IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
YVONNE STONE,1 § § No. 483, 2022 Petitioner Below, § Appellant, § Court Below–Family Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § File No. CK19-01031 CALVIN SMITH, § Petition No. 22-10207 § Respondent Below, § Appellee. §
Submitted: May 26, 2023 Decided: August 3, 2023
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief and the record on appeal,
it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Yvonne Stone (“the Mother”), filed this appeal from a
December 1, 2022 Family Court order denying the Mother’s motion for
reconsideration of the Family Court’s order that granted the appellee’s motion to
dismiss the Mother’s petition for custody modification. For the following reasons,
we affirm the Family Court’s judgment.
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). (2) The Mother and the appellee, Calvin Smith (“the Father”), are the
parents of two minor children (“the Children”). The record reflects that, beginning
in early 2019, the parties engaged in an acrimonious custody battle, with the Mother
repeatedly complaining to the court and State agencies that the Father was abusing
the Children.2 The Family Court held a trial on the parties’ multiple cross-petitions
for custody and findings of contempt over three days—December 15, 2020, March
25, 2021, and April 9, 2021. Following the hearing, the Family Court issued a final
custody order on June 29, 2021 (“the Custody Order”). Among other things, the
Custody Order: (i) awarded primary residential placement of the Children to the
Father and established a visitation schedule for the Mother; (ii) dismissed the
Mother’s two petitions for findings of contempt; and (iii) found that the Mother had
previously been in contempt of the court’s orders on three occasions when she failed
to return the Children to the Father for scheduled visitation. The Mother did not
appeal the Custody Order.
(3) On May 10, 2022, the Mother filed a petition for modification of the
Custody Order, seeking joint custody and primary placement of the Children. The
Mother also moved for interim relief, seeking increased visitation with the Children
pending the outcome of her motion for custody modification. Because the motion
2 Notably, none of these claims were substantiated.
2 for interim relief had not been properly served on the Father, the Family Court denied
it without prejudice. On September 23, 2022, the Mother filed a motion for an
emergency ex parte order, alleging that the Father had relocated and was refusing to
let her visit with the Children. Also on September 23, 2022, the Mother renewed
her motion for interim relief, claiming that the Father was attempting to alienate the
Children from the Mother and seeking sole custody and primary placement of the
Children. The Family Court denied the motion for emergency relief, finding that the
allegations did not warrant immediate relief.
(4) The Father moved to dismiss the Mother’s petitions for custody
modification and interim relief, citing insufficiency of process and the Mother’s
failure to state a claim under the heightened standard required under 13 Del. C. §
729(c)(1) for a petition for custody modification filed within two years of a Family
Court custody order entered after a full hearing on the merits. While the Father’s
motion to dismiss was pending, the Mother filed another motion for an emergency
ex parte order, asking the court to grant her immediate weekend overnight visitation
and extra communication with the Children during the week and to find the Father
in contempt of court. The Mother also filed a motion to reopen the Custody Order,
claiming that it should be set aside because she had been unable to attend the final
two days of the custody hearing. The Father objected to the motion to reopen,
pointing out that the Mother had failed to advise the Family Court that she could not
3 participate in the final days of the custody hearing, despite her obvious familiarity
with Family Court litigation procedure, and arguing that the Mother had filed the
motion to reopen to circumvent the heightened standard she was required to meet
under Section 729(c)(1).
(5) On October 26, 2022, the Family Court denied the Mother’s motion for
an emergency ex parte order and directed the parties to comply with the visitation
terms of the Custody Order. On November 15, 2022, the Family Court granted the
Father’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the motion was unopposed and that
the Mother had failed to plead that enforcement of the Custody Order would
endanger the Children’s physical health or significantly impair their emotional
development as required by Section 729(c)(1).3 Finally, on November 21, 2022, the
Family Court denied as untimely the Mother’s motion to reopen the Custody Order.
(6) On November 28, 2022, the Mother filed a motion to reargue the
Family Court’s November 15, 2022 order because the Family Court had concluded
that the Father’s motion to dismiss was unopposed, but the Mother had, in fact,
responded to and opposed the motion. After conducting an initial review of the filing
as required by 10 Del. C. § 8803, the Family Court ordered that the filing be
3 This order also disposed of the Mother’s renewed motion for interim relief.
4 dismissed as legally frivolous. Although the order purportedly rejected the filing, it
also noted that the motion for reargument was denied. This appeal followed.
(7) This Court’s review of a Family Court decision includes a review of
both the law and the facts.4 Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.5 If the law
was correctly applied, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion.6 We review
a trial court’s denial of a motion for reargument for abuse of discretion.7
(8) On appeal, the Mother argues that the Family Court improperly
dismissed her filing as legally frivolous and that the Family Court erred when it
granted the Father’s motion to dismiss because, she claims, the Custody Order was
not entered after a full hearing on the merits. The Mother also alleges that she was
deprived of the opportunity to participate in the custody hearing and that the Family
Court judge who rejected her motion for reargument is biased against her. The
Mother’s arguments are unavailing.
(9) As a preliminary matter, the Mother has waived any arguments relating
to the proceedings that led to the entry of the Custody Order because she failed to
appeal that order. Second, although we agree with the Mother that the Family Court
4 Mundy v. Devon, 906 A.2d 750, 752 (Del. 2006). 5 Wright v. Wright, 49 A.3d 1147, 1150 (Del. 2012). 6 Id. 7 Maddox v. Isaacs, 2013 WL 4858989, at *1 (Del. Sept. 10, 2013).
5 should not have rejected her filing as legally frivolous because she raised a legitimate
objection to the Family Court’s finding that the Father’s motion to dismiss was
unopposed, we nevertheless affirm the Family Court’s denial of the Mother’s motion
for reargument on the independent and alternative basis that the Family Court did
not abuse its discretion by denying the motion.8 Contrary to the Mother’s argument
on appeal, the fact that the Mother declined to participate in the final two days of the
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
YVONNE STONE,1 § § No. 483, 2022 Petitioner Below, § Appellant, § Court Below–Family Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § File No. CK19-01031 CALVIN SMITH, § Petition No. 22-10207 § Respondent Below, § Appellee. §
Submitted: May 26, 2023 Decided: August 3, 2023
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief and the record on appeal,
it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Yvonne Stone (“the Mother”), filed this appeal from a
December 1, 2022 Family Court order denying the Mother’s motion for
reconsideration of the Family Court’s order that granted the appellee’s motion to
dismiss the Mother’s petition for custody modification. For the following reasons,
we affirm the Family Court’s judgment.
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). (2) The Mother and the appellee, Calvin Smith (“the Father”), are the
parents of two minor children (“the Children”). The record reflects that, beginning
in early 2019, the parties engaged in an acrimonious custody battle, with the Mother
repeatedly complaining to the court and State agencies that the Father was abusing
the Children.2 The Family Court held a trial on the parties’ multiple cross-petitions
for custody and findings of contempt over three days—December 15, 2020, March
25, 2021, and April 9, 2021. Following the hearing, the Family Court issued a final
custody order on June 29, 2021 (“the Custody Order”). Among other things, the
Custody Order: (i) awarded primary residential placement of the Children to the
Father and established a visitation schedule for the Mother; (ii) dismissed the
Mother’s two petitions for findings of contempt; and (iii) found that the Mother had
previously been in contempt of the court’s orders on three occasions when she failed
to return the Children to the Father for scheduled visitation. The Mother did not
appeal the Custody Order.
(3) On May 10, 2022, the Mother filed a petition for modification of the
Custody Order, seeking joint custody and primary placement of the Children. The
Mother also moved for interim relief, seeking increased visitation with the Children
pending the outcome of her motion for custody modification. Because the motion
2 Notably, none of these claims were substantiated.
2 for interim relief had not been properly served on the Father, the Family Court denied
it without prejudice. On September 23, 2022, the Mother filed a motion for an
emergency ex parte order, alleging that the Father had relocated and was refusing to
let her visit with the Children. Also on September 23, 2022, the Mother renewed
her motion for interim relief, claiming that the Father was attempting to alienate the
Children from the Mother and seeking sole custody and primary placement of the
Children. The Family Court denied the motion for emergency relief, finding that the
allegations did not warrant immediate relief.
(4) The Father moved to dismiss the Mother’s petitions for custody
modification and interim relief, citing insufficiency of process and the Mother’s
failure to state a claim under the heightened standard required under 13 Del. C. §
729(c)(1) for a petition for custody modification filed within two years of a Family
Court custody order entered after a full hearing on the merits. While the Father’s
motion to dismiss was pending, the Mother filed another motion for an emergency
ex parte order, asking the court to grant her immediate weekend overnight visitation
and extra communication with the Children during the week and to find the Father
in contempt of court. The Mother also filed a motion to reopen the Custody Order,
claiming that it should be set aside because she had been unable to attend the final
two days of the custody hearing. The Father objected to the motion to reopen,
pointing out that the Mother had failed to advise the Family Court that she could not
3 participate in the final days of the custody hearing, despite her obvious familiarity
with Family Court litigation procedure, and arguing that the Mother had filed the
motion to reopen to circumvent the heightened standard she was required to meet
under Section 729(c)(1).
(5) On October 26, 2022, the Family Court denied the Mother’s motion for
an emergency ex parte order and directed the parties to comply with the visitation
terms of the Custody Order. On November 15, 2022, the Family Court granted the
Father’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the motion was unopposed and that
the Mother had failed to plead that enforcement of the Custody Order would
endanger the Children’s physical health or significantly impair their emotional
development as required by Section 729(c)(1).3 Finally, on November 21, 2022, the
Family Court denied as untimely the Mother’s motion to reopen the Custody Order.
(6) On November 28, 2022, the Mother filed a motion to reargue the
Family Court’s November 15, 2022 order because the Family Court had concluded
that the Father’s motion to dismiss was unopposed, but the Mother had, in fact,
responded to and opposed the motion. After conducting an initial review of the filing
as required by 10 Del. C. § 8803, the Family Court ordered that the filing be
3 This order also disposed of the Mother’s renewed motion for interim relief.
4 dismissed as legally frivolous. Although the order purportedly rejected the filing, it
also noted that the motion for reargument was denied. This appeal followed.
(7) This Court’s review of a Family Court decision includes a review of
both the law and the facts.4 Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.5 If the law
was correctly applied, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion.6 We review
a trial court’s denial of a motion for reargument for abuse of discretion.7
(8) On appeal, the Mother argues that the Family Court improperly
dismissed her filing as legally frivolous and that the Family Court erred when it
granted the Father’s motion to dismiss because, she claims, the Custody Order was
not entered after a full hearing on the merits. The Mother also alleges that she was
deprived of the opportunity to participate in the custody hearing and that the Family
Court judge who rejected her motion for reargument is biased against her. The
Mother’s arguments are unavailing.
(9) As a preliminary matter, the Mother has waived any arguments relating
to the proceedings that led to the entry of the Custody Order because she failed to
appeal that order. Second, although we agree with the Mother that the Family Court
4 Mundy v. Devon, 906 A.2d 750, 752 (Del. 2006). 5 Wright v. Wright, 49 A.3d 1147, 1150 (Del. 2012). 6 Id. 7 Maddox v. Isaacs, 2013 WL 4858989, at *1 (Del. Sept. 10, 2013).
5 should not have rejected her filing as legally frivolous because she raised a legitimate
objection to the Family Court’s finding that the Father’s motion to dismiss was
unopposed, we nevertheless affirm the Family Court’s denial of the Mother’s motion
for reargument on the independent and alternative basis that the Family Court did
not abuse its discretion by denying the motion.8 Contrary to the Mother’s argument
on appeal, the fact that the Mother declined to participate in the final two days of the
hearing without notifying the court does not mean that she was deprived the
opportunity to participate in the hearing.9 The Custody Order was therefore “entered
by the [Family] Court after a full hearing on the merits,” and the Mother was required
to plead in her petition for custody modification that continuing enforcement of the
Custody Order “may endanger the [Children’s] physical health or significantly
impair [their] emotional development.”10 She did not do so. Accordingly, the
Family Court properly granted the Father’s motion to dismiss, and the Family Court
did not abuse its discretion when it denied the Mother’s motion for reargument,
which did not set forth any valid reason to set aside the Family Court’s order granting
8 See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995) (recognizing that this Court may affirm a trial court’s judgment on the basis of a different rationale than that articulated by the trial court). 9 We observe that the Mother does not deny that she was aware of the dates of the custody hearing. 10 13 Del. C. § 729(c).
6 the motion to dismiss.11 Finally, we have carefully reviewed the record and find that
it is devoid of any evidence that the Family Court judge harbors any bias against the
Mother.12
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family
Court be AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen L. Valihura Justice
11 See Dickens v. Coupe, 2019 WL 1220717, at *2 (Del. Mar. 13, 2019) (noting that the proper purpose of a motion for reargument is to ask the trial court to reconsider whether it overlooked an applicable legal principle or misapprehended the law or the facts). 12 See Beck v. Beck, 766 A.2d 482, 484-85 (Del. 2001) (noting that judges need not recuse themselves based on allegations of personal bias for or against a party; the alleged bias or prejudice must be based on information that the trial judge acquired from an extra-judicial source).