STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. DOCKET NO., RE-18-0013
JOANNE M. STINSON and BETH A. ) CORMIER, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS, v. ) INTERVENORS, AND DEFENDANTS' ) MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT GREGORY S. CUSHMAN and ) JENNIFER S. CUSHMAN, )
Defendants,
and
NANCY COBB and JERRY COBB,
Intervenors.
Before this court are the parties' cross Motions for Summary Judgment. For the following
reasons, the Motions are denied.
I. Factnal Background
The parties all own property within the Crescent Lake Development Association's
subdivision plan (the "Plan"). All deeds relevant to this action have referenced and adopted the
Plan into the language of the deed. Plaintiffs own lots 135, 136, 137 and 138 as depicted on the
Plan. Intervenors own lots 34 and 35 as depicted on the Plan, as well as 128 and 129. Defendant's
own lots 124, 125, 126, and 127 as depicted on the Plan.
The Plan depicts over 150 numbered parcels of land. Beginning in 1931, the Crescent Lake
Association began selling parcels by deed, which referenced a specific numbered lot in the Plan.
Most deeds stated:
"Said lot is conveyed together with a right of way in common with others to and from the premises to the town road between Webbs Mills and East Raymond by such common ways as are or may be established by this Corporation."
Page 1 of 15 This action concerns a strip of land described in the Plan as 33A. Parcel 33A is but one of
several "A" designated parcels, all of which are depicted in the Plan as narrow strips that run from
various points along Haskell Ave to Crescent Lake. Unlike other lots depicted on the Plan, which
are fully demarcated by enclosed boundaries, 33A and other "A" parcels are not demarcated by
fully enclosed boundaries. Instead, the Plan's illustration depicts the "A" lots to be closed on three
sides, but do not depict any enclosure in regards to Haskell Ave, similar to how Haskell Avenue
flows from one street to another.
Parcel 33A is only twenty feet wide and runs between lots 33 and 34. 33A provides a
walking path from Haskell A venue to the Crescent Lake shorefront. Plaintiffs hold title to Lot
135 by deed and an express easement over 33A. The following language regarding 33A can be
traced back in Lot I35's chain of title to the Association's original grant of the deed:
"Said lot is conveyed together with a right of way in common with others to and from said premises to the town road between Webbs Mills and East Raymond by such common ways as are or may be established by the Corporation and a right of way in common with others over ... lot 33-A as shown on said map."
(Jt. Ex. 7; Jamison Aff. Ex 14; PSMF! 14; Defs.' R. PSMF! 14)(emphasis added.) Lots 128 and
129, were conveyed to the Intervenors' family in the early 1930s, whose deed also states:
"Said lots are conveyed together with ... a right of way in common with others to and from said premises over Haskell Ave .... and over lots 23A, and 33A, as shown on said map."
(Int. and Pis.' JSMF ! 5.) This language can also be traced back in the chain of title to the
Association's original grant of the deed. (Jamison Aff. Ex 11.) Although the parties dispute the
legal classification of 33A, the Defendants do not hold title to any deed that specifically references
33A, or hold any express easement over the parcel.
Page 2 of 15 The history of the Association, which developed and sold lots in the subdivision, is also at
issue in this case. The Association was formed on August 11, 1928, with its owners being Harry
P. Woodbury (48 shares of stock), Josiah D. Winship (2 shares of stock), and Byron E. Haskell
(48 shares of stock). On October 14, 1940, the Association conveyed property to Byron Haskell
by deed, which included:
"certain lots or parcels of land situated in the Town of Raymond, in said County and State, and being lots numbered 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71,72,74, 75,76, 77,78,79,80,81,86,87,89,4,92,91,94, 94a,95,95a,96,97,98,99,l00,101,l03,l04, 105,106,111,112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127,130,133,136,137,93,138,141,l42,l43,144, 145,146,147, 148. Meaning and intending to convey and hereby conveying all of the unsold lots belonging to the said Crescent Lake Development Association, as shown ou plan of Crescent Lake Terrace ..."
(JSMF' 15, Ex 12.) The Association ceased doing business on June 9, 1941.
Byron Haskell subsequently deeded to Bertha G. Haskell "all unsold lots belonging to
[Byron] which [he] obtained by deed from Crescent Lake Development Association" on October
14. (Ints.'and Pis.' JSMF, 17). Neither the deed to Byron or Bertha Haskell contained a specific
reference to 33A. Bertha Haskell also was the sole devisee under Byron Haskell's will after Byron
died in December, 1943.
The Association ceased doing business on June 9, 1941. Then, Bertha Haskell died in
March, 1965. Roy N. Cummings was the sole devisee under Bertha Haskell's will. Roy N.
Cummings died on November 2, 2014. Adrian H. Schreiber was the sole devisee under Roy
Cumming's will. During the pendency of this litigation, Adrian Schreiber issued a release deed to
the Defendants, which purported to convey any interest he held in 33A.
The Plaintiffs and Intervenors believe that only those who have an express easement over
33A are allowed to use it. In or around 2014, the Defendants' represented that they had a right to
Page 3 of 15 use 33A to access the lake, for which Plaintiffs and Interveners incorrectly assumed to mean the
Defendants had an express easement over 33A. The Defendants proceeded to install a seasonal
dock at the end of 33A. The parties disagree about the nature and extent to which the Defendants
have since utilized the dock, which will be treated as a disputed issue of fact. There is no evidence
regarding whether other individuals with a deeded right of way over 33A or other "A" lots have
maintained a private dock. There is also no evidence regarding if, how, or when, any person
without a deeded right of way may or may have not utilized 33A, other than for a walking trail.
The Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that: (1) the Defendants
have no right to use 33A, by virtue of deed or otherwise; (2) the Defendants have no right to erect
a dock at the end of 33A, regardless of any interest they might have in the property; (3) Defendants
do not hold a fee interest in 33A by virtue of the release deed issued by Adrian Schreiber; (4) if
the Defendants hold a fee interest in 33A, their use of the dock still impairs Plaintiffs and
Intervenors' deeded right of way over 33A; and (5) the Defendants cannot hold fee title to 33A by
virtue of the Paper Streets Act. The Intervenors have joined in the Plaintiffs' request for
declaratory judgment.
The Defendants have filed a counterclaim seeking declaratory judgment that: (1) the
Defendants have an easement over 33A by virtue of the Plan and thus have a right to maintain a
private dock; (2) Defendants own 33A by virtue of the release deed Adrian Schreiber and his
alleged inheritance of the land; (3) the Defendants own an interest in 33A by virtue of Adrian
Schreiber and his alleged inheritance of a shared interest in 33A; and (4) the Defendants own an
interest in 33A by virtue of Adrian Schreiber and his alleged inheritance of the shares in the
Association held by Byron Haskell.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Page 4 of 15 When there are cross-motions for summary judgment, the rules for consideration of
summary judgment are applied separately to each motion. F.R. Carroll, Inc. v. TD Bank, NA.,
2010 ME 115,, 8, 8 A.3d 646. The record on each summary judgment issue must be considered
most favorably to the party objecting to the grant of summary judgment on that issue. Blue Star
Corp. v. CKF Properties LLC, 2009 ME 101,, 23,980 A.2d 1270. A party is entitled to summary
judgment when review of the parties' statements of material facts and the record to which the
statements refer, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in dispute and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dyer v. Dep't o/Transp., 2008 ME
106,, 14,951 A.2d 821; M.R. Civ. P. 56(c). A contested fact is "material" if it could potentially
affect the outcome of the case. Id. A "genuine issue" of material fact exists if the claimed fact
would require a factfinder to "choose between competing versions of the truth." Id. ( quotations
omitted).
Once a properly supported motion is filed, the party opposing summary judgment must
show that a factual dispute exists sufficient to establish a prima facie case for each element of the
defense raised in order to avoid summary judgment. Watt v. Unifirst Corp., 2009 ME 47,, 21,
969 A.2d 897. A party who moves for summary judgment is entitled to judgment only if the party
opposed to the motion, in response, fails to establish a prima facie case for each element of the
defense raised. Lougee Conservancy v. Citi Mortgage, Inc., 2012 ME 103,, 12, 48 A.3d 774.
Unlike a stipulated record for trial, a judge is required to make certain inferences in favor
of the non-moving party on issues presented at summary judgment. See generally Blue Sky West
LLC v. Me. Revenue Servs., 2019 ME 137,, 16, n.10, 215 A.3d 812. Accordingly, "[a] record of
stipulated facts does not, by itself, mean that there are no genuine issues of material fact." Blue
Sky West LLC v. Me. Revenue Servs., 2019 ME 137,, 16, n.10, 215 A.3d 812.
Page 5 of 15 III. Discussion
A. Easement Rights Generally
First, all parties seek a declaratory judgment that they hold an easement over 33A. The
Plaintiffs and Intervenors seek a judgment that they hold an express easement over 33A and that
the Defendants hold no easement rights. Conversely, the Defendants seek a judgment that they
hold an easement over 33A in common with all subdivision residents.
Determining what easements rights the parties have in 33A is a matter of intent. It is settled
law that the intent of the parties controls the interpretation of deeds. See e.g. Beckerman v. Conant,
2017 ME 142, ! 14, 166 A.3d 1006; Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69," 32-35, 770 A.2d
592; Milligan v. Milligan, 624 A.2d 474,478 (Me. 1993). "[I]n construing a deed, we first give
words their general and ordinary meaning to determine if they create any ambiguity." Sleeper v.
Loring, 2013 ME 112, ! 12, 83 A.3d 769. "When the language of a deed is susceptible of more
than one meaning, the trial court must determine the grantors' intent from contemporaneous
circumstances and from standard rules of construction." Harvey v. Furrow, 2014 ME 149, ! 9,
107 A.3d 604 (citations and quotations omitted); see also Beckerman, 2017 ME 142, ! 14, 166
A.3d 1006. However, "[t]he rules of construction should be applied beginning with the
overarching goal of giving effect to the intent of the parties." Lloyd v. Benson, 2006 ME 129, !
13, 910 A.2d 1048 (emphasis added). Also, if a deed references a plan, the entirety of the plan
becomes a part of the deed. Sleeper, 2013 ME 112, ! 13, 83 A.3d 769.
Here, there are multiple genuine issues of fact regarding the intent of the Association and
its original grant of easement rights over 33A. For one, there is an ambiguity as to whether 33A
was intended to be an easement for only express easement holders, or one held in common with
all subdivision residents. The Plan, which is referenced and included in the deeds at issue, depicts
Page 6 of 15 33A in a manner that a fact finder could reasonably interpret to mean that 33A and other "A" lots
were intended to provide owners with access to the lake. The "A" lots are all depicted on the Plan
as spilling onto Haskell Avenue, and is not closed on all sides as are the other lots. Furthermore,
33A is depicted alongside multiple other "A" designated parcels, which could all reasonably be
interpreted to mean that the "A" parcels were intended to provide common paths the lake for all
subdivision residents.
The deeds and Plan, when read as a whole, also provide another reasonable interpretation
regarding the Association's intent. Only a select few property owners have a deeded right of way
over 33A and multiple other lot owners have a separate and individual right of ways over separate
"A" parcels. This fact also gives rise to a reasonable interpretation that only those with an express
right of way over an "A" parcel have the right to cross an "A" designated property. Also, the use
of the term "lot" in Plaintiff and Intervenor's deeds also suggest that the Association intended for
33A and other "A" parcels to be separate from other streets such as Haskell Avenue.
Based on the ambiguities above, a fact finder is forced to choose between competing
versions of the truth; whether 33A was intended to be an easement for subdivision owners
generally, or only for those who hold an express easement over the parcel. On one hand, the
express easement held by the Plaintiffs and Intervenors suggest that their respective deeds manifest
an intent to convey an exclusive easement over 33A. However, the Defendants' deeds, by
reference to the Plan, cast doubt on this version of truth because the Plan depicts 33A in a manner
similar to other commonly held easements, such as the one over Haskell Avenue. There is no
interpretation of the facts presented that are sufficient to dispel all reasonable inferences that may
be made in favor of the opposing party. There is simply a competing interpretation of fact
regarding the Association's intent for 33A. Accordingly, no party has established that it is entitled
Page 7 of 15 to judgment as a matter of law regarding what easement rights the Defendants may or may not
have over 33A. Therefore, each parties motion for summary judgment is denied with regard to
whether the Defendants have an easement over 33A.
B. Scope of Defendants' Alleged Easement
As an initial matter, Justice Horton has previously ruled that there is a genuine issue of
material fact on the Defendants' Motion regarding whether the Defendants' use overburdens the
parcel. Accordingly, the only issue here is whether the Plaintiffs and Intervenors have proven that
they are entitled to judgment that the private dock overburdens whatever easement rights the
Defendants have as a matter of law. "The scope of a party's easement rights must be determined
from the unambiguous language on the face of the deed." Matteson v. Batchelder, 2011 ME 134,
, 16, 32 A.3d 1059 (quotation and citation omitted). Furthermore, an overburdening analysis is
based upon reasonableness. See Poire v. Manchester, 506 A.2d 1160, 1163 (Me. 1986).
The court did not grant summary judgment on whether the Defendants have an easement,
fee interest, or any interest in 33A. This determination will necessarily impact how the Defendants
may utilize the property, regardless of any potential interest they may have. The Intervenor's make
a strong argument that the use of a private dock overburdens the easement in any form, particularly
if the easement is shared by all the parties. The court cannot, however, rule that the dock
overburdens other easement rights as a matter of law. Furthermore, the Defendants have obtained
fee ownership of 33A, and that fee ownership is subject to only a select few easements as the
Plaintiffs and Intervenor's originally argue, then that will effect whether the Defendants use of the
dock interferes with the rights of express easement holders. A fact finder is still presented with
competing interpretations of the facts presented and it is therefore inappropriate to enter summary
judgment here. See generally Blue Sky West LLC, 2019 ME 137,, 16, n.10, 215 A.3d 812.
Page 8 of 15 C. Fee Ownership by Defendants
The Defendants also seek a declaratory judgment that they have acquired fee ownership of
33A by virtue of the release deed issued by Adrian Schreiber. Conversely, both Plaintiffs and
Intervenors seek a declaratory judgment that the Defendants lack such a fee interest. Each
argument relevant to this theory of ownership is addressed below.
1. Title By Deed
The Plaintiffs and Intervenors first argue that Adrian Schreiber did not hold fee title to 33A
because the Association never conveyed the parcel to Byron Haskell. The argument here is that
the Association's 1940 deed to Byron Haskell did not specifically name 33A as among the specific
lots being conveyed. Accordingly, the Association did not intend to include 33A in its 1940
conveyance to Byron Haskell and thus fee title to 33A never became part of Byron Haskell's
inheritable estate.
The Plaintiffs and Intervenors argue here that, "[o]f all rules of construction[,] none is more
rigid than the one that where the language describing the grant is specific and definite, ... [and]
the grant cannot be enlarged or diminished by a later general description, or by mere reference to
deeds through which title was obtained." Perry v. Buswell, 113 Me. 399, 94,A. 483. However, it
is also a basic rule of deed interpretation that the "grantor's intent is relevant even when applying
the standard rules of construction[.]" Milligan v. Milligan, 624 A.2d 474, 477 (Me. 1993); see
also Furrow, 2014 ME 149, ! 9, 107 A.3d 604.
Here, the fact finder is again presented with competing version of the truth regarding what
intent the Association had toward 33A. There is an ambiguity in the Association's 1940 deed to
Byron Haskell and whether 33A was included in that conveyance; namely because 33A is not
listed in the 1940 deed. The standard rules of construction might suggest that the express mention
Page 9 of 15 of certain parcels, to the exclusion of 33A, indicates an intent for the Association to withhold title
to 33A. Moreover, the Defendants argue elsewhere that 33A is not a "lot" as that term was used
by the Association. This becomes an issue here because the 1940 deed manifests an intent to
convey unsold "lots." 1f 33A is not a lot, as Defendants originally argue, then the deed's reference
to "lots" could also be interpreted to mean that the conveyance did not include the 33A parcel.
Conversely, the deed still manifests an intent to convey all unsold lots held by the
Association. Without regard to any rule of construction, this language could also suggest that the
Association intended to convey all unsold property to Byron Haskell. Importantly, there is no
evidence to suggest that the Association ever conveyed a fee interest in 33A or the other "A"
parcels to any other party. A reasonable fact finder could interpret the 1940 deed to mean that the
Association intended to convey title to 33A, regardless of whether 33A was left unmentioned by
mistake, mischaracterization, or otherwise. Accordingly, the court cannot say that, as a matter of
law, the Association intended to convey a fee interest in 33A to Byron Haskell by virtue of the
1941 deed. A fact finder is again presented with competing versions of the truth regarding the
1940 Byron Haskell deed and the court cannot say that either interpretation is unreasonable.
Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of material fact on the Defendants' title by deed theory of
ownership and summary judgment is inappropriate on such grounds.
The court is also unpersuaded by the Plaintiffs and Intervenors argument regarding Brown
v. Heard, 85 Me. 294, 27 A.182 (1893). In Brown, the Law Court held that a meaning and
intending to convey clause in a deed could not expand the premises otherwise described by meets
and bounds. The facts presented here do not concern the size or location of 33A and there is no
specific meets and bounds description at issue. Instead, there is a genuine issue of fact regarding
whether the Association's deed to Byron Haskell intended to convey 33A because the deed did not
Page 10 of 15 identify the parcel's number. The court cannot say that, as a matter of law, the Association's deed
intended to include or exclude 33A from its deeded conveyance to Byron Haskell.
2. Title as Shareholder
The Plaintiffs and lntervenors next argue that the Defendants could not obtain an interest
in 33A by virtue of any shareholder interest. The Law Court has recognized the equitable principle
that "shareholders have the right to a fair share of assets in a dissolved corporation." Sturtevant v.
Town of Winthrop, 1999 ME 84, l) 15, 732 A.2d 264. However, "[merely ceasing to transact
business does not work a dissolution." Tozier v. Woodworth, 135 Me. 46, 49, 188 A. 771 (1936).
Here, the court is without facts or evidence sufficient to state as a matter of law how, if, or
when, the shareholders in the Association dissolved the corporation. Moreover, there is nothing
in the record that would allow this court to determine what rights the Defendants might have by
virtue of Byron Haskell's original shares in the Association because there are others who also held
Association shares (i.e. heirs to Woodbury and Winship). Accordingly, the court cannot say as a
matter of law that the Defendants have acquired fee title to 33A by virtue of Byron Haskell's shares
in the Association, nor can it properly determine the scope of any potential interest that may arise
in 33A out of those shares. Therefore, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
Defendants' title by shareholder theory and judgment is inappropriate on such grounds.
3. Paper Streets Act
Finally, the Plaintiffs and Intervenors argue that the Defendants could not obtain fee title
to 33A because title has already passed to the owners of lots 33 and 34 by virtue of the Paper
Streets Act. The Paper Streets Act has several components. However, the following passage is
particularly relevant here:
"Any conveyance made before September 29, 1987 that conveyed land abutting upon a proposed, unaccepted way laid out on a
Page 11 of 15 subdivision plan recorded in the registry of deeds is deemed to have conveyed all of the grantor's interest in the portion of the way that abuts the land conveyed, unless the grantor expressly reserved the grantor's title to the way by a specific reference to this reservation in the conveyance of the land."
33 M.R.S. § 469-A. "The term 'proposed, unaccepted way' is not defined under Maine Statutory
law." Fournier v. Elliott, 2009 ME 25JJ 14,966 A.2d 410. The Law Court has also not articulated
a specific definition, stating instead that "the statutory scheme ... encompasses both constructed
and unconstructed roads" and "is not conditioned on its physical state." Fournier, 2009 ME 25,,
16,966 A.2d 410. The only condition for a way is that it be "one that is laid out on a subdivision
plan recorded in the registry of deeds." Fournier, 2009 ME 25,, 16,966 A.2d 410.
Here, the fact finder is again forced to determine the Association's intent regarding 33A
and it is therefore unclear whether the Paper Streets Act divests ownership of 33A under the
circumstances. If the Defendants have acquired a fee interest in 33A subject to a few select
easements, the Defendants acquisition could indeed be unaffected by the Paper Streets Act because
the association may not have intended for 33A to be a way. Conversely, if subdivision residents
all have an easement right to 33A, then it might indeed be considered a "way" for the purposes of
the Act.' Accordingly, because a fact finder is still presented with competing versions of the
Association's intent, and such intent is material to determining the potential application of the
Paper Streets Act, the court lacks sufficient evidence to determine as a matter of law whether the
Paper Streets Act precludes fee ownership of 33A by the Defendants.
D. Standing
Judgment regarding whether the Plaintiffs have standing in this case has already been
determined by this court and the doctrine of the law of the case controls the issue here. (Order, J.
, Certainly, if 33A is a "way," then it would appear as if title to the parcel passed to the abutting landowners pursuant to 33 M.R.S. 469-A. See also 23 M.R.S. §§ 3031(2), 3032.
Page 12 of 15 Horton, May 29, 2019.) The doctrine of the law of the case generally holds that a judge should
not overrule or reconsider the decision of another in the same case or reopen what has already been
decided. See Blance v. Alley, 404A.2d 587,589 (Me. 1979). Justice Horton squarely decided, on
a Motion for Summary Judgment, that the Plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claims and this
court does not see any reason to disturb this prior decision. Additionally, the Intervenors' interest
in this case is similar to that of the Plaintiffs and virtually indistinct for the purposes of standing.
Accordingly, the lntervenors also have standing to bring this claim.
The court is also unpersuaded by the Defendants' argument regarding final judgments. Of
course, the doctrine of the law of the case does not apply if it would prevent the court from hearing
additional evidence essential to adjudicate issues. See Pearson v. Wendell, 2015 ME 136, ,, 26
28, 125 A.3d 1149. However, there is no new evidence presented by the Defendants to support
their lack of standing argument and the court sees no reason to disturb Justice Horton's prior ruling
on the issue.
E. Indispensable Party
The Defendants also argue that summary judgment cannot be entered because other
potential fee owners of 33A have not been joined in this lawsuit. Maine Rule of Civil Procedure
19(a) "requires joinder of all available persons who have an interest in the litigation so that any
judgment will effectively and completely adjudicate the dispute." Ocwen Fed. Bank v. Gile, 2001
ME 120,, 14, 777 A.2d 275 (quotations omitted). "If joinder of a directly interested party is
possible, then joinder is mandatory." Gile, 2001 ME 120,, 14, 777 A.2d 275. The Law Court
has interpreted Rule 19(a) to "require the joinder of a party holding a property interest that will be
affected by the litigation." Gauthier v. Gerrish, 2015 ME 60,, 11, 116 A.3d 461.
Page 13 of 15 Here, the Plaintiffs conveyed their ownership of lot 33 to Stuart and Mitzi Perlmutter
during the pendency of this lawsuit. However, the Perlmutter's have not been joined as parties to
this lawsuit. The court notes at the outset that both Motions for Summary Judgment are denied
because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding each cause of action at issue. However,
the court also notes that the Perlmutter' s may have a potential fee interest in 33A at the center line
by virtue of the Paper Streets Act. Because the Defendants seek a declaratory judgment that they
own fee title to 33A, the Perlmutter's must be joined in the Defendants' lawsuit before this count
may proceed. The Perlmutter' s potential fee interest will necessarily be affected by the
Defendants' request for declaratory judgment. Although denial of judgment may not prejudice the
Perlmutter's potential fee interest, the court cannot divest of the Perlmutter's of the opportunity to
claim ownership of part of the parcel in this action. There is no evidence indicating that the
Perlmutter's cannot be joined in this lawsuit and thus their potential fee interest in the parcel cannot
be ignored. Accordingly, the Defendants' requests for declaratory judgment that they own a fee
interest in 33A cannot proceed to trial unless the Defendants have joined the Perlmutters. This
ruling will not affect the Scheduling Order absent a motion from a party. Furthermore, the court
may allow the remaining portions of the case to go to trial in the event this issue is not resolved.
This ruling encompasses Counts Two, Three and Four found in Defendants' Supplemental
Counterclaim.
V. Conclusion
Although the parties do not contest most facts, summary judgment is not appropriate under
the circumstances. The parties may prefer to present the court with a stipulated record for decision,
but a record of generally stipulated facts does not, by itself, mean that there are no genuine issues
of material fact. See Blue Sky West, LLC v. Me. Revenue Servs., 2019 ME 137, lJ 16, n.10, 215
Page 14 of 15 A.3d 812. Here, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding the Associations original intent
when drafting the Plan and conveying express easements over 33A. The intent of the Association
is essential to resolving each claim presented and thus summary judgment is not the appropriate
mechanism in which to dispose of this case.
The entry is:
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Intervenors' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Defendants are ORDERED to join Stuart M. and Mitzi P. Perlmutter as parties to Counts
Two, Three, and Four of their Supplemental Counterclaim.
The Clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference pursuant to
Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a).
Dated: '-!.,_p,Ly--'1"'. -/"":!'--,_ _z_tn_._:_
Page 15 of 15