Stinson v. Gardner, County Attorney

78 S.W. 492, 97 Tex. 287, 1904 Tex. LEXIS 148
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 8, 1904
DocketNo. 1264.
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 78 S.W. 492 (Stinson v. Gardner, County Attorney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stinson v. Gardner, County Attorney, 78 S.W. 492, 97 Tex. 287, 1904 Tex. LEXIS 148 (Tex. 1904).

Opinion

BROWF, Associate Justice.

This is a certified question from the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fifth Supreme Judicial District. The statement and questions are as follows:

“On the 10th day of July, 1903, an election was held throughout Harrison. County, in this State, to determine whether the sale of intoxicating liquors should be prohibited in said county. The commissioners court of the county met and on the 25th day of July, 1903, declared the result of said election to be a majority of 786 votes against prohibition. On July 30, 1903, appellants filed a contest of said election under the statute, and in the first count of their petition" alleged substantially as follows: That the election had been illegally conducted and that such irregularities existed as rendered the true result of the same impossible to be arrived at or very doubtful of ascertaining. That on the 31st day of January, 1903, certain persons, to contestants unknown, who were desirous of defeating prohibition in Harrison County, through W. R. Hodge, their representative, paid to A. B. Blocker, tax *289 collector of said county, the poll taxes due by 500 voters of said Harrison County for the year 1902. That such payment was made for the sole purpose of qualifying and inducing the persons owing the tax to vote against prohibition. That the total amount of money so paid was about $875, and was paid without any authority from the persons against whom said poll taxes were assessed and for whom said money was paid. That such persons never repaid the amount or any part thereof and never promised to repay it and never ratified said payment, except so far as to vote by. reason of the authority thereby given. That said parties did vote at said election.

“Contestants in the second count in their petition, alleged, in substance, that about 900 persons voted at said election without exhibiting to the managers thereof their poll tax receipts and without making and filing, with the judge of said election, an affidavit in writing stating that such receipts were lost; that said voters wholly disregarded the provisions of the Constitution requiring each voter to hold his poll tax receipt, showing that his poll tax was paid before the 1st day of February preceding the election at which he offers- to vote, or to make, in the absence of such receipt, an affidavit in writing that such receipt was lost. That the managers of the election allowed such persons to vote and receive their ballots without requiring them to exhibit their poll tax receipt, or without filing such affidavit.

“The contestee, John M. Gardner, on the 21st day of August, 1903, filed and urged a general demurrer and special exceptions to both counts of contestant’s petition.

“The trial judge filed his conclusions of law arising on these demurrers in a written opinion, which is in the record before us. On the 25th day of August, 1903, the demurrers were overruled as to the first count in contestant’s petition, the trial judge expressing his conclusion of law arising thereon in the following language: ‘A tax which is

assessed upon one person and paid for him by another without his previous authority, if he recognize the act and promise to repay the amount on the ground that such person acted as his agent, he thereby acquires the right to vote the same as if he had paid it with his own hand. On the other hand, when the tax is paid by a person other than the person against whom it is assessed, without authority to do so, it is not such compliance with the law as will clothe the voter with the qualifications of an elector as regards taxes. A partisan paying the tax of a voter in order to have him cast a ballot for, his candidate or cause does not so far clothe the voter with the qualifications of an elector, unless authorized or ratified by the voter.

“ 'The plain intent of the law is to secure the purity of the ballot and the freedom of the voter in his right of suffrage. How, anything either in the payment of taxes for him or in any other way which will induce the voter to cast his ballot contrary to his will is not tolerated by the law. A person who intends to neglect to pay his tax is not disposed *290 to vote, and. it could not be said in good policy that a partisan would come along and pay the tax for the voter and thereby induce the voter to vote his way for the sake of public good. The mere voting after the payment by another would not alter the state of the question. Votes of this standing should not be counted on a contest, but should be rejected. The law certainly makes illegal “any privilege bestowed or promised for the purpose of influencing a person in the performance of any duty, regardless of whether the privilege was bestowed direct or under semblance of the payment" of a debt.” ’

“Contestee’s demurrer to the second count in contestant’s petition, which alleges, in substance, that the managers of the election did not require the voter to show his poll tax receipt, nor file an affidavit that same was lost with the judge of the election, was by the court sustained, and it then held that the illegal votes otherwise complained of are not enough to change or render doubtful the result of the election, and dismissed the case at cost of contestants.

“The conclusions of law reached by the trial judge and grounds upon which the demurrers were sustained as to this phase of contestant’s case are expressed by the court as follows: “The failure of the managers of election to require the voter “to show his poll tax receipt” at the time he offers to vote, or the failure of the voter at the time to exhibit it, does not determine that the person at the time he votes does not “hold a tax receipt showing the payment of his poll tax before the 1st day of February next preceding the election,” within the meaning, by proper and practical construction, of that clause of the Constitution, so as to make illegal and void that vote and reject it on a contest. It would be a severe regulation which excludes the votes of qualified voters under 'such circumstances. The language of the law does not prohibit a more liberal construction in favor of the voter. The language of the Constitution embraces the ideas that if the voter has paid his poll tax, and before the 1st day of February next preceding the election, he is entitled to participate in the election, and that if he has lost his poll tax receipt that the managers of the election may require him to-file an affidavit to the effect that he has lost his poll tax receipt. In passing a poll tax law it was intended to regulate the exercise of the privilege to vote. The substantial end. in view has been reached when the legal voter votes under prescribed qualifications for voters. To simply exhibit a receipt to the managers of the election would not appear to be of the substance of the law or a condition to be complied with before he can rightfully deposit his ballot, but only a form. If the substance of the regulation of suffrage be not in all respects complied with by the voter at the time he votes, then, on a contest, the requirements of the law can not relate back and be supplied. If only form be the violation, then the vote deposited is not illegal and void. If a voter has exercised a constitutional right, and has done‘so only in an irregular manner or has disregarded some of the forms, which by intendment does not amount to a qualification, prescribed for the exercise, this will not work a forfeiture

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78 S.W. 492, 97 Tex. 287, 1904 Tex. LEXIS 148, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stinson-v-gardner-county-attorney-tex-1904.