Stine v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review

833 A.2d 1192, 2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 744
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 16, 2003
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 833 A.2d 1192 (Stine v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stine v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 833 A.2d 1192, 2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 744 (Pa. Ct. App. 2003).

Opinion

OPINION BY

Senior Judge McCLOSKEY.

Katherine E. Stine (Petitioner) petitions for review of an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board), dated September 26, 2002, affirming the decision of an Unemployment Compensation Referee (the Referee), thereby denying Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation (TEUC) benefits to Petitioner. We now reverse.

Petitioner is an attorney who was laid off from her employment on September 30, 2000. On October 1, 2000, she filed an application for unemployment compensation (UC) benefits, which was ultimately approved. Petitioner exhausted those benefits in April of 2001. During the period from September 20, 2000, through December 31, 2001, Petitioner held several part-time positions as an attorney and as an instructor at Penn State Mont Alto.

On or about January 6, 2002, Petitioner filed a claim for UC benefits based on the wages she had earned from September 20, 2000 through December 31, 2001. On January 16, 2002, Petitioner was found to be financially eligible for UC benefits at a weekly benefit rate of $113.00.

On February 6, 2002, Petitioner elected to participate in the Self Employment Assistance Program (SEA Program).1 In connection with that election, Petitioner executed a document entitled “The Self Employment Assistance Program (SEA) Participation Agreement” (the SEA Agreement). According to the language of the SEA Agreement, Petitioner’s execution of the document represented her “official acceptance into the SEA Program.” The SEA Agreement required Petitioner, in part, to participate in self-employment activities, report her income from self-employment activities or other employment, and devote her full-time activities to starting her own business. Income from Petitioner’s self-employment activities was not deductible from her SEA allowance, although income from other employment could be deductible. Under the terms of the SEA Agreement, Petitioner did not have to accept an offer of suitable employment.2 On the same date that Petitioner executed the SEA Agreement, she signed a certification that she was provided cer[1194]*1194tain information about the SEA Program and its requirements.

Petitioner exhausted her SEA allowance the week ending July 13, 2002. On July 16, 2002, Petitioner received notification that she was financially eligible for TEUC benefits. The notice stated “[t]his certifies that you are ineligible for regular UC benefits at this time.” Thereafter, Petitioner filed a claim for TEUC benefits.

By notice of determination dated August 22, 2002, the Unemployment Compensation Service Center denied Petitioner’s claim for TEUC benefits.3 Petitioner appealed the notice of determination. A hearing was conducted on September 24, 2002, before the Referee. By decision dated September 26, 2002, the Referee affirmed the notice of determination. Petitioner then timely appealed the Referee’s decision. By order dated November 15, 2002, the Board affirmed the decision of the Referee.4

On appeal,5 Petitioner argues that the Board erred when it affirmed the determination that she had failed to exhaust her UC benefits and was, therefore, ineligible for TEUC benefits. Respondent argues that because the SEA allowance was paid “in lieu of’ unemployment compensation benefits, Petitioner has not exhausted her regular unemployment compensation benefits. Petitioner also argues that she was not a “dislocated worker” under the SEA Program and, therefore, she was not prohibited from receiving TEUC benefits under the terms of the SEA Agreement. To the contrary, Respondent contends that Petitioner is a “dislocated worker” such that she is not entitled to TEUC benefits pursuant to the SEA Agreement.

With regard to Petitioner’s first argument, Petitioner seeks benefits under the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 2002 (the TEUC Act of 2002).6 The TEUC Act of 2002 permits a State to enter into and participate in an agreement with the Secretary of Labor whereby the State will make payment of TEUC benefits to eligible individuals.7 Under the TEUC Act of 2002, TEUC benefits are payable to individuals who have exhausted all rights to regular compensation under State law or under Federal law with respect to a benefit year (excluding any benefit year ending prior to March 15, 2001) and have no rights to regular compensation or extended compensation with respect to a week under any State or Federal unemployment compensation or other law.8 See Section 202(b)(1) and (2) of the TEUC Act of 2002.

[1195]*1195Section 202(c) of the TEUC Act of 2002 defines “exhaustion of benefits” as follows:

For purposes of subsection (b)(1), an individual shall be deemed to have exhausted such individual’s rights to regular compensation under a State law when
(1) no payments of regular compensation can be made under such law because such individual has received all regular compensation available to such individual based on employment or wages during such individual’s base period; or
(2) such individual’s rights to such compensation have been terminated by reason of the expiration of the benefit year with respect to which such rights existed.

With regard to the SEA Program in which Petitioner participated, federal and State law provides that an individual who meets certain requirements is eligible to participate in an SEA Program and to receive an allowance in lieu of regular UC benefits under the State law for the purpose of assisting such individuals in establishing a business and becoming self-employed. See 26 U.S.C. § 3306(t)(l), and Section 2 of the SEA Act, 43 P.S. § 920.2. The SEA allowance is “payable in the same amount, at the same interval, on the same terms, and subject to the same conditions, as regular” UC benefits. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(t)(2), and Section 5(a) of the SEA Act, 43 P.S. § 920.5(a). An individual participating in the SEA Program is not subject to requirements relating to availability for work, active search for work, and refusal to accept work, and, in addition, State requirements relating to disqualifying income are not applicable to income earned from self-employment by such individuals. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(t)(2)(A) and (B), Section 5(a)(1) and (2) of the SEA Act, 43 P.S. § 920.(5)(a)(l) and (2). In addition, the sum of the allowances paid under the SEA Act and regular UC benefits paid with respect to any benefit year cannot exceed the maximum amount payable for the benefit year. Section 4 of the SEA Act, 43 P.S. § 920.4.

The federal law specifically provides that individuals receiving SEA allowances “are considered to be unemployed for the purposes of Federal and State laws applicable to unemployment compensation.” 26 U.S.C. § 3306(C).

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Frimet v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review
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840 A.2d 457 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2004)

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Bluebook (online)
833 A.2d 1192, 2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 744, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stine-v-unemployment-compensation-board-of-review-pacommwct-2003.