Stillman v. Stillman

119 Misc. 862
New York Supreme Court·Decided September 15, 1922·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

Gleason,

Referee. This is an action for divorce brought by the plaintiff against the defendant Anne TJ. Stillman, praying the marriage between the plaintiff and the said defendant be dissolved because of the adultery of the defendant, and as a part of the affirmative relief asked by the plaintiff prays that it be adjudged that the infant defendant Guy Stillman be declared to be illegitimate and not the child of the plaintiff, but the child of one Frederick Beauvais.

The defendant Anne TJ. Stillman denies the charges of adultery set forth in the complaint and as an affirmative defense alleges that the plaintiff was guilty of adultery with one Florence H. Leeds, one “ Helen ” and one Clara ” and lived in adulterous intercourse with the said Florence H. Leeds and that the said [863]*863Florence H. Leeds gave birth to two children as a result of her adulterous intercourse with the plaintiff.

The infant defendant Guy Stillman appears by his guardian ad litem and interposes the usual guardian’s answer submitting the rights and interests of the infant defendant to the protection of the court.

The action was commenced by the service of the summons and complaint herein on the 8th day of July, 1920. The counter charge of adultery made by the adult defendant was not interposed until the early part of 1921 and after testimony had been taken in support of the charges of the plaintiff.

Three questions remain for determination, and for convenience sake I have grouped them as follows:

First. Can the plaintiff, in any event, succeed as against the defendant Anne U. Stillman, because of his adulterous intercourse with Florence Helen Leeds?

Second. Is the infant defendant legitimate?

Third. Is the adult defendant guilty of the charges of adultery set forth in the complaint?

This is a very unusual action, as it clearly appears without contradiction that since at least as early as 1916, and ever since that date, during the continuance of this action and down to at least March, 1921, the plaintiff has been sexually intimate with a woman not his wife, known as Florence H. Leeds; has supported and maintained her as his wife, in various places and in various apartments; that during that period she has given birth to two children, who have been recognized by him as his children; has supplied her with motor cars and jewelry; supervised her bank account and has borne the same relations with her as a man ordinarily bears to his own wife.

The proof on this subject was so overwhelming and convincing that the plaintiff’s attorneys frankly stated to the referee that no denial would be made of these charges and upon the uncontradicted proof I find that the plaintiff has been guilty of adultery with one Florence H. Leeds and has lived in adulterous intercourse with her from the year 1916 to at least the early part of 1921.

As to the charges of adultery with one “ Clara ” and with one “ Helen,” no proof was offered as to any adultery with Clara, but while there is evidence that the plaintiff occupied a stateroom in his yacht with one Helen, no proof has been offered that the said Helen was not the adult defendant herein, and I find the charges of adultery as to the said “ Clara ” and “ Helen ” not proved.

A more serious question is presented as to the legitimacy of the infant defendant Guy Stil.man.

As the infant defendant Guy Stillman was coneededly bom in [864]*864lawful wedlock, the burden of establishing his illegitimacy is upon the plaintiff, and the plaintiff must establish such illegitimacy by clear and irrefragable proof and beyond a reasonable doubt.

“ The presumption of fact of legitimacy is one of the strongest-known to the law, and of course it cannot be overthrown except by evidence which is stronger. The burden of proof is upon the party asserting illegitimacy, and the rule in a case like the present one has been declared to be ' that to bastardize the issue of a married woman, it must be shown beyond all reasonable doubt that there was no such access as could have enabled the husband to be the father of the child.’ ” Mayer v. Davis, 119 App. Div. 96, 99.

Upon a reargument of the above case, reported in 122 Appellate Division, 393, at page 394, Justice Gaynor states: “The burden was on the respondents to show incontrovertibly — (by irrefragable proof,’ Caujolle v. Ferrié, 23 N. Y. 90, 108) i. e., so clearly and certainly as not to admit of denial, dispute or controversy (see ‘ Irrefragable,’ Century Dictionary) —that such access did not take place and this they did not do. It would be hazardous to say there was no access.”

The plaintiff apparently realizing the burden imposed on him by law, has sought to establish by a considerable number of witnesses that between Christmas, 1917, and March, 1918, the plaintiff had no access to the defendant, or, at least, if there was any access or meeting between the plaintiff and the adult defendant, the circumstances of such access and meeting would not permit the presumption that sexual intercourse took place at the time of such access and meeting.

No burden is imposed on the plaintiff to establish that it was impossible for the plaintiff to have been the father of the infant defendant, such burden never having been imposed on the plaintiff by the courts of the United States. The only burden imposed on the plaintiff was to establish that if there was access between the plaintiff and the defendant at or about the commencement of the .gestation period, that such access or meeting took place under circumstances that show that intercourse did not take place on such occasion.

It is claimed by the plaintiff that during the period from Christmas, 1917, to March, 1918, the plaintiff was never at the home of the adult defendant at Pleasantville and that there was no meeting at any other place which would have naturally permitted the usual intercourse between a husband and wife.

To meet this proof, evidence has been offered on behalf of the adult defendant that on January 6 and January 27, 1918, the plaintiff and defendant were together at his residence, “ Mondanne,” Pleasantville, N. Y., and between the twelfth and the twenty-sixth [865]*865of February the adult defendant with her family stayed at the St. Regis Hotel in New York city, and on one or two occasions the plaintiff was observed taking the elevator which led to her apartments, and the plaintiff answered a telephone call to the adult defendant’s apartments. It further appears, without contradiction, that during all this period the relations between the plaintiff and the adult defendant were most harmonious and pleasant, no proof being offered or claimed that at the time the plaintiff and defendant were not carrying on their usual marital relations, and in October previous it is established that the plaintiff and defendant occupied a room together at Lake Dawson, at which time the plaintiff expressed great pleasure at occupying a room with his wife; in fact, it also clearly appears that after the birth of the infant Guy the plaintiff and adult defendant were often together, at which times the plaintiff played the victrola for the benefit of the defendant and the said infant and their relations then were apparently most happy and pleasant.

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Stillman v. Stillman, 119 Misc. 862 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1922).

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