Stirlen v. United States

183 F. 302, 105 C.C.A. 514, 1910 U.S. App. LEXIS 5041
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedOctober 4, 1910
DocketNo. 1,603
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 183 F. 302 (Stirlen v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stirlen v. United States, 183 F. 302, 105 C.C.A. 514, 1910 U.S. App. LEXIS 5041 (7th Cir. 1910).

Opinion

GROSSCUP, Circuit Judge,

delivered the opinion:

The conviction of plaintiff in error, in the Court below, was under section 5440 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3676), which makes it a crime for two or more persons to conspire to commit an offense against the United States— the offense charged in the indictment being the using of the mails in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. The conspirators named in the indictment were plaintiff in error, Thomas P. Daniels, alias Thomas E. Cameron, Frederick C. Struckmeyer and Isaac E. H. Holton — - [303]*303Daniels pleading guilty and Holton and Struckmeyer nolo contendere, ■ — the latter two being sentenced to terms in the penitentiary.

The initial step in the scheme to defraud was an advertisement in the newspapers as follows:

“$125,000 or any part for investment in some good enterprise without services, T. E. Cameron, Central Building,’Milwaukee.”

The purpose being, that whoever was attracted by such advertisement, should be led to believe that to realize the proposed investment, it was necessary that they should organize corporations and issue bonds secured by trust deeds; the promoters of the scheme holding out that, under such circumstances they would sell the bonds to raise the money required by the victims. And the profit in the scheme was in the fees that the promoters received from the victims in the way of organizing the corporations, and in the way of going to and inspecting the properties upon which the bonds were to be issued; such so-called expenses and compensation being divided between the promoters of the scheme — the victims being turned off finally by some pretended obstacle purporting to make the loans undesirable. As an illustration of the care with which the ground was prepared to look encouraging at the start, hut to carry no obligation for failure at the end, the following passage, in a so-called proposition from the imaginary investor to the inserter of the advertiseinent (to be shown, of course, to the proposed victim), is given:

“I will purchase these bonds provided the property is as represented and after an examination by an expert, the report of the expert discloses no disparaging comments upon the property of the company and upon the company and its personnel and prospective, the examination to be without cost to me.”

The part charged against plaintiff in error, in the conspiracy, was that he was to act as the pretended trustee of the bonds; and that, in many cases, in pursuance of such conspiracy, he did act as such trustee, receiving certain sums of money in pretended compensation therefor.

The assignments of error relied on were:

(a) That there was not sufficient evidence to go to the jury to show plaintiff in error guilty of conspiracy; and

(b) That the Court erred in permitting certain evidence, offered by the Government, to go to the jury.

There was abundant evidence going to the jury that this was a conspiracy to commit the crime charged, and there was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the question whether plaintiff in error, having in fact taken the part assigned to him in the indictment (on that there is no controversy), had taken such part conscious of its purposes. This assignment of error, therefore, may be dismissed without further comment.

It was the duty of the Government, of course, to prove guilty knowledge, and the substance of the second assignment of error is that a letter was permitted to go to the jury, written by one of the conspirators to another, in which it was stated, “I have now secured a new trustee” (referring to plaintiff in error-), “who fully understands the whole proposition and is O. K. in every respect”; and that the tes[304]*304tintony of a post office inspector, detailing what was said to him by some of the conspirators other than plaintiff in error, was permitted to go to the jury, although at that time the operation of the conspiracy had been broken up by the arrest of the parties. Whether the conversations referred to were incompetent, we need not decide, for there was nothing whatever in them, so far as they related to plaintiff in error, that was prejudicial to him.1 Respecting the letter, from which [305]*305the passage above has been quoted, it is sufficient to say that, as an entirety, the letter was competent to show the existence of the conspiracy and the conduct of such conspirators in furtherance thereof.2 Had objection specifically been made to the line or two quoted that plaintiff in error complains of, and the Court had failed to pay attention to such objection, a question might be raised. But no such objection was specifically made. The objection was to the letter as an entirety, and the letter as an entirety was competent evidence to show a conspiracy, and what the conspirators were doing.

The. judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed.

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Related

McDonald v. United States
133 F.2d 23 (D.C. Circuit, 1942)

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Bluebook (online)
183 F. 302, 105 C.C.A. 514, 1910 U.S. App. LEXIS 5041, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stirlen-v-united-states-ca7-1910.