Stokes v. Amen Corporation

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: April 4, 2024
• Docket: 1:22-cv-00565
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MICHAEL STOKES, Case No. 1:22-cv-00565-JLT-CDB

12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 13 v. DEFAULT JUDGMENT

14 AMEN CORPORATION, (Doc. 9)

15 Defendant. 14-DAY DEADLINE

17 18 Plaintiff Michael Stokes initiated this action with the filing of a complaint against 19 Defendant Amen Corporation on May 10, 2023. (Doc. 1). On May 11, 2022, the Court issued a 20 summons, and on June 10, 2022, Plaintiff filed a notice of summons returned executed. (Doc. 5). 21 After Defendant failed to timely respond to the complaint, Plaintiff moved for entry of default on 22 August 9, 2022, and default was entered by the Clerk of the Court on the same day. (Docs. 6-7). 23 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, filed on October 19, 24 2022. (Doc. 9).1 For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned will recommend to the 25 assigned district judge that the motion be granted. 26 / / /

27 1 This matter is referred to the undersigned for issuance of findings and recommendations pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(19). 1 Background 2 According to the allegations of his complaint, Plaintiff is a professional photographer and 3 the legal and rightful owner of a photograph of Kyle Clark, a United States Army Captain, 4 modeling in physician’s attire with a hanging surgical facemask (“the Photograph”). The 5 Photograph was registered to Plaintiff by the United States Copyright Office (“USCO”) on 6 October 15, 2015, under registration number VAu 1-222-629. (Doc. 1 p. 5). 7 Defendant is the registered owner of a Facebook account associated with the Casablanca 8 Night Club in Bakersfield, California (@CasablancaNightclubBakersfield) (hereinafter, the 9 “Account”). (Doc. 9-7 p. 3). According to Plaintiff’s complaint, the Casablanca Night Club 10 conducts “Drag shows” and events with male performers on “stripper poles.” The Account also 11 contains paid advertisements through which Defendant draws profits. Id. 12 On March 14, 2022, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s Account and found 11 separate posts 13 advertising a “Medic Strippers” event that featured the Photograph, with five posts dated on 14 February 21, 2018, two posts on February 22, 2018, three posts on February 24, 2018, and 15 February 28, 2018. (Doc. 1 ⁋27; Doc. 1-2). Plaintiff did not grant Defendant a license, 16 authorization, or other permission to use the Photograph. Id. ⁋32. It is evident that the 17 Photograph was copied and used as a component of Defendant’s promotional material. Id. ⁋35. 18 Legal Standard 19 In general, “default judgments are ordinarily disfavored,” as “[c]ases should be decided 20 upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 21 616 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986)). Prior to 22 entry of default judgment, there must be an entry of default. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. Upon entry 23 of default, the factual allegations of the complaint, save for those concerning damages, are 24 deemed to have been admitted by the defaulting party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6); see Geddes v. 25 United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). Where the damages claimed is 26 a liquidated sum or ascertainable by mathematical calculation, the Court may enter a default 27 judgment without a hearing. See Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 1981); Mesa 1 Apr. 11, 2016), F&R adopted, 2016 WL 9180434 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2016). 2 However, “a defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit 3 conclusions of law.” United States v. Cathcart, No. C 07–4762 PJH, 2010 WL 1048829, at *4 4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2010) (citing Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 5 1206 (5th Cir.1975)); cf. DirecTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) 6 (allegations that do no more than “parrot” the elements of a claim not deemed admitted). “[F]acts 7 which are not established by the pleadings of the prevailing party, or claims which are not well- 8 pleaded, are not binding and cannot support the judgment.” Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 9 1388 (9th Cir. 1978). 10 A district court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for default judgment. Aldabe v. 11 Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); see TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 12 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Rule 55 gives the court considerable leeway as to what it may 13 require as a prerequisite to the entry of a default judgment.”) (per curiam). The Ninth Circuit has 14 set out seven factors to be considered by courts in reviewing a motion for default judgment: “(1) 15 the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim (3) the 16 sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a 17 dispute concerning material facts, (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) 18 the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the 19 merits.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. Entry of default judgment is not appropriate where the 20 second and third factors weigh against plaintiff. See Mnatsakanyan v. Goldsmith & Hull APC, 21 2013 WL 10155707, *10 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2013) (“The fact that factors two and three weigh 22 against the entry of default judgment is particularly significant, as courts often treat these as the 23 most important factors.”) (citing cases). 24 “If the court determines that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to establish 25 liability, it must then determine the ‘amount and character’ of the relief that should be awarded.” 26 Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Parth Enters., Inc., 725 F. Supp.2d 916, 920 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting 27 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. and Proc. § 2688, at 63 (3d ed. 1998)). However, 1 Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992); Aldabe, 616 F.2d at 1092-93 2 (“Given the lack of merit in appellant’s substantive claims, we cannot say that the district court 3 abused its discretion in declining to enter a default judgment in favor of appellant”). 4 Discussion 5 1. Possibility of Prejudice to the Plaintiffs 6 The first Eitel factor contemplates the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff if a default 7 judgment is not entered. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. Prejudice may be shown where failure to enter 8 a default judgment would leave plaintiff without a proper remedy. PepsiCo, Inc. v. California 9 Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Here, this factor favors the entry of 10 default judgment as Defendant has failed to participate in this action despite being properly 11 served with the complaint and motion for default judgment. (Docs. 5, 7). See J&J Prods., Inc. v. 12 Gomez, No. 1:10-cv-02249-LJO-JLT, 2012 WL 4936057, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2012) 13 (applying Eitel factors and awarding default judgement in copyright infringement case), F&R 14 adopted, 2012 5386270 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2012). 15 2. Sufficiency of the Complaint and the Likelihood of Success on the Merits 16 The second and third Eitel factors require the Court to consider the merits of the plaintiff’s 17 substantive claim and the sufficiency of the complaint. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. The Court 18 considers these two factors together given the close relationship between the two inquiries. 19 Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F.Supp.2d 1039, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2010). These two 20 factors will favor entry of default judgment where the complaint sufficiently states a claim for 21 relief upon which the plaintiff may recover. PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp.2d at 1177. 22 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated 17 U.S.C. § 501 et seq., and seeks damages under 23 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Since this claim arises under federal copyright law, the Court finds that 24 federal jurisdiction exists. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (“The district courts shall have original 25 jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety 26 protection, copyrights and trademarks.”) 27 “An owner of a copyright has the exclusive rights to authorize reproductions of the 1 copies ‘by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.’” J&J Prods., Inc., 2 2012 WL 4936057, at *3 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 106). To prevail on a claim of copyright 3 infringement, “two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying 4 of constituent elements of the work that are original.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 5 Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 6 Taking the allegations of the complaint as true, Plaintiff owns a valid copyright of the 7 Photograph (Doc. 1-4), and Defendant “used, published, communicated, posted, publicized, and 8 otherwise held out to the public for commercial benefit” Plaintiff’s Photograph, without 9 authorization. (Doc. 1 ⁋51). Since Plaintiff adequately stated the elements of a copyright 10 infringement claim, the second and third Eitel factors favor granting default judgment. 11 McDermott v. RYI Unity LLC, No. 8:23-cv-00927-MCS-JDE, 2023 WL 9418045, at *3 (C.D. 12 Cal. Dec. 19, 2023) (applying Eitel factors and awarding default judgment in copyright 13 infringement case). 14 3. Sum of Money at Stake 15 Under the fourth Eitel factor, “the court must consider the amount of money at stake in 16 relation to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc., F.Supp.2d at 1176-77. 17 “[S]tatutory damages are appropriate in default judgment cases because the information needed to 18 prove actual damages is within the infringers’ control and is not disclosed.” Microsoft Corp. v. 19 Nop, 549 F.Supp.2d 1233, 1238 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, 20 where a large sum of money is at stake, this factor disfavors default judgment. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 21 1472. 22 Damages for copyright claims are largely within the Court’s discretion. Peer Int’l Corp. 23 v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1990). Since the Court will recommend 24 reduction of the claimed damages to an amount commensurate with Defendant’s alleged 25 misconduct, this factor does not weigh against entry of default judgment. See Three Lakes 26 Design v. Savala, No. 2:17-cv-01757 MCE CKD (PS), 2019 WL 1979918, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 27 3, 2019) (recommending reduced award of statutory damages in granting default judgment to 1 4. Possibility of Disputed Material Facts. 2 The fifth Eitel factor examines whether a dispute exists regarding material facts. Eitel, 3 782 F.2d at 1471-72. Since Defendant is in default, all of Plaintiff’s well pleaded factual 4 allegations are taken as true. TeleVideo Sys., Inc., 826 F.2d at 918 (citing Geddes, F.2d at 560). 5 Where, as here, a properly served defendant fails to defend the action, there is little possible 6 dispute of material fact that would preclude the grant of default judgment in Plaintiff’s favor. J&J 7 Prods., Inc., 2012 WL 4936057, at *5. This factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment. 8 5. Whether the Default was Due to Excusable Neglect 9 The sixth Eitel factor examines whether a defendant’s default was due to excusable 10 neglect. PespiCo, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177; Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. This factor considers due 11 process and requires a court to assess whether defendants are “given notice reasonably calculated 12 to apprise them of the pendency of the action and be afforded opportunity to present their 13 objection before a final judgment is rendered.” Phillip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., 219 14 F.R.D. 494, 500 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 15 Defendant was served with the summons and complaint. (Doc. 5). In addition, Plaintiff 16 served Defendant with a copy of his motion and supporting papers for default judgment (Doc. 9) 17 but Defendant failed to answer, appear, or file any opposition, seek an extension, or otherwise 18 respond to Plaintiff’s motion. Accordingly, this factor favors entry of default judgment. See J&J 19 Prods., Inc., 2012 WL 4936057, at *5. 20 6. Policy of Deciding Cases on the Merits 21 The seventh Eitel factor emphasizes the “general rule that default judgments are ordinarily 22 disfavored.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. “Cases should be decided upon the merits whenever 23 reasonably possible.” Id. (citing Pena v. Seguros La Comersial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 24 1985)). Defendant’s refusal to participate in this action rendered a decision on the merits 25 impossible. This factor does not weigh against default judgment. 26 * * * * * 27 The Court has considered the Eitel factors and finds that the balance of those factors 1 Remedies 2 1. Damages 3 Here, Plaintiff seeks $80,000.00 in statutory damages. The Copyright Act provides in 4 relevant part:

5 (1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, 6 an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or 7 more infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just. 8 (2) In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, 9 that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000. 10 11 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). 12 Plaintiff elects to recover statutory damages with respect to the Photograph. (Doc. 9-7 p. 13 12). “[T]he court has wide discretion in determining the amount of statutory damages to be 14 awarded, constrained only by the specified maxima and minima.” Peer Int’l Corp, 909 F.2d at 15 1336; Dream Games of Arizona, Inc. v. PC Onsite, 561 F.3d 983, 993 (9th Cir. 2009). Courts 16 have applied the following factors involving the statutory damages provision of the Copyright 17 Act: “restitution of profit, reparation of injury, and deterrence of future infringement.” Symantec 18 Corp. v. Logical Plus, Inc., No. C 06-7963 SI, 2010 WL 2330388, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2010); 19 see Phillip Morris USA Inc. v. Shalabi, 352 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1076 (C.D. Cal. 2004). Courts also 20 consider whether the damages request has a plausible relationship to the plaintiff’s actual 21 damages. See Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Tilley, No. C 09-1085 PJH, 2010 WL 309249, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 22 Jan. 19, 2010) (“[W]hile the plaintiff in a trademark or copyright infringement case is entitled to 23 damages that will serve as a deterrent, it is not entitled [to] a windfall.”) 24 Plaintiff seeks an award of $80,000 for the infringement of the Photograph over multiple 25 Facebook postings by Defendant, which represents eight times the amount that Plaintiff would 26 have charged for the Photograph had Defendant sought his permission to use it. (Doc. 9-1, 27 Declaration of Michael Stokes (“Stokes Decl.”) ⁋39; Doc. 9-7 p. 9). However, in his declaration, 1 license [the Photograph] to advertise a striptease event or liquor sale event … .” (Stokes Decl. 2 ⁋39). Plaintiff further attests that he rarely licenses or sells any photographs because his business 3 does not rely on licensing his original works as he is very selective about approving the use of his 4 photographs. Id. ⁋8. Instead, Plaintiff’s primary interest is to create table-books depicting 5 amputee-veterans in a positive light to serve as an inspiration to others who suffered serious 6 injuries. Id. ⁋14. Plaintiff also attests that Captain Clark would be very upset and concerned if he 7 became aware that his image and persona was used to advertise a striptease club or event. 8 Plaintiff takes pride in his reputation as a photographer and believes that the use of his work to 9 promote events of a prurient nature would diminish the potential value for his works. Id. ⁋40. 10 The Court takes judicial notice of similar copyright infringement actions filed by Plaintiff 11 in other federal courts involving his photography. E.g., Stokes v. Jerry James, Inc., No. CV 22- 12 6708 PA (RAOx), 2023 WL 2347426 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2023) (“Jerry James”); Stokes v. 13 MilkChocolate NYC LLC, No. 22 Civ. 6786 (PAE) (RWL), 2023 WL 4447073 (S.D.N.Y July 11, 14 2023); Stokes v. Hombres Lounge, Inc., No. 19 CV 3434 (LDH) (CLP), 2020 WL 9814097 15 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2020); Stokes v. TMM Corporation, No. 3:22-cv-00187-X, 2022 WL 16577862 16 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2022); Stokes v. Gold Prods. Inc., No. CIV-22-538-G, 2023 WL 6380009 17 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2023) (“Gold Productions”). 18 In one of these actions (Jerry James), Plaintiff requested $20,000.00 in statutory damages 19 for each of three allegedly infringed copyrighted images. Jerry James, 2023 WL 2347426, at *3. 20 The court concluded that Plaintiff’s objections to the use of his work to promote the sale of 21 alcohol to be an insufficient basis to approximate his damages. Id. The court also found that 22 Plaintiff’s concern about the depiction of his models to be “overblown and speculative.” Id. 23 Ultimately, the court in Jerry James found that Plaintiff’s request was excessive and instead 24 concluded that damages in the amount of $3,000.00 ($1,000.00 for each of the three infringed 25 works) was appropriate. Id. Likewise, in Gold Productions, Plaintiff requested $120,000.00 in 26 statutory damages (comprised of $30,000.00 for each photograph infringed upon). Gold 27 Productions, 2023 WL 6380009, at *3. The court instead found Plaintiff was entitled to 1 It appears that Plaintiff seeks statutory damages mostly for the purpose of deterrence since 2 the $10,000.00 he estimates as the value of the Photograph is a hypothetical figure and not 3 tethered to, for instance, actual sales of the Photograph or lost profits resulting from the 4 infringements. See Adobe Systems, Inc., 2010 WL 309249, at *5-6 (finding requested damages of 5 $50,000 per infringed trademark would constitute a windfall where evidence established only one 6 sale of counterfeit copyrighted software). 7 Based on the Court’s review of Defendant’s alleged Facebook posts depicting and 8 infringing the Photograph (Doc. 1-2), it appears the infringement took place on four separate 9 dates in February 2018. In its award of statutory fees, the Court takes this into consideration as 10 bearing on the expenses saved and possible profits reaped by Defendant and the profits lost by 11 Plaintiff as a result of the infringement. The Court also takes into account that the Photograph 12 evinces creative and artistic talent as compared to, say, a still photograph of an inanimate object 13 like a piece of jewelry. E.g., Three Lakes Designs, 2019 WL 1979918, at *5 (“Here, due to the 14 relative simplicity of [the infringed photographs], which functioned as a set of images showcasing 15 plaintiff’s original jewelry rather than works of independent value and artistic merit, the court 16 finds an award of $12,700 per infringed work to be excessive.”). Additionally, the Court weighs 17 Plaintiff’s assertions that the nature of the infringement tarnished his and his photography 18 subject’s image and reputation. (Stokes Decl. ⁋⁋30-32). 19 Having considered the above-referenced factors and in balancing an amount of statutory 20 damages that is not punitive but is sufficient to promote deterrence of unlawful conduct, the 21 undersigned recommends that the Court award to Plaintiff $15,000.00 in statutory damages for 22 Defendant’s repeated infringement of the Photograph. 23 2. Costs 24 Under the Copyright Act, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by 25 or against any party. 17 U.S.C. § 505. Court filing and service of process fees are considered 26 reasonable costs. Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Poluk, No. 2:20-cv-2146-TLN-CKD, 2021 WL 27 5321824, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2021) (finding recovery of $402 filing fee and $491.96 service 1 $402.00 and $90.00 for service of process costs. (Doc. 9-3 ⁋⁋9-11). The undersigned finds these 2 costs reasonable and should be awarded. 3 3. Attorney’s Fees 4 The Copyright Act permits the Court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing 5 party. 17 U.S.C. § 505. A prevailing party is “[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered.” 6 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 7 598, 603 (2001) (quotation omitted). The Court uses the “lodestar” method to calculate 8 reasonable attorney’s fees in copyright infringement cases. Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Intern., Inc., 6 9 F.3d 614, 622-23 (9th Cir. 1993). The “lodestar” is calculated by multiplying the number of 10 hours reasonably expended by the prevailing party by a reasonable hourly rate. Camacho v. 11 Bridgeport Financial, Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008). When determining a reasonable 12 hourly rate, the relevant community is the forum in which the district court sits. Id. (citing Barjon 13 v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997)). It is Plaintiff’s “burden of establishing entitlement 14 to an award” of attorneys’ fees. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). That is, Plaintiff 15 “has the burden of producing satisfactory evidence, in addition to the affidavits of [Plaintiff’s] 16 counsel, that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar 17 services of lawyers of reasonable comparable skill and reputation.” Jordan v. Multnomah Cnty., 18 815 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 1987). 19 Plaintiff requests an award of $5,950.00 in attorney’s fees. (Doc. 9-3 ⁋⁋12-17; Doc. 9-5). 20 In support of the requested award, Plaintiff proffers the relevant attorney billing invoices annexed 21 to the declaration of Attorney Craig B. Sanders, who attests that he has 26 years of experience 22 and requests payment for 3.5 hours spent at a rate of $750 per hour. According to Mr. Sanders, 23 Attorney Jonathan Cader has 15 years of experience and requests payment for 5.5 hours spent at a 24 rate of $500 per hour. Paralegal Ronald Li requests payment for $575 for 4.6 hours spent for a 25 rate of $125 per hour. Plaintiff’s motion includes a 2017 survey by the American Intellectual 26 Property Law Association (Doc. 9-6) of attorney billing rates that provides rates from certain 27 larger metropolitan regions, including from Los Angeles, for the litigation of intellectual property 1 billing rates are reasonable as compared to the forum district (the Eastern District of California). 2 Since Plaintiff has not proffered a survey or other evidence of billing rates for prosecuting 3 copyright infringement claims in California’s central valley, the Court is left to determine what 4 rates are reasonable. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984) (“To inform and assist 5 the court in the exercise of its discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory 6 evidence – in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits – that the requested rates are in line with 7 those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, 8 experience and reputation.”) 9 Another judge of this court previously found that $275 an hour was a reasonable rate for a 10 partner and $175 an hour a reasonable rate for an associate in an “uncomplicated” copyright 11 infringement case. See Animal Blood Bank, Inc. v. Hale, No. CIV-S-10-2080-KJM-KJN, 2013 12 WL 12305504, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2013) (citing Broadcast Music Inc. v. Antigua Cantina 13 & Grill, No. 2:12–cv–1196 KJM DAD, 2013 WL 224641, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2013)). 14 While the undersigned acknowledges this authority is approximately ten years old and that billing 15 rates in the field of intellectual property litigation undoubtedly have increased since the opinion 16 was issued, without evidence from the Plaintiff, the Court will rely on this caselaw and apply a 17 modest increase to account for the passage of time and inevitable increase in rates. Given the 18 relevant lawyers’ experience level, that Court concludes that a rate of $350 per hour for partner 19 and $225 for senior associate is reasonable. See Renova Energy Corp. v. Cuevas, No. 1:22-cv- 20 00999-JLT-EPG, 2024 WL 245116, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2024) (finding $350 an hour to be a 21 reasonable rate for attorney with 20 years of experience), F&R adopted, 2024 WL 524448 (E.D. 22 Cal. Feb. 9, 2024). For paralegals, the current reasonable hourly rate ranges from $75 to $150, 23 depending on experience. Project Sentinel v. Komar, No. 1:19-cv-00708-DAD-EPG, 2021 WL 24 1346025, at *21 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2021). Accordingly, the Court will apply a rate of $100 per 25 hour for paralegal time. 26 Turning to the hours reasonably expended, the Court finds that the 13.6 hours reportedly 27 billed to Plaintiff are reasonable. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Plaintiff be entitled to 1 || by Attorney Cader (5.5 times $225); and $460 for the time spent by Paralegal Li (4.6 times $100) 2 | for a total of $2,922.50 in attorney fees.” 3 | Findings and Recommendation 4 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within three (3) days, Plaintiff shall serve a 5 || copy of these findings and recommendations on Defendant at its registered or last known address 6 | and file proof of service of same. 7 And IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 8 1. Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 9) be GRANTED, in part, as specified 9 below: 10 a. Judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff Michael Stokes against Defendant Amen 11 Corporation. 12 b. Plaintiff be awarded statutory damages in the amount of $15,000.00. 13 c. Plaintiff be awarded attorneys’ fees of $2,922.50 plus $492 in costs. 14 2. The Clerk of the Court be directed to close this case. 15 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 16 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within 14 days after 17 | being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with 18 || the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 19 || Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served 20 | and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure 21 | to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's 22 | order. See Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 23 | ITIS SO ORDERED. ** | Dated: _ April 3, 2024 | br 25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 27 Although Plaintiff’s complaint seeks additional relief, including an injunction and pre- 2g || judgment interest, neither Plaintiff's motion for default judgment nor the proposed order mention these forms for relief, and accordingly, the undersigned does not recommend issuing such relief. 12