Stinson v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Stinson v. State

590 So. 2d 31, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 11883, 1991 WL 248623

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedNovember 29, 1991

DocketNo. 91-840

StatusPublished

This text of 590 So. 2d 31 (Stinson v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Stinson v. State, 590 So. 2d 31, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 11883, 1991 WL 248623 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991).

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Opinions

HARRIS, Judge.

We affirm on the authority of Reese v. State, 535 So.2d 676 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) and Tillman v. State, 555 So.2d 940 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Both of these cases reject the position of the dissent that the imposition of jail time as a condition of community control is an illegal sentence. The legislature has specifically authorized the court to impose up to 364 days incarceration as a condition of probation or community control. See § 948.03(8), Fla.Stat. (1989). Since the guideline schedules only address “12-30 months incarceration,” it is evident that county jail incarceration (364 days or less — a nonstate prison sanction) as a condition of probation or community control was not intended to be affected by guideline sentencing. Contrary to the dissent, Stinson did not receive both a sentence of community control and incarceration. The trial court merely conditioned his “grace” of granting community control on Stinson spending some time in jail. The legislature gave him that authority; the courts should not needlessly take it away.

AFFIRM.

[32]*32GOSHORN, C.J., concurs. SHARP, W., J., dissents with opinion.

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HARRIS, Judge.

We affirm on the authority of Reese v. State, 535 So.2d 676 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) and Tillman v. State, 555 So.2d 940 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Both of these cases reject the position of the dissent that the imposition of jail time as a condition of community control is an illegal sentence. The legislature has specifically authorized the court to impose up to 364 days incarceration as a condition of probation or community control. See § 948.03(8), Fla.Stat. (1989). Since the guideline schedules only address “12-30 months incarceration,” it is evident that county jail incarceration (364 days or less — a nonstate prison sanction) as a condition of probation or community control was not intended to be affected by guideline sentencing. Contrary to the dissent, Stinson did not receive both a sentence of community control and incarceration. The trial court merely conditioned his “grace” of granting community control on Stinson spending some time in jail. The legislature gave him that authority; the courts should not needlessly take it away.

AFFIRM.

[32]*32GOSHORN, C.J., concurs. SHARP, W., J., dissents with opinion.

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Bluebook (online)

590 So. 2d 31, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 11883, 1991 WL 248623, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stinson-v-state-fladistctapp-1991.

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