70 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1991)
Lawton v. Dracousis
437 N.E.2d 543 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1982)
McNeill v. Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance
650 N.E.2d 793 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1995)
Rao v. Board of Registration of Real Estate Brokers & Salesmen
13 Mass. App. Ct. 922 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1982)
McEneaney v. Chestnut Hill Realty Corp.
650 N.E.2d 93 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1995)

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Bluebook (online)
8 Mass. L. Rptr. 192, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stone-v-tavares-masssuperct-1998.