Stine v. Howard

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedFebruary 27, 2023
Docket4:21-cv-00482
StatusUnknown

This text of Stine v. Howard (Stine v. Howard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stine v. Howard, (D. Ariz. 2023).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Mikeal Glenn Stine, No. CV-21-00482-TUC-JAS (DTF)

10 Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

11 v.

12 Danon Colbert,

13 Respondent. 14 15 Petitioner Mikeal Glenn Stine (Stine or Petitioner) presently incarcerated in the U.S. 16 Penitentiary in Tucson, Arizona ("USP Tucson"), filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 17 Corpus pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2241. (Doc. 1.) On December 27, 18 2021, Stine filed his First Amended Petition. (Doc. 5.) Respondent filed an answer on 19 February 14, 2022. (Doc. 11.) Stine filed his reply on February 24, 2022. (Doc. 14.) This 20 matter is fully briefed. This matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate 21 Judge for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 6 at 3.) As more fully set forth below, this 22 Court recommends that D. Colbert be substituted with Warden M. Gutierrez, the current 23 warden of USP-Tucson, pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 24 that the First Amended Petition be denied and dismissed. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 Petitioner is serving an aggregated term of 361 months' imprisonment. (Doc. 11-2 27 at 3.) On September 7, 2021, Lt. G. Merrell wrote and issued an incident report charging 28 Stine with bribing an official/staff member. Id. at 26, 31. Lt. Merrell had received an 1 "inmate Cop Out" from the Charlie Unit reportedly from Stine. Id. at 31. Stine was in 2 Charlie unit and his cell mate had been escorted to the Special Housing Unit (SHU). Id. 3 The communication stated that the author would provide information in exchange for 4 Stine's cell mate being released from the SHU. Id. Stine refused to participate in the Unit 5 Disciplinary Committee hearing. Id. at 32. At that time, Stine received a copy of the 6 incident report and was advised of his rights. Id. at 33. 7 The Discipline Hearing Officer (DHO) held a hearing on September 29, 2021. Id. 8 at 26. Stine did not present any evidence or call any witnesses, but he denied the 9 accusations, stating "I did not write that. Anybody could have done that. I ain't wrote that." 10 Id. at 26. The DHO found Stine had committed the act as charged and disallowed 11 twenty-seven days of good conduct time, along with other privilege sanctions. Id. at 27, 12 29. 13 II. DISCUSSION 14 a. Exhaustion 15 Before a court may consider the merits of a § 2241 petition, it must address 16 exhaustion. See Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). To exhaust a § 2241 17 claim, a petitioner must exhaust all available judicial and administrative remedies, unless 18 excused. Id. For § 2241 claims, the exhaustion requirement is prudential—not 19 jurisdictional. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017). "When a 20 petitioner does not exhaust administrative remedies, a district court ordinarily should either 21 dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner has 22 exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is excused." Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 23 1160 (9th Cir. 2011). Exhaustion can be waived or excused when "administrative remedies 24 are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile 25 gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void." 26 Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988 (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 27 2004)). 28 Petitioner acknowledges that he did not exhaust the administrative remedies. (Doc. 1 5 at 4.) He asserts the staff in the SHU refused to provide the necessary forms, and as such, 2 that he should be excused from exhausting his claims. Id. Respondent argues that 3 exhaustion should not be excused. (Doc. 11 at 6-7.) He points out that on December 20, 4 2021, Petitioner filed two administrative remedies requesting books and phone use in SHU. 5 Id. Petitioner argues this is a red herring because the "staff ask[s] what the issue is, write 6 [the issue] at the top corner of the form, and if [a prisoner] turn[s] in [a form regarding] 7 anything but that issue, it's thrown away." (Doc. 14 at 4.) Thus, according to Petitioner, 8 staff can filter the forms and appeals. 9 Respondent also argues Petitioner did not state when staff refused to provide the 10 forms or which staff refused to provide the appropriate forms. (Doc. 11 at 6.) Petitioner 11 filed two reported affidavits from other inmates. (Docs. 15, 15-1.) Both inmates report that 12 named staff refused forms for Stine on October 6, 2021, and October 13, 2021. (Docs. 15, 13 15-1.) If this issue were dispositive, the Court would recommend an evidentiary hearing 14 on the matter. However, it is not. Based on the above, the Court will consider the 15 administrative remedies unavailable—thus excused. 16 b. Merits 17 Under § 2241, courts may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner "is in 18 custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 19 § 2241(c)(3). Petitioners may only be deprived of good time credits if they are afforded 20 due process. Lane v. Salazar, 911 F.3d 942, 950-51 (9th Cir. 2018). "Prison disciplinary 21 proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a 22 defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 23 (1974). "[T]here must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and 24 objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application." Id. The 25 Supreme Court has held that due process for a prison disciplinary hearing requires: (1) 26 "written notice of the claimed violation" at least twenty-four hours before the hearing; (2) 27 "'written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons' for the 28 disciplinary action"; (3) the ability to call witnesses and present evidence if it "will not be 1 unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals"; (4) if "the complexity of the 2 issue makes it unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect and present the evidence 3 necessary for an adequate comprehension of the case," the inmate should be able to seek 4 assistance; and (5) a decision maker that is sufficiently impartial. Id. at 563-71 (internal 5 citations omitted). Additionally, a disciplinary decision must be supported by "some 6 evidence" in the record. Superintendent Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 447, 454-56 7 (1985). Thus, courts must determine if there is "any evidence in the record that could 8 support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Lane, 911 F.3d at 951 (quoting 9 Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56). 10 Petitioner does not argue he was deprived of the five Wolff protections. (Doc. 5 at 11 4-5.) The Court finds the five Wolff-due-process requirements were present. Stine was 12 informed of the incident report more than twenty-four hours before the DHO hearing. (See 13 Doc. 11-2 at 26.) He received a written statement as to what evidence was relied on and 14 the reasoning. See id. at 27-30.

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Related

Wolff v. McDonnell
418 U.S. 539 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Trevor A. Laing v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General
370 F.3d 994 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
Ward v. Chavez
678 F.3d 1042 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Xochitl Hernandez v. Jefferson Sessions
872 F.3d 976 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Mark Lane v. Josias Salazar
911 F.3d 942 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)
Leonardo v. Crawford
646 F.3d 1157 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)

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Stine v. Howard, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stine-v-howard-azd-2023.