Stone v. Hall

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Mississippi
DecidedMay 3, 2019
Docket4:18-cv-00100
StatusUnknown

This text of Stone v. Hall (Stone v. Hall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stone v. Hall, (N.D. Miss. 2019).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI GREENVILLE DIVISION

TED STONE PLAINTIFF

V. CIVIL ACTION NO.: 4:18CV100-GHD-JMV

PELICIA HALL, ET AL. DEFENDANTS

ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE FOR PLAINTIFF TO RESPOND TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION

Defendant Huffman has filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff would ordinarily have fourteen (14) days after service of the motion to submit a response. Because he is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, however, the court finds that he should be allowed twenty (20) days from the date of this order to file his response and opposing evidence in accordance with the directives set out below. Summary Judgment Procedure and Proof Because the plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this action, a brief explanation regarding summary judgment motions is in order.1 Motions for summary judgment are authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. These motions permit the court to resolve lawsuits without the necessity of trials if there is no genuine dispute as to any facts which are material and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under Rule 56(e)(3), if the nonmoving party fails to properly address the moving party’s assertions of fact by presenting appropriate summary judgment evidence, the court may grant

1The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a district court may grant summary judgment sua sponte, provided that the losing party is afforded proper notice and an opportunity to submit documents opposing summary judgment. See Judwin Properties, Inc. v. U. S. Fire Insurance Co., 973 F.2d 432, 436 (5th Cir. 1992). summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials show the movant is entitled to it. In other words, when a defendant files a motion for summary judgment which is accompanied by proper supporting evidence, the court may grant the motion if the plaintiff fails to present evidence which contradicts it. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”2 In the usual case, the party who seeks summary judgment must show by affidavit or other evidentiary materials that there is no genuine dispute as to any fact material to resolution of the motion.3 In order for the court to find there are no genuine material factual issues, the court must

be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could have found for the nonmoving party or, in other words, that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is not sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for him.4 To satisfy this burden, the movant must either submit evidentiary documents that establish that the nonmovant cannot prove a material element of his claim, or, if the crucial issue is one for which the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial, point out that the evidentiary documents in the record do not contain sufficient proof on an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim.5

2Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1273 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 973, 113 S. Ct. 462, 121 L. Ed. 2d 371 (1992); Hanks v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 953 F.2d 996, 997 (5th Cir. 1992). “Material facts” are facts that “will affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 283 (5th Cir. 1998).

3See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).

4See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986).

5See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 952 F.2d 841, 847 (5th Cir. 1992). Once the moving party has carried that burden, however, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that summary judgment is not appropriate.6 The nonmoving party cannot discharge this burden by referring to the mere allegations or denials of the nonmoving party’s pleadings; rather, that party must, either by submitting opposing evidentiary documents or by referring to evidentiary documents already in the record, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue as to a material fact exists.7 The party opposing a motion supported by evidence cannot discharge his burden by alleging mere legal conclusions; instead, he must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.8 If he is unable to present affirmative evidence with his response to the motion, he must explain the reasons for his inability.9

Where the party opposing the motion for summary judgment will have the burden of proof on an essential element of his case at trial and does not, after adequate time for discovery, make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of that element, summary judgment may be entered against him.10 However, Rule 56 does not require that discovery take place before the court may grant a summary judgment.11 To be entitled to discovery prior to a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must demonstrate how additional time and discovery will enable him to rebut the movant’s allegation that no genuine issue of material fact exists.12

6See Little, 952 F.2d at 847; Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1991). 7See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 1991); Fields v. City of South Houston, 922 F.2d 1183, 1187 (5th Cir. 1991); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). 8See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248-55. 9See Cormier v. Pennzoil, 969 F.2d 1559, 1561 (5th Cir. 1992). 10Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24. 11See Cormier, 969 F.2d at 1561; Rosas v. U.S. Small Business Administration, 964 F.2d 351, 359 (5th Cir. 1992). 12See Cormier, 969 F.2d at 1561; International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1267 (5th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 502 U.S. 1059, 112 S. Ct. 936, 117 L. Ed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Salas v. Carpenter
980 F.2d 299 (Fifth Circuit, 1992)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Wayne Ernest Barker v. Ben Norman and Jack Ballas
651 F.2d 1107 (Fifth Circuit, 1981)
Irene Reese, Etc. v. Steve Anderson
926 F.2d 494 (Fifth Circuit, 1991)
Rosas v. U.S. Small Business Admin.
964 F.2d 351 (Fifth Circuit, 1992)
Colston v. Barnhart
146 F.3d 282 (Fifth Circuit, 1998)
Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distributor, Inc.
819 F.2d 547 (Fifth Circuit, 1987)
Fields v. City of South Houston
922 F.2d 1183 (Fifth Circuit, 1991)
Little v. Liquid Air Corp.
952 F.2d 841 (Fifth Circuit, 1992)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Stone v. Hall, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stone-v-hall-msnd-2019.