Stoll v. Musculoskeletal Institute, Chartered

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedNovember 18, 2020
Docket8:20-cv-01798
StatusUnknown

This text of Stoll v. Musculoskeletal Institute, Chartered (Stoll v. Musculoskeletal Institute, Chartered) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stoll v. Musculoskeletal Institute, Chartered, (M.D. Fla. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

RAY STOLL and HEIDI IMHOF, individually and o/b/o all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs, v. Case No.: 8:20-cv-1798-T-36AAS

MUSCULOSKELETAL INSTITUTE, CHARTERED d/b/a FLORIDA ORTHOPAEDIC INSTITUTE,

Defendant. ________________________________________/

ORDER Musculoskeletal Institute Chartered d/b/a Florida Orthopaedic Institute (Florida Orthopaedic) moves to strike a portion of the plaintiffs’ Amended Initial Disclosures. (Doc. 29). The plaintiffs oppose the motion. (Doc. 34). I. BACKGROUND The plaintiffs filed a state court putative class action arising from a data breach due to a ransomware attack against Florida Orthopaedic. (Doc. 1, Ex. 1). The plaintiffs allege common law and Florida state law claims against Florida Orthopaedic. (Id. at ¶¶ 91–217). Florida Orthopaedic removed the case to federal court. (Doc. 1). On September 14, 2020, the plaintiffs served Florida Orthopaedic with their Initial Disclosures. (Doc. 29, Ex. A). Florida Orthopaedic requested the plaintiffs 1 amend their initial disclosures to specify damages suffered by the named plaintiffs and not just the possible damages for the proposed class. (Doc. 29, ¶ 5). On October 1, 2020, the plaintiffs served their Amended Initial Disclosures. (Doc. 29, Ex. C). In the plaintiffs’ Amended Initial Disclosures, the plaintiffs include these fourteen damages categories: (a) actual identity theft; (b) unauthorized use and misuse of their PII; (c) the loss of opportunity to control how their PII is used; (d) the diminution in value of their PII; (e) the compromise, publication, and/or theft of their PII; (f) out-of-pocket costs associated with the prevention, detection, recovery, and remediation from identity theft or fraud; (g) the lost opportunity costs and lost wages associated with effort expended and the loss of productivity from addressing and attempting to mitigate the actual and future consequences of the Data Breach; (h) costs associated with placing freezes on credit reports; (i) delay in receipt of tax refund monies; (j) the diminished value of Defendant’s goods and services Plaintiffs and Class members received; (k) the lost opportunity and benefits of electronically filing of income tax returns; (l) the imminent and certain impending injury flowing from potential fraud and identity theft posed by their PII being placed in the hands of criminals; (m) the continued risk to their PII, which remains in the possession of Defendant and is subject to further breaches so long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate measures to protect the PII in their possession; and (n) current and future costs in terms of time, effort, and money that will be expended to prevent, detect, contest, remediate, and repair the impact of the Data Breach for the remainder of Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ lives.

(Doc. 29, Ex. C). Florida Orthopaedic requests an order striking the plaintiffs’ damages section 2 in their Amended Initial Disclosures. (Doc. 29, p. 6). Florida Orthopaedic also requests the order require the plaintiffs to amend their damages disclosures, and to provide all documents supporting those calculations. (Id.). Florida Orthopaedic also requests a stay of its obligation to respond to the plaintiffs’ discovery requests until the plaintiffs provide updated damages disclosures. (Id. at p. 7). Florida Orthopaedic argues the plaintiffs’ amended disclosures are incomplete

because they provide no factual or evidentiary support for those damages and do not attribute the damages to a cause of action. (Id. at p. 5). Florida Orthopaedic argues the plaintiffs must provide the documents supporting their damages rather than delay until a protective order is agreed to between the parties. (Id. at p. 6). The plaintiffs argue they have complied with Rule 26 by providing the categories of damages that are susceptible to computation. (Doc. 34, p. 4). The plaintiffs argue they cannot at this time provide a complete computation of damages

for eight categories1 because those categories depend on the extent of the data breach. (Id. at pp. 5–6). The plaintiffs argue four other categories2 have no fixed standard for their measurement and do not fall under the mandates of the Rule 26(a)(1)(iii). (Id. at p. 6). The plaintiffs assert those categories are novel, developing theories of damages. (Id.).

1 Those eight categories from the list above are: (a), (b), (h), (i), (j), (l), (m), and (n).

2 Those four categories from the list above are: (c), (d), (e), and (k). 3 II. ANALYSIS Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), “[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Florida Orthopaedic does not seek to strike a pleading but rather the plaintiffs’ Amended Initial Disclosures. Because Rule 12(f) is inapplicable to discovery, the court will construe Florida Orthopaedic’s motion as a motion to compel

more complete initial disclosures from the plaintiffs under Rule 37(b). The parties must disclose, without requesting, “a computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party—who must also make available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary material, unless privileged or protected from disclosure, on which each computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(iii ). The requirements of Rule 26(a) are mandatory. Altheim v. GEICO

Gen. Ins. Co., No. 8:10-cv-156-T-24TBM, 2010 WL 11508155, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 17, 2010). “The goal of the initial disclosure requirement is to accelerate the exchange of basic information about the case.” King v. City of Waycross, Ga., No. 5:14-cv-32, 2015 WL 5468646, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 2015) (citation omitted). The “disclosure provision applies only with respect to materials available to the party seeking monetary relief, and where the materials necessary for the

computation are not in this party’s possession,” the disclosure requirement does not apply. 8A Wright & Miller Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2053 (3d ed.). The disclosure 4 obligation is also subject to a duty to supplement under Rule 26(e)(1). At this point, the plaintiffs do not know the full extent of the data breach of Florida Orthopaedic’s system. Because the plaintiffs have not received discovery about the extent of the data breach of Florida Orthopaedic’s system, they do not yet know the extent of all of their alleged damages. However, as discovery progresses, the plaintiffs must supplement their initial disclosures to address the eight categories

it states depends on the extent of the data breach. See LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, G.P., No. 8:06-cv-1216-T-TBM, 2007 WL 2446900, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2007) (The disclosing party must make “a good faith estimate of damages and methods of calculations based on the information available at this stage of the litigation while reserving the right to amend his calculation.”). Although the plaintiffs have not provided damage calculations for the remaining categories,3 the plaintiffs presented their developing theories of damages

to Florida Orthopaedic. Because these theories are developing, the plaintiffs will conduct discovery to determine whether those theories create a remedy and possible fixed standard for damages. But see Mee Indus. v. Dow Chem. Co., 608 F.3d 1202, 1221 (11th Cir.

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