Mr\ Justice CLIFFORD,
having stated the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
Two principal objections are taken to the proceedings, as tending to show that this court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the ease under the powers conferred by the Bankrupt Act:
1st. Because the original pleading in the District Court is a suit in equity, commenced under the third clause of the second section of the Bankrupt Act, which eould only be removed into the Circuit Court by appeal, as provided in the eighth section of that act.
2d. Because an appeal will not lie from the Circuit Court to this court, from the decree of the Circuit Court rendered in a petition of review, filed under the supervisory jurisdiction conferred upon the Circuit Courts by the first clause of the second section of the said Bankrupt Act.
1. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Courts is con
ferred upon the District Courts of all suits at law or in equity, which may or shall be brought by the assignee in bankruptcy against any person claiming an adverse interest, or by such person against such assignee, touching any property or rights of property of such assignee, transferred to or vested in such assignee, by virtue of the fourteenth section of the act providing for such transfers.
Rights of property were claimed in these lands by the appellee, and the suit in this case was commenced in the District Court contesting that claim, which is plainly a subject-matter cognizable under that provision; nor is it any argument against that theory that the first pleading in the District Court is, in form, a petition, as suits at law and in equity, in many jurisdictions, are commenced in that form of pleading. Beyond all doubt the petition contains every requisite of a good bill in equity, whether the pleading is tested by the statement of the cause of action, or by the charging part of the bill, or by the prayer for relief, and if it be suggested that it contains no prayer for process, the answer to the objection is a plain one, to wit, that three of the parties respondent appeared and waived the issuing and service of process, and that the appellee voluntarily appeared and filed an answer.
Nor is it any valid objection to that view that the Circuit Court, under the supervisory clause of the second section, may, in certain cases, proceed by bill, petition, or other proper process, as the power conferred by that clause does not extend to any case or question “ otherwise provided for,” by any special provision, especially as it is clear that cases arising under the third clause of that section, where the debt or damages claimed amount to more than five hundred dollars, may be appealed from the District Court to the Circuit Court for the same district.
Special provision, therefore, is made for the removal of such a case into the Circuit Court, and inasmuch as the case is made the subject of such special provision, it follows, be
yond peradvent-ure, that it does not fall within the supervisory jurisdiction conferred upon the Circuit Courts by the said first clause of the second section.
2. Much discussion of the second question is unnecessary, as the justices of this court are unanimously-of the opinion that the question is settled in the negative by the prior decisions of this court.
Even a slight examination of that case will be sufficient to convince any inquirer that the question under consideration was directly presented for decision in that case, and it is equally certain, in the judgment of the court, that it was expressly decided without any qualification whatever. Attempts have since been made to induce the court to give its sanction to certain alleged exceptions to the rule, but the court has in every such case refused to countenance any such theory.
Controversies, in order that they may be cognizable in the Circuit or District Court, under the third clause of the second section of that act, must have respect to some property or rights of property of the bankrupt transferable to, or vested in such assignee, and the suit, whether it be a suit at law or iu equity, must be in the name of one of the two parties described in that clause and against the other, no matter whether they are citizens of the same State or not, as the jurisdiction is conferred by the Bankrupt Act and depends upon the conditions therein prescribed.
Final judgments and decrees in such cases rendered in the Circuit Court, if the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars, may be removed into the Supreme Court for re-examination, as provided in the twenty-second section of the Judiciary Act.
Such, judgments and decrees, however, in order that they may be re-examinable in this court, must be final judgments
or decrees, rendered in term time, as contradistinguished from mere interlocutory judgments or decrees or orders ■which may be entered at chambers, or if entered in court are still subject to revision before the final disposition of the cause.
Prior to the passage of the Bankrupt Act the District Courts possessed no equity jurisdiction whatever, but it is undoubtedly true that those courts do now possess concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Courts in the cases specified in the third clause of the second section of that act, and that final decrees rendered by those courts in such eases, where the debt or damages claimed amount to more than five hundred dollars, may be removed by appeal into the Circuit Court for re-examination. Doubt upon that subject cannot be entertained, and it is equally certain that a final decree rendered in the Circuit Court in such a case, whether originally brought there, or removed there by appeal from the District Court, may be removed by appeal into this court for re-examination, provided the appeal is perfected as required in the acts of Congress allowing appeals in cases of equity and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
Nothing of the kind was done in this case, as appears by the record.
Sufficient has already been remarked to show that the proceeding to revise the decree of the District Court was instituted and prosecuted throughout under the first clause of the second section of the Bankrupt Act, which confers upon the Circuit Courts merely a supervisory power over the proceedings, of the District Courts in bankruptcy, and which the Circuit Courts may exercise in term time or vacation, and the provision is that the jurisdiction shall extend to questions, as well as cases, arising under the Bankrupt Act, except where provision is otherwise made. Special provision is otherwise made for appeals in cases like the one before the court, and it necessarily follows that the case is not one falling within the power conferred upon the Circuit Courts by the first clause of the second section of that act.
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Mr\ Justice CLIFFORD,
having stated the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
Two principal objections are taken to the proceedings, as tending to show that this court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the ease under the powers conferred by the Bankrupt Act:
1st. Because the original pleading in the District Court is a suit in equity, commenced under the third clause of the second section of the Bankrupt Act, which eould only be removed into the Circuit Court by appeal, as provided in the eighth section of that act.
2d. Because an appeal will not lie from the Circuit Court to this court, from the decree of the Circuit Court rendered in a petition of review, filed under the supervisory jurisdiction conferred upon the Circuit Courts by the first clause of the second section of the said Bankrupt Act.
1. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Courts is con
ferred upon the District Courts of all suits at law or in equity, which may or shall be brought by the assignee in bankruptcy against any person claiming an adverse interest, or by such person against such assignee, touching any property or rights of property of such assignee, transferred to or vested in such assignee, by virtue of the fourteenth section of the act providing for such transfers.
Rights of property were claimed in these lands by the appellee, and the suit in this case was commenced in the District Court contesting that claim, which is plainly a subject-matter cognizable under that provision; nor is it any argument against that theory that the first pleading in the District Court is, in form, a petition, as suits at law and in equity, in many jurisdictions, are commenced in that form of pleading. Beyond all doubt the petition contains every requisite of a good bill in equity, whether the pleading is tested by the statement of the cause of action, or by the charging part of the bill, or by the prayer for relief, and if it be suggested that it contains no prayer for process, the answer to the objection is a plain one, to wit, that three of the parties respondent appeared and waived the issuing and service of process, and that the appellee voluntarily appeared and filed an answer.
Nor is it any valid objection to that view that the Circuit Court, under the supervisory clause of the second section, may, in certain cases, proceed by bill, petition, or other proper process, as the power conferred by that clause does not extend to any case or question “ otherwise provided for,” by any special provision, especially as it is clear that cases arising under the third clause of that section, where the debt or damages claimed amount to more than five hundred dollars, may be appealed from the District Court to the Circuit Court for the same district.
Special provision, therefore, is made for the removal of such a case into the Circuit Court, and inasmuch as the case is made the subject of such special provision, it follows, be
yond peradvent-ure, that it does not fall within the supervisory jurisdiction conferred upon the Circuit Courts by the said first clause of the second section.
2. Much discussion of the second question is unnecessary, as the justices of this court are unanimously-of the opinion that the question is settled in the negative by the prior decisions of this court.
Even a slight examination of that case will be sufficient to convince any inquirer that the question under consideration was directly presented for decision in that case, and it is equally certain, in the judgment of the court, that it was expressly decided without any qualification whatever. Attempts have since been made to induce the court to give its sanction to certain alleged exceptions to the rule, but the court has in every such case refused to countenance any such theory.
Controversies, in order that they may be cognizable in the Circuit or District Court, under the third clause of the second section of that act, must have respect to some property or rights of property of the bankrupt transferable to, or vested in such assignee, and the suit, whether it be a suit at law or iu equity, must be in the name of one of the two parties described in that clause and against the other, no matter whether they are citizens of the same State or not, as the jurisdiction is conferred by the Bankrupt Act and depends upon the conditions therein prescribed.
Final judgments and decrees in such cases rendered in the Circuit Court, if the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars, may be removed into the Supreme Court for re-examination, as provided in the twenty-second section of the Judiciary Act.
Such, judgments and decrees, however, in order that they may be re-examinable in this court, must be final judgments
or decrees, rendered in term time, as contradistinguished from mere interlocutory judgments or decrees or orders ■which may be entered at chambers, or if entered in court are still subject to revision before the final disposition of the cause.
Prior to the passage of the Bankrupt Act the District Courts possessed no equity jurisdiction whatever, but it is undoubtedly true that those courts do now possess concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Courts in the cases specified in the third clause of the second section of that act, and that final decrees rendered by those courts in such eases, where the debt or damages claimed amount to more than five hundred dollars, may be removed by appeal into the Circuit Court for re-examination. Doubt upon that subject cannot be entertained, and it is equally certain that a final decree rendered in the Circuit Court in such a case, whether originally brought there, or removed there by appeal from the District Court, may be removed by appeal into this court for re-examination, provided the appeal is perfected as required in the acts of Congress allowing appeals in cases of equity and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
Nothing of the kind was done in this case, as appears by the record.
Sufficient has already been remarked to show that the proceeding to revise the decree of the District Court was instituted and prosecuted throughout under the first clause of the second section of the Bankrupt Act, which confers upon the Circuit Courts merely a supervisory power over the proceedings, of the District Courts in bankruptcy, and which the Circuit Courts may exercise in term time or vacation, and the provision is that the jurisdiction shall extend to questions, as well as cases, arising under the Bankrupt Act, except where provision is otherwise made. Special provision is otherwise made for appeals in cases like the one before the court, and it necessarily follows that the case is not one falling within the power conferred upon the Circuit Courts by the first clause of the second section of that act.
Where both the Circuit Court and this court are without jurisdiction it is in general irregular to make any order or decree in the case, except to dismiss the suit, but that rule does not apply to a case where the Circuit Court renders a judgment or decree in favor of the party instituting the suit, but in such a case the court here will reverse the judgment or decree in the court below, and remand the cause with directions to dismiss the suit.
Unless the practice were as explained great injustice would be done in all cases where the judgment or decree is in favor of the plaintiff' or petitioner, as he would obtain the full benefit of a judgment or decree rendered in his favor by a court which had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the controversy.
Want of jurisdiction to hear and determine the merits in such a case does not show that this court, may not correct the erroneous judgment or decree of the Circuit Court, but if the Circuit Court is also without jurisdiction this court cannot direct a new trial or a new hearing, as it may do in a case where the want of jurisdiction in this court is occasioned by a mistrial in the court below, which has led to an erroneous removal of the cause from the Circuit. Court into this court, as by appeal instead of a writ of error, or by a writ of error, when it should have been by appeal.
Cases wrongly brought up, it may be admitted, should, as a general rule, be dismissed by the appellate tribunal, but a necessary exception exists to that rule where the consequence of a decree of dismissal will be to give full effect to an irregular and erroneous decree of the subordinate court in a case where the decree is entered without jurisdiction, and in violation of any legal or constitutional right. Rules of practice are established to promote .the ends of justice, and where it appears that a given rule will have the opposite effect, appellate courts are inclined to regard the case as one of an exceptional character. Such courts, where there is no de
feet in bringing up a cause, usually affirm or reverse the judgment or decree of the subordinate court, but cases occar sionally arise in which the proceedings in the lower court are so irregular that a mere affirmance or reversal upon the merits would work very great injustice, and in such cases it is competent for the appellate court to reverse the judgment or decree in question and to remand the cause with such directions, if it be practicable, as will do justice to both parties. Instances of the kind are numerous in the decisions of this court, nor is there much difficulty in accomplishing the end in view in a case where the subordinate court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and the right to a new appeal or writ of error is not barred by lapse of time.
Difficulties of the kind frequently occur in cases of seizures, as the District Courts have often failed to distinguish between seizures on land and seizures on navigable waters, sometimes trying the latter as a common-law action, and sometimes trying the former as an instance cause. Mistakes of the kind have also been made in libels of information filed under the confiscation acts passed by Congress. Errors of the kind, when they have seasonably come to the knowledge of this court, have uniformly been corrected, as far as it is in the power of this court to afford a remedy. Serious embarrassment often arises in such cases where it appears that the subordinate court is also without jurisdiction, but that difficulty does not prevent this court from assuming jurisdiction, on appeal, for the purpose of reversing the judgment or decree rendered in such subordinate court, in order to vacate the same, when rendered or passed without authority of law.
Where the court below has no jurisdiction of the case in
any form
of proceeding, the regnlar course, if the judgment or decree is for the defendant or respondent, is to direct the
cause to be dismissed, but if the judgment or decree is for the plaintiff or petitioner, as in this case, the court here will reverse the judgment or decree and remand the cause with proper directions, which in the case supposed must be to dismiss the writ, libel, or petition, as the subordinate court cannot properly hear and determine the matter in controversy.
Viewed in the light of these suggestions it is quite clear that the decree of the Circuit Court rendered under the petition of review, must be reversed, and inasmuch as the Circuit Court has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter in that form of proceeding, and that it is now too late to take an appeal from the District Court to the Circuit Court, the cause must be remanded with directions to dismiss the petition.
Unable to refer the appellee to any legal remedy as matter of right, under the present pleadings, it seems'to be proper, in the judgment of the whole court, to suggest that it may be that the District Court will grant a review of the decree rendered in that court, if a proper application is presented for that purpose, which would lay the foundation, if it be granted, in case of an adverse decision upon the merits of the case*for a regular appeal to the Circuit Court.
Decree reversed without costs, and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the petition
For want oe jurisdiction.