Stickles v. Townsend

171 Iowa 697
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedOctober 4, 1915
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 171 Iowa 697 (Stickles v. Townsend) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stickles v. Townsend, 171 Iowa 697 (iowa 1915).

Opinion

Preston, J.

[699]*6991. Witnesses : attorney as witness: duty to withdraw from ease. [698]*698— There is no serious dispute between counsel as to the law of the case, and the question presented is almost entirely one of fact. Many of the facts are not disputed. The determination of the case turns ' on the question as to whether there had been a delivery to plaintiff of the deed which it is admitted the three other named children of deceased executed. Plaintiff contends that the deed and assignment of the one-sixth interest in the personal property were sent to him at Denver, Colorado, by A. D. Howard, who is one of the attorneys for appellants, and who was also temporary administrator and administrator with the will annexed, and who, plaintiff claims, was acting for plaintiff in this matter. It is also claimed that plaintiff returned the deed and assignment to Howard with directions to record the same. He claims that he did not know of the alleged or so-called escrow papers which defendants claim they left with Howard at the time the deed and assignment were placed in Howard’s hands; and he claims that said escrow paper is an afterthought. Defendants contend that, at the same time that the deed and assignment were executed and placed in Howard’s hands, they also executed and placed with him a paper, the substance of which is that the deed and assignment were not to be delivered to plaintiff until they should so direct; they contend that Mr. Howard did not send the papers to plaintiff, or if he did, he was not authorized so to do, and that, therefore, there was no delivery. Their claim now is that plaintiff, who is their half brother, was addicted to gambling and that their purpose in executing the deed and assignment was to induce plaintiff to “straighten up”, as they put it, and that if he did so, the papers were to be then delivered to him. The [699]*699three defendants, grantors in said deed, and their attorney, Mr. Howard, so testify over plaintiff’s objection. A strong circumstance, in our opinion, against defendants’ contention at this point is that neither the deed itself nor the so-called escrow paper refer to such a matter. Some of the grantors testify that the reason they did not want the deed delivered was that plaintiff and defendant Ross Townsend had lost too much money in a business venture in which they were engaged together in Colorado a year or two after Reece Townsend died, although they attempt to explain and qualify their testimony so given. There is but little evidence in the record that plaintiff was a gambler. One of the defendants testifies that he saw him gamble, but we do not find that any date was fixed. One of the attorneys for defendants, testifying as a witness, said that plaintiff had admitted it to him. "We might say here that on the really vital points in the ease the defendants rely almost entirely upon the testimony of their attorney, who was a witness, and who continued in the active management of the defense in the district court, and who has made the argument in this court.

"We do not wish to criticise too harshly; but under such circumstances, we much prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they should then withdraw from the active management of the case. It is human nature for attorneys to be intensely interested in the result of their client’s case.

As bearing upon this point, we may state that appellants’ abstract contains 74 pages and there is an additional abstract of 65 pages. Substantially every page of the abstract is corrected, and there is no denial of appellee’s abstract. The entire deposition of one material witness is omitted from the abstract. The argument for appellants is made without regard to the corrections in the additional abstract.

[700]*7002' Syf.1evidence: sufficiency [699]*699The plaintiff is a son of defendant Theresa Jane Townsend, by a former husband. Defendants Frank, Ross and Elda [700]*700are her children by deceased, Reece Townsend, who died July 1, 1906, seized of the real estate described. Deceased died testate, but his will made no provision for plaintiff except upon a contingency which did not happen. The will gave to his widow, Theresa, one third, and the undivided two thirds to his three children, Frank, Ross and Elda, share and share alike. The plaintiff had lived in the family for about twenty years, and since he was fifteen years of age, and, as we understand it, claimed to have had some agreement that he should receive a share of the estate, and threatened to contest the will on that ground. He was dissatisfied that he would get nothing under the will.'

By direction of the three devisees, Mr. Howard prepared a deed of conveyance, absolute in form, to an undivided one-sixth of the real estate of which deceased died seized, but as to the lot in town, — the' homestead, — subject to a life estate. This deed contains this provision: “and, whereas, it is the desire of the said Frank Earl Townsend, Ross M. Townsend, and Elda Townsend, that their brother, Harry Elmer Stickles, should own a part of the real estate belonging to said estate, and that he should receive an equal share therein with the said legatees under said will . . . this conveyance of said one-sixth interest is made to the said Harry Elmer Stickles for the purpose of making him an equal owner with the grantors in the undivided two-thirds of said real property that is left to the grantors under said last will and testament of the said Reece Townsend, and for no other purpose. ’ ’ This deed bears date July 10, 1906, and was signed by all the grantors named and was duly acknowledged July 14, 1906. At the same time, an undivided one-sixth interest in the personal estate was assigned by the same parties and a life lease from the three children and devisees before named was executed for the homestead, which contains the following recital, among others: “And it is further agreed that in consideration of this life lease to our said mother that said home shall remain [701]*701as it now is until the death of the said second party, at which time said home shall become the sole property of Frank Earl Townsend, Ross M. Townsend, Elda Townsend, and Harry Elmer Stickles, each to share and share alike.” Defendants contend that the escrow paper before referred to was executed at the same time. As stated, this last proposition is denied by plaintiff, who says he never heard of it until a year or two afterwards, and there are other circumstances in the case indicating that there was no such paper delivered to Howard until after plaintiff had returned the deed to Howard for recording. We shall not now attempt to refer to all these circumstances, but content ourselves with stating that, from the entire record, which we have examined with care, the weight of the evidence is against the contention of defendants that such an instrument was executed and placed in Howard’s hands at the time the deed and assignment were given to Howard. The circumstances, or some of them hereinafter referred to, have a bearing upon this point. There is a conflict in the testimony as to whether plaintiff was present at the time the deed, assignment and lease were made. Plaintiff claims that after the funeral he returned home before any of the papers were drawn. On July 22, 1906, or eight days after the papers were acknowledged, he wrote a letter to A. D. Howard from Denver, Colorado, in which he stated:

“Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
171 Iowa 697, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stickles-v-townsend-iowa-1915.