Stokes v. Chrysler Corp.

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: April 22, 1996
• Docket: CV-94-647-SD
• Status: Published

Opinion

Stokes v. Chrysler Corp. CV-94-647-SD 04/22/96 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Gina Stokes, et al

v. Civil No. 94-647-SD

Chrysler Corporation

O R D E R

In this diversity action, plaintiffs Gina and David Stokes,

and Joanne Falmuchi-Johnson on behalf of the Estate of Tammi

Stokes, assert, inter alia, a claim for strict products liability

against defendant Chrysler Corporation for injuries incurred when

plaintiffs' Jeep Cherokee was involved in a motor vehicle

accident.

Presently before the court is plaintiffs' motion for partial

summary judgment on the issue of the existence of a manufacturing

defect in the vehicle, to which defendant objects.

Background

The background of this action is outlined in the court's

order of June 26, 1995, at 2-3, and will not be here repeated. Discussion

1. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment shall be ordered when "there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Fed. R.

Civ. P. Since the purpose of summary judgment is issue finding,

not issue determination, the court's function at this stage "'is

not [] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the

matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial.'" Stone & Michaud Ins., Inc. v. Bank Five for Savings,

785 F. Supp. 1065, 1068 (D.N.H. 1992) (guoting Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). Although

"motions for summary judgment must be decided on the record as it

stands, not on litigants' visions of what the facts might some

day reveal," Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriquez, 23 F.3d 576,

581 (1st Cir. 1994), the entire record will be scrutinized inthe

light most favorable to the nonmovant, with all reasonable

inferences indulged in that party's favor. Smith v. Stratus

Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1994), cert, denied, ___

U.S. ___ , 115 S. C t . 1958 (1995); see also Woods v. Friction

Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 259 (1st Cir. 1994); Maldonado-

Denis , supra, 23 F.3d at 581.

"In general . . . a party seeking summary judgment [is

2 required to] make a preliminary showing that no genuine issue of

material fact exists." National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of

Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir.) (citing Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)), cert, denied, U.S.

115 S. C t . 2247 (1995) .

A "genuine" issue is one that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because it may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. Maldonado-Denis, 23 F.3d at 581. In other words, a genuine issue exists "if there is 'sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute' to require a choice between 'the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.'" Id. (quoting Garside [v. Osco Drug, Inc.,1 895 F.2d [46,] 48 [1st Cir. 1990)]. A "material" issue is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 435 (1st Cir. 1995).

"'The evidence illustrating the factual controversy cannot

be conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the

sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a

factfinder must resolve . . . .'" National Amusements, supra, 43

F.3d at 735 (quoting Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d

179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989)). Accordingly, "purely conclusory

allegations, . . . rank speculation, or . . . improbable

inferences" may be properly discredited by the court, id. (citing

Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st

Cir. 1990)), and "'are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of

3 material fact,'" Horta v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 2, 8 (1st Cir. 1993)

(quoting August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 580

(1st Cir. 1992)).

2. The Merits

Plaintiffs principally rely upon the report and affidavit of

their vehicle-analysis expert David A. Renfroe, Ph.D., P.E.,

wherein he concludes that "Tammi's rear seat failed allowing her

to be ejected . . . [and that such] back seat failure was due to

a manufacturing defect[,] i.e excessive grinding of the left

locking tab weld . . . ." Affidavit of David A. Renfroe, Ph.D.,

P.E., 5 6 (attached to Plaintiff's Motion as Exhibit B)

(parenthesis omitted).

In apparent opposition to this conclusion, defendant has

submitted an affidavit and report of their own retained vehicle-

analysis expert, Jon S. McKibben, who avers that "[biased on

presently available information, it is my opinion that there is

no manufacturing defect in the left locking tab weld for the rear

seat of the subject vehicle." Affidavit of Jon S. McKibben 5 3

(attached to Defendant's Objection as Exhibit B ) . In support

thereof, Mr. McKibben offers the following opinion:

Deformation of the seatback is substantial, consistent with the loading against the seatback by the rear passenger when the rear of the Jeep was accelerated forward by the trailer which

4 impacted the upper left rear Jeep structure. Deformation of the seatback obviously occurred before any separation of seatback retention latches. Due to the extensive deformation loads on the seatback, the seatback bent and ultimately forced the upper left seatback latch assembly apart.

There is no indication that the Jeep Cherokee involved in this crash performed any differently than would any other typical production vehicle of similar type. No defect in design or manufacture appears to have caused or aggravated injuries in this case.

Preliminary Investigation Report of Jon S. McKibben, dated

December 4, 1995, at 4-5 (attached to Defendant's Objection as

Exhibit B ) .

In light of the conflicting evidence on the issue of

manufacturing defect, as well as the acknowledgement that the

respective experts have yet to be deposed, the court herewith

denies plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment as to

manufacturing defect.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, plaintiffs' motion for

partial summary judgment as to manufacturing defect (document 21)

is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Shane Devine, Senior Judge United States District Court

April 22, 1996

5 cc: Robert M. Nadeau, Esq Robert J. Foley, Esq. Peter M. Durney, Esq.