Stokes v. Hanford Police Dept.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: July 16, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00836
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 BILLIE STOKES, Case No. 1:25-cv-00836-SKO 10 Plaintiff, FIRST SCREENING ORDER 11 v. (Doc. 1) 12 HANFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT, et THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 Plaintiff Billie Stokes is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action. Plaintiff 16 filed his complaint in the Sacramento Division of this Court on July 7, 2025. (Doc. 1). The case 17 was transferred, sua sponte, to the Fresno Division on July 10, 2025. (See Doc. 3.) Upon reviewing 18 the complaint, the undersigned concludes that it fails to state any cognizable claims. 19 Plaintiff has the following options as to how to proceed. He may file an amended complaint, 20 which the Court will screen in due course. Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a statement with the 21 Court stating that he wants to stand on this complaint and have it reviewed by the presiding district 22 judge, in which case the undersigned will issue findings and recommendations to the district judge 23 consistent with this order. If Plaintiff does not file anything, the undersigned will recommend that 24 the case be dismissed. 25 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 26 In cases where the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to screen 27 each case and shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation of poverty 28 is untrue, or that the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which 1 relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 2 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (district 3 court has discretion to dismiss in forma pauperis complaint); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 4 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim). If the Court determines 5 that a complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the 6 deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 8 In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading 9 standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). A complaint must contain “a short and 10 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 12 a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 13 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A 14 complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a claim based on (1) the lack of 15 a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri 16 v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff must allege a minimum 17 factual and legal basis for each claim that is sufficient to give each defendant fair notice of what 18 the plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See, e.g., Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of 19 Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995); McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 20 In reviewing the pro se complaint, the Court is to liberally construe the pleadings and accept 21 as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 22 (2007). The Court, however, need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 23 at 678. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it 24 stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting 25 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal quotation marks omitted). 26 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 27 Plaintiff drafted his complaint using the general complaint form provided by the United 28 States District Court for the Northern District of California. (Doc. 1.) The complaint names the 1 Hanford Police Department, the Kings County Jail, “J. Farr,” and “T. Davis” as defendants. (Doc. 2 1 at 1, 2.) Plaintiff states that subject matter jurisdiction is based on federal question. (Id. at 2.) In 3 the section in which Plaintiff is asked to indicate which federal law or right is involved, Plaintiff 4 writes “Civil Rights.” (Id.) 5 The statement of facts section of the complaint states: “Myself Billie Stokes, My Civil 6 Rights, Assault, false charges, Personal Property Damages, Personal Injury! Harassment, 7 Discrimination, False Reports, Police Brutality, Destroying Personal Property!” (Doc. 1 at 3.) The 8 “Civil Rights” claim is explained as “Pushed, Hit on right side of my face as well as being escorted 9 to a different unit car flying knee kicked with bunt [sic] force! All my civil rights where [sic] taken 10 from me for 7 years time money spend couldn’t even get a new job due to the false charges.” (Id. 11 at 5.) Regarding the relief sought, Plaintiff writes, “70,000,000 for 7 years of my life I cannot get 12 back.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff attaches to the complaint 11 pages comprised of an agency complaint 13 form dated May 15, 2019, describing an interaction with Hanford law enforcement on May 13, 14 2019; a “transcript” of an interaction between Plaintiff and Defendant J. Farr; a “Certificate of 15 Graduation” from a “Citizens Police Academy Class” presented by the Fresno Police Department 16 dated October 8, 2014; a civil rights complaint filed April 11, 2025, in Superior Court of California, 17 County of Kings, against the “Hanford Police Department, et al.”; and a “Bail Information Sheet” 18 from the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office dated June 10, 2023. (See id. at 9–19.) 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the complaint does not state any 21 cognizable claims. Plaintiff shall be provided with the legal standards that appear to apply to his 22 claim and will be granted an opportunity to file an amended complaint to correct the identified 23 deficiencies. 24 A. “Civil Rights”: Section 1983 25 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) provides a cause of action for the violation of 26 Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre 27 v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009); Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 28 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). “Section 1983 is not 1 itself a source of substantive rights but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights 2 elsewhere conferred.” Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Sec’y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th 3 Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989)) (internal quotation marks 4 omitted). It “creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, 5 liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional 6 deprivation.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996); see Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 7 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Liability under [S]ection 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal 8 participation by the defendant.”). 9 To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant (1) acted 10 under color of state law, and (2) deprived them of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. 11 Long, 442 F.3d at 1185; see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) 12 (discussing “under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within 13 the meaning of [Section] 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative 14 act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of 15 which complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 16 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “ 17 A Section 1983 plaintiff’s allegations must demonstrate that each individual defendant 18 personally participated in the deprivation of their rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. This requires the 19 presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Persons proceeding 20 pro se are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their 21 favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). But the sheer 22 possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability 23 falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 24 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 25 As set forth below, although he purports to bring a claim for “Civil Rights” (Doc. 1 at 2, 5), 26 Plaintiff has not pleaded a cognizable claim under Section 1983. 27 1. Claims Against the Hanford Police Department and the Kings County Jail 28 Plaintiff names as defendants the Hanford Police Department and the Kings County Jail, as 1 indicated above. If Plaintiff wishes to proceed with a Section 1983 claim at the entity level—rather 2 than asserting them against individual officers—he will need to meet the legal standard for stating 3 a constitutional claim against a municipal entity. Although there is split authority on this subject, 4 the undersigned continues to hold that a California police department is not a “person” under 5 Section 1983 and therefore not a proper defendant for Section 1983 claims. See Gunn v. Stanton 6 Corr. Facility, No. 2: 21-CV-0456-KJN-P, 2021 WL 1402141, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2021) 7 (citing Cantu v. Kings Cty., No. 1:20-CV-00538-NONE-SAB, 2021 WL 411111, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. 8 Feb. 5, 2021) (discussing split authority in this district)). Nor is the Kings County Jail a properly 9 named defendant under Section 1983. See Gatlin v. Bank of Am., No. 2:23-CV-0272-DAD-KJN 10 P, 2023 WL 2529725, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2023) (“Turning to plaintiff’s claim against 11 defendant Sacramento County Jail, an agency or department of a municipal entity is not a proper 12 defendant under Section 1983.”). This is because the Hanford Police Department and the Kings 13 County Jail are subdivisions, departments, or agencies of a local government entity—in this case 14 the City of Hanford and the County of Kings, respectively. Nelson v. County of Sacramento, 926 15 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1170 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2013) (“Under [Section] 1983, ‘persons’ includes 16 municipalities. It does not include municipal departments.”). Thus, Plaintiff would need to sue the 17 City of Hanford and the County of Kings, not the Police Department and the Jail. If Plaintiff files 18 an amended complaint naming the City of Hanford and the County of Kings as defendants, the 19 legal standard for stating a claim against a municipal entity is as follows. 20 Liability under Section 1983 may be imposed on local governments when their official 21 policies or customs cause their employees to violate an individual’s constitutional rights. Monell 22 v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). A plaintiff may establish Monell liability by 23 showing that a city or county employee committed an alleged constitutional violation pursuant to 24 a formal governmental policy or a “longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the ‘standard 25 operating procedure’ of the local governmental entity.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 26 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (citation omitted). A “policy” is a “deliberate choice to follow a course 27 of action . . . made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for 28 establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Fogel v. Collins, 531 F.3d 1 824, 834 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A “custom” is a “widespread practice that, although 2 not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to 3 constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.” St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 4 (1988) (citation omitted). To hold the municipality liable, the policy, practice, or custom must be 5 the “moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 6 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011). Further, the policy or custom must “reflect[ ] deliberate indifference 7 to the constitutional rights of [the municipality’s] inhabitants.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 8 378, 392 (1989); Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016). 9 Therefore, for any constitutional violation Plaintiff might wish to assert against the City of 10 Hanford and Kings County via Section 1983, he would have to allege facts showing “that a 11 [municipal] employee committed the alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a formal 12 governmental policy or a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating 13 procedure of the [municipality].” Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346. In very restricted circumstances, the 14 lack of a county policy to limit constitutional violations—for instance a failure to train county 15 employees or officers—can also give rise to Monell liability. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390; 16 Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he decision not to take any action to 17 alleviate the problem of detecting missed arraignments constitutes a policy for purposes of § 1983 18 municipal liability.”). 19 The current complaint lacks sufficient facts to raise a Monell claim of any sort against the 20 City of Hanford or Kings County based on any constitutional violation. Plaintiff merely alleges 21 that the defendants “pushed,” “hit,” and “kicked” him. (Doc. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff does not allege 22 which specific County or City officers or employees violated his constitutional rights, or how they 23 did so; nor does he connect their conduct to a County or City policy, practice, or custom. 24 Should Plaintiff wish to pursue constitutional claims via Section 1983 against the County, 25 City, and/or its employees or government actors, the Court briefly addresses the problems with the 26 potential constitutional claim suggested in the current complaint so that Plaintiff can address them 27 in any amended complaint, if he chooses. 28 1 2. Excessive Force 2 Plaintiff appears to assert a claim for excessive force, although the circumstances and the 3 participants are unclear. (See Doc. 1 at 5.) The use of excessive force by law enforcement officers 4 in effectuating an arrest states a valid claim under Section 1983. See Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 5 780 F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 1986). A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force 6 in the course of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen is analyzed under the Fourth 7 Amendment reasonableness standard. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394–95. “Determining whether the 8 force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a 9 careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 10 interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396 (citations omitted). 11 Whether a law enforcement officer’s use of force was “objectively reasonable” depends upon the 12 totality of the facts and circumstances confronting him. Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 13 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1128 (2005). 14 “The question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the 15 facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” 16 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (citation omitted). Reasonableness must be assessed from the perspective 17 of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight, and must allow 18 for the fact that “police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances 19 that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a 20 particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. 397. The relevant factors in the Fourth Amendment 21 reasonableness inquiry include “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an 22 immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or 23 attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. While these are the most common 24 considerations, they are not “a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions” to determine 25 whether an officer’s conduct constituted excessive force. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 26 Consequently, courts consider other factors, such as the availability of alternative methods of 27 capturing or detaining the suspect in determining reasonableness. Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 28 1 1441 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1148 (1995). 2 Plaintiff alleges that he was “Pushed, Hit on right side of my face as well as being escorted 3 to a different unit car flying knee kicked with bunt [sic] force!” (Doc. 1 at 5.) The Court finds that 4 these allegations as pleaded fail to state a cognizable claim for the use of excessive force in violation 5 of the Fourth Amendment because Plaintiff does not sufficiently plead facts to link any of the 6 defendants to any specific factual allegations sufficient show their “integral participation” in 7 allegedly unlawful actions and whether those actions were objectively unreasonable under the 8 circumstances. 9 3. “False Charges” 10 Plaintiff pleads that he was subjected to “false reports” and “false charges” (Doc. 1 at 3, 11 5.) The filing of false reports during a criminal proceeding may be brought as a malicious 12 prosecution claim.1 A claim for malicious prosecution or abuse of process is not generally 13 cognizable under Section 1983 if a process is available within the state judicial system to provide 14 a remedy. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). The 15 exception is “when a malicious prosecution is conducted with the intent to deprive a person of equal 16 protection of the laws or is otherwise intended to subject a person to denial of constitutional rights.” 17 Id. (citations omitted). To prevail on a Section 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff 18 “must show that the defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable cause, and that 19 they did so for the purpose of denying [him] equal protection or another specific constitutional 20 right.” Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir.1995) (citations omitted). See 21 also Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). Malicious prosecution 22 actions are not limited to suits against prosecutors, but also may be “brought against other persons 23 who have wrongfully caused the charges to be filed.” Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1066 (citing Galbraith 24

25 1 To the extent Plaintiff intends to challenge an arrest as the result of “false charges,” such claim may be pursued as a Fourth Amendment violation under Section 1983. An arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and gives rise to a claim for damages under Section 1983. Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1022 (9th 26 Cir. 2008). “Probable cause to arrest exists when officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe an offense has been or is being committed by the person 27 being arrested.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007)). Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support a lack of probable cause for his arrest sufficient to state a 28 Fourth Amendment false arrest claim 1 v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2002)). See also Blankenhorn v. City of 2 Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 482 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[a] police officer who maliciously or recklessly makes 3 false reports to the prosecutor may be held liable for damages incurred as a proximate result of 4 those reports”). 5 Again, Plaintiff has pleaded no facts to support such a claim. Plaintiff fails to plead to 6 whom any false “charges” or reports were made, i.e., a prosecutor, nor does he plead facts showing 7 the participation by the named defendants in the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff 8 also pleads no facts that he was prosecuted with malice and without probable cause, or facts 9 sufficient to show that false “charges” or reports were made for the purpose of denying Plaintiff 10 equal protection or another specific constitutional right. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a 11 cognizable claim for malicious prosecution under Section 1983. 12 4. Statute of Limitations 13 Critically, any Section 1983 claim appears to be time-barred under the applicable statute of 14 limitations according to the face of the complaint. For claims brought pursuant to Section 1983, 15 the statute of limitations is the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Fink 16 v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 17 2004) (noting California’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to § 18 1983 claims); McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 674-674 (9th Cir. 1991) overruled 19 on other grounds by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (“suits under § 1985(3) 20 are . . . governed by the same statute of limitations as actions under §1983). The California statute 21 of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1. Although 22 California law determines the limitations period, federal law determines when a claim accrues. 23 Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 363 F.3d 916, 926 (9th Cir. 2004). Under federal law, a claim 24 accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the 25 action.” Id. (quoting TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999)). 26 “Failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitations may be grounds for dismissal 27 at the screening stage if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that plaintiff cannot ‘prevail, 28 as a matter of law, on the equitable tolling issue.’” Tafoya v. City of Hanford, Case No. 1:20-cv- 1 00010-NONE-SAB, 2020 WL 1083823, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2020) (citing Cervantes v. City of 2 San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993); Kelly v. Islam, Case No. 1:18–cv–00018–JDP, 2018 3 WL 2670661, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2018); El-Shaddai v. Stainer, 2016 WL 7261230, at *21 4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2016)). In actions where the federal court borrows the state statute of 5 limitations, courts should also borrow all applicable provisions for tolling the limitations period 6 found in state law. Jones, 393 F.3d at 927. This applies to both statutory and equitable tolling. Id. 7 (“For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for 8 personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s law regarding tolling, including equitable 9 tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent with federal law.”). 10 “Equitable tolling under California law ‘operates independently of the literal working of the 11 Code of Civil Procedure to suspend or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure 12 fundamental practicality and fairness.’” Jones, 393 F.3d at 928 (quoting Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 13 31 Cal.4th 363, 370 (2003)). “Under California law, a plaintiff must meet three conditions to 14 equitably toll a statute of limitations: (1) defendant must have had timely notice of the claim; (2) 15 defendant must not be prejudiced by being required to defend the otherwise barred claim; and (3) 16 plaintiff’s conduct must have been reasonable and in good faith.” Fink, 192 F.3d at 916 (internal 17 quotation marks and citation omitted). 18 Plaintiff appears to base his claim arising under Section 1983 on events that occurred “7 19 years” ago. (Doc. 1 at 5, 7.) An attachment to Plaintiff’s complaint suggests that the events giving 20 rise to Plaintiff’s claim occurred in May 2019. (See id. at 9.) Both time periods are outside the 21 statute of limitations. Thus, any claim pursuant to Sections 1983 based on events that occurred 22 prior to July 7, 2023, i.e., two years before the filing of the complaint, is facially time-barred and 23 not cognizable, absent any applicable tolling. If Plaintiff intends to pursue a claim under Section 24 1983 based on events before that date, any amended complaint should allege facts establishing that 25 the statute of limitations has not run or that equitable tolling applies. 26 5. Abstention 27 Finally, the Court notes that state court records attached to the complaint indicate Plaintiff 28 is or was involved in civil litigation with the Hanford Police Department in Kings County Superior 1 Court, Case Number 25CU0160, Billie Stokes vs. Hanford Police Department et al. (See Doc. 1 at 2 16.) If the state court case is currently pending and involves claims based on the same incident at 3 issue here, several abstention doctrines may preclude this Court from deciding this case until the 4 state court case is final.2 5 Under the abstention doctrine articulated in Younger v. Harris, a federal district court should 6 abstain from hearing a federal case that may interfere with certain state proceedings. 401 U.S. 37, 7 43-54 (1971). “Abstention is required when: ‘(i) the state proceedings are ongoing; (ii) the 8 proceedings implicate important state interests; and (iii) the state proceedings provide an adequate 9 opportunity to raise federal questions.’” Delta Dental Plan of California, Inc. v. Mendoza, 139 10 F.3d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Although the Younger 11 abstention doctrine originated in the context of pending state court criminal proceedings, it has 12 since been extended to certain civil cases. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 (1975). 13 Younger has also been extended beyond state civil enforcement proceedings to also avoid 14 interference with pending civil proceedings involving certain orders that further state courts’ 15 performance of judicial functions. Sprint Communs., Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013). 16 Although Younger principles apply to actions for damages as well as for injunctive or declaratory 17 relief, in general the doctrine warrants a stay of damages actions until state proceedings are 18 completed, rather than dismissal. AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th 19 Cir. 2007). 20 Abstention may also be warranted under the doctrine articulated in Colorado River Water 21 Conservation Dist. v. United States, which considers the following factors: (1) which court first 22 assumed jurisdiction over any property at stake, (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum, (3) the 23 desire to avoid piecemeal litigation, (4) the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction, (5) 24 whether federal or state law provides the rule of decision on the merits, (6) whether the state court 25 proceedings can adequately protect the federal litigants’ rights, (7) the desire to avoid forum 26 shopping, and (8) whether the state court proceedings will resolve all issues before the federal court. 27 2 The doctrine of res judicata may also later bar this Court’s consideration of any potential federal claim. See Ali v. 28 Cnty. of San Joaquin, No. 2:17-CV-0509 AC P, 2017 WL 5665836, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2017). 1 Montanore Minerals Corp. v. Bakie, 867 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 2017). 2 Any amended complaint must state whether Plaintiff is or has been involved in any state 3 court litigation or other legal proceedings involving the incident at issue here and, if so, indicate 4 the status or outcome of those proceedings or that litigation. 5 B. Leave to Amend 6 The Court has screened Plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state any cognizable 7 claims. Under Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court should freely 8 give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Accordingly, the Court will provide Plaintiff with 9 time to file an amended complaint so he can provide additional factual allegations against 10 defendants who are amenable to suit and demonstrate why this case should not be barred by the 11 statute of limitations or stayed in favor of state court proceedings. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. 12 Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days. If Plaintiff 13 chooses to amend his complaint, in his amended complaint he must state what each named 14 defendant did that led to the deprivation of his constitutional or other federal rights. Fed. R. Civ. 15 P. 8(a); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. 16 Plaintiff is further advised that an amended complaint supersedes all prior complaints filed 17 in an action, Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012), and must be “complete 18 in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” E.D. Cal. Local Rule 220. 19 Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement 20 of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. Plaintiff is advised that, in determining whether a 21 complaint states cognizable claims, the Court’s duty is to evaluate the complaint’s factual 22 allegations, not to wade through exhibits. 23 The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First Amended Complaint,” 24 refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. Although 25 Plaintiff has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not for the purpose of changing the nature 26 of this suit or adding unrelated claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no 27 “buckshot” complaints). 28 Plaintiff has a choice on how to proceed. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint as 1 described above, which will be screened in due course. Alternatively, Plaintiff may choose to stand 2 on his complaint subject to the undersigned issuing findings and recommendations to a district 3 judge consistent with this order. Lastly, Plaintiff may file a notice of voluntary dismissal. 4 IV. ORDER 5 Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that: 6 1. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall either: 7 a. File a First Amended Complaint; 8 b. Notify the Court in writing that he wants to stand on the current complaint; 9 or 10 c. File a notice of voluntary dismissal. 11 2. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff shall caption the amended 12 complaint “First Amended Complaint” and refer to case number 1:25-cv-00836- 13 SKO. 14 3. Failure to comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this action. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 17 Dated: July 15, 2025 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18

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