Stokes v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: June 16, 2025
• Docket: 99, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

TERRANCE STOKES, § § No. 99, 2025 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID No. 1702003570 (K) STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Appellee. §

Submitted: April 11, 2025 Decided: June 16, 2025

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to

affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Terrance Stokes, filed this appeal from the Superior

Court’s denial of a motion in which Stokes sought to modify the Level IV portion of

his sentence to Level III. The State has moved to affirm the judgment below on the

ground that it is manifest on the face of Stokes’s opening brief that the appeal is

without merit. We agree and affirm. (2) In Criminal Action No. 1702003570, Stokes pleaded guilty to second-

degree robbery and second-degree conspiracy.1 The Superior Court sentenced him

as follows: for second-degree robbery, five years of imprisonment, suspended after

four years for six months of Level IV work release or home confinement, followed

by twelve months of Level III probation; for second-degree conspiracy, two years of

imprisonment, suspended for twelve months of Level III probation.

(3) In addition to an unsuccessful motion for postconviction relief, Stokes

has filed several unsuccessful motions for reduction or modification of sentence. In

February 2025, he filed a motion seeking modification of the Level IV portion of his

sentence to Level III so that he can request transfer of his probation supervision to

California when he is released from Level V. The Superior Court denied the motion,

stating that the court will not consider repetitive requests for sentence reduction or

modification. Stokes has appealed to this Court.

(4) We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for modification of

sentence for abuse of discretion.2 First, Stokes asserts, without additional

information, that the Superior Court judge knows the victim in the case and should

have recused himself. Stokes’s motion in the Superior Court did not seek the judge’s

1 In some filings, Stokes has referred to the criminal action number of another case, in which he pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a person prohibited. The Level IV time that he seeks to modify was imposed in the robbery and conspiracy case, No. 1702003570. 2 Benge v. State, 101 A.3d 973, 976-77 (Del. 2014). 2 recusal, nor has he provided any facts to suggest that recusal was warranted. We

find no reversible error as to this issue.

(5) Second, Stokes argues that the court abused its discretion by denying

the motion for modification because eliminating the Level IV portion of the sentence

would advance Stokes’s rehabilitative needs by allowing him to return to California

to help family members who were impacted by wildfires. Rule 35(b) of the Superior

Court Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “[t]he court will not consider

repetitive requests for reduction of sentence.”3 The rule “does not set forth any

exception to the repetitive motion bar.”4 “‘A motion is “repetitive” as that term is

used in Rule 35(b) when it is preceded by an earlier Rule 35(b) motion, even if the

subsequent motion raises new arguments.’”5 Stokes has previously brought

unsuccessful motions for reduction or modification of his sentence in this case. The

Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Stokes’s motion as repetitive.6

3 DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. PROC. 35(b). 4 State v. Culp, 152 A.3d 141, 144 (Del. 2016). 5 Barrall v. State, 2019 WL 1787310, at *1 (Del. Apr. 23, 2019) (quoting Culp, 152 A.3d at 144). 6 See id. (affirming denial of motion seeking a reduction of the term of probation and modification of the conditions of probation, and stating that the motion was repetitive because the defendant had brought two previous motions for sentence modification). 3 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Affirm is

GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths Justice