Stingray Music USA, Inc. v. uCast LLC

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided June 29, 2020·No. 1:19-cv-07473·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-------------------------------------------------------------- X STINGRAY MUSIC USA, INC., : : Plaintiff, : ORDER AWARDING -against- : SANCTIONS AND REGULATING : PROCEEDINGS uCAST LLC f/k/a QELLO, LLC, : : 19 Civ. 7473 (AKH) Defendant. : -------------------------------------------------------------- X ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN, U.S.D.J.: Since late April 2020, I have twice sanctioned Defendant for failure to comply with discovery obligations and multiple directives of this Court. See ECF No. 37, 39. The most recent order awarding sanctions did not mince words: I warned Defendant that its behavior was “unacceptable and sanctionable.” ECF No. 39, at 2. In addition to imposing monetary sanctions, both of my prior orders–––recognizing Defendant’s ongoing failure to designate a witness under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6)–––outlined the following procedure: Plaintiff will make a submission identifying all factual propositions that Plaintiff wishes to have the opportunity to prove by way of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) witness. Defendant will have three weeks from the date of Plaintiff’s submission to produce a Rule 30(b)(6) [witness] or represent to the Court that no suitable witness exists.

ECF No. 37, at 1. In the second of the two orders awarding sanctions against Defendant, I added that “[i]f no such witness exists, those matters will be deemed proven unless … controverted by documentary materials in the record.” ECF No. 39, at 3. Plaintiff submitted its proposed factual propositions on May 20, 2020. See ECF No. 43-1. Accordingly, Defendant’s response was due on or before June 11, 2020. Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s third motion for sanctions, on the grounds that June 11 came and went, and Defendant “did not designate a 30(B)(6) witness” or represent to the Court that “no suitable witness existed.” ECF No. 43, at 4. Plaintiff notes that on June 17, 2020, nearly a full week after the deadline had passed, Plaintiff “requested an update from Defendant,” and that in response, on June 19, Defendant’s counsel stated that (a) Defendant did not provide a 30(b)(6) witness, and (b) counsel intended to withdraw. See id. On June 22, defense counsel did

indeed move to withdraw, citing Defendant’s “continued lack of assistance and non-cooperation” with the defense of its case. ECF No. 41. Later in the day on June 22, after filing the motion to withdraw but before I had granted the motion,1 defense counsel notified Plaintiff in an email that the “[Defendant] finally designated a 30(b)(6) witness.” ECF No. 43-3. Plaintiff followed up to ask defense counsel whom to contact for purposes of scheduling the deposition, and has not yet received any response. See ECF No. 43 at 5. Plaintiff’s third motion for sanctions is granted. As I made clear in my last order, the Supreme Court and Second Circuit have repeatedly approved of sanctions as a necessary and prudent tool for “‘dealing with a party which flouts court orders.’” ECF No. 39 (quoting Fonar Corp. v. Magnetic Plus, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). I limited the latest round of

sanctions to monetary penalties, but indicated that more punitive measures were available, see, e.g., id. at 2 n.1 (noting that imposition of an adverse inference or default judgment may be in order), and expressly warned that if Defendant could not timely identify a 30(b)(6) witness, the factual matters asserted by Plaintiff “will be deemed proven unless squarely controverted by documentary materials in the record.” ECF No. 39, at 3. Despite my ordering thousands of dollars in sanctions and my unequivocal chastisement of Defendant’s behavior, Defendant has flagrantly ignored this Court’s order. It is true that Defendant has now belatedly identified a witness to testify pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), but by the time Defendant finds new counsel (if

1 I granted the motion to withdraw shortly after it was filed, and instructed Defendant that it had 30 days to procure new counsel. See ECF No. 42. ever) and by the time this counsel gets up to speed, a deposition on this issue may not occur for months. I see no reason to further prejudicially delay Plaintiff’s advancement of this litigation. Accordingly, I make two rulings: First, Defendant shall pay $5,000 to Plaintiff to cover the costs of bringing this motion and in recognition of Defendant’s unacceptable behavior.

Second, the factual findings proposed by Plaintiff are hereby deemed to be proven, unless later directly controverted by documentary evidence. These factual findings are as follows: 1. The negotiations, drafts, and terms and conditions of the Asset Purchase Agreement, Transition Services Agreement, and Software License Agreement (“Transaction Documents), as referenced in the underlying Complaint at ¶ 1-2.

a. Negotiations with Defendant to purchase Qello Concerts including but not limited to representations and warranties regarding relationship with subcontractor, X3EAM (a/k/a “Nextstream LLC”)

1. That uCAST (or “Defendant”) never disclosed at any point in time during the negotiations, drafting and sale of Qello Concerts to Stingray that X3EAM was employed on other projects.

2. That uCAST never disclosed at any point in time during the negotiations, drafting and sale of Qello Concerts to Stingray its unilateral plan to renegotiate fees with X3EAM which included not paying for X3EAM services for a period of time.

3. That uCAST never disclosed at any point in time during the negotiations, drafting and sale of Qello Concerts or any time after the sale of Qello Concerts to Stingray its attempts to renegotiate payments with X3EAM

b. Earnout details (period and shortfall)

1. That uCAST negotiated terms in the Transaction Documents relating to an Earnout but after the sale of Qello Concerts was unable to properly calculate and apply these figures leading to confusion about amounts owed by Stingray to uCAST.

c. Holdback details

1. That uCAST negotiated terms in the Transaction Documents relating to Holdback but after the sale of Qello Concerts was unable to properly understand the details of the terms of the sale. d. Reserve balance details

1. That uCAST negotiated terms in the Transaction Documents relating to a Reserve balance but after the sale of Qello Concerts was unable to properly understand the details of the terms of the sale.

e. Deferred Revenue details

1. That uCAST negotiated terms in the Transaction Documents relating to Deferred Revenue but after the sale of Qello Concerts was unable to properly calculate and apply these figures leading to confusion on any amounts owed by Stingray to uCAST.

f. Gift card credit details

1. That uCAST negotiated terms with Stingray relating to Gift Card credits but after the sale of Qello Concerts was unable to properly calculate and apply these figures leading to confusion on any amounts owed by Stingray to uCAST.

g. None of the Transaction Documents included a “pay when paid” clause

h. uCAST was independently responsible for paying X3EAM for services rendered by X3EAM on behalf of uCAST.

2. uCAST’s transfer, sale, or otherwise assignment of Qello Concerts to STINGRAY, as defined in the Transaction Documents.

a. That uCAST failed to transfer the complete asset to Stingray as required by the Transaction Documents.

b. That uCAST failed to transfer the complete source code for asset to Iron Mountain as required by the Transaction Document and an Escrow Agreement.

3. Contracts, agreements, and scope of engagement between uCAST and X3EAM, LLC (a/k/a “Nextream LLC”).

a.

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Stingray Music USA, Inc. v. uCast LLC, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

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Related

Fonar Corp. v. Magnetic Resonance Plus, Inc.
175 F.R.D. 53 (S.D. New York, 1997)