Stewart v. United States

372 F. Supp. 407, 33 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 760, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12560
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedJanuary 28, 1974
DocketNos. CA 3-4048-C and CA 3-4049-C
StatusPublished

This text of 372 F. Supp. 407 (Stewart v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stewart v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 407, 33 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 760, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12560 (N.D. Tex. 1974).

Opinion

OPINION

WILLIAM M. TAYLOR, Jr., Chief Judge.

These are suits for recovery of income taxes paid to the United States and for statutory interest.

[408]*408These cases were consolidated because Plaintiffs 1 are partners in an insurance agency, their claims are identical, they arise out of the same transactions and occurrences and the applicable law is the same.2

Plaintiffs in 1964 consolidated their insurance agencies and bought out a third agency. We are concerned with the latter transaction, the buying and selling of the third insurance agency.

Plaintiffs purchased the agency by written contract, a copy of which is appended to this Opinion as Appendix “A”. The contract price was $125,000.00, broken down as $10,000.00 for goodwill, $107,500.00 for expirations,3 $1,500.00 for furniture and fixtures, and $6,000.00 for a covenant nbt to compete. Plaintiffs also paid a $10,000.00 brokerage fee which was allocated proportionately to the same items.

Plaintiffs took deductions on their 1965, 1966 and 1967 returns for depreciation on the expirations. The deductions were disallowed by the Government. In 1967, Plaintiffs took deductions for the loss of good will in 1967 because they moved that year from the offices which they had taken over from the third agency and because they had changed the name of their agency from Sleeper-Stewart-Dean & Co. to Sleeper-Stewart Insurance Agency in that year. These deductions were also disallowed. Plaintiffs paid their assessed deficiencies and made claim for the alleged excess. These claims were denied and Plaintiffs timely filed these actions under 28 U.S.C., § 1346(a)(1). The Government has moved for Summary Judgment under Rule 56(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the Court is of the opinion that it should be granted.

I.

DEPRECIATION OF EXPIRATIONS

Plaintiffs’ first contention is that under § 167(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,4 they should be allowed to deduct the cost of the expirations purchased from the Dean Agency over a period of five years. The Government’s contention is that the expirations are in the nature of goodwill5 un[409]*409der § 167(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, Regulation § 1.167(a)-36 and that they are therefore a non-depreciable and non-deductible item.7

The Fifth Circuit in the case of Commissioner v. Killian8 ruled that the ex-pirations in that case “ . . . had one single practical and legal attribute: good will.” 9 In that case, only the expirations and a covenant not to compete were transferred. No right to future commissions and no contracts were transferred.10

Since Killian, there have been two Fifth Circuit eases concerning expirations, Salome v. United States11 and Blaine v. United States.12 The Court in Blaine gave an apt description of the substance of these cases when it said:

“The taxpayer’s burden in this case was to show by a preponderance of credible and convincing evidence that these expirations are to be legally distinguished from those in . (Killian).”13

In neither case did the taxpayers meet their burden.

How does this holding translate into grounds for the granting of a summary judgment? The facts in Blaine are illuminating.

The expirations in Blaine were for the most part of insurance policies that were issued in connection with mortgage loans that had been made by the seller of the expirations. The taxpayer was arguing that past history had shown that no referrals would be made from the expirations and that the policies would only be renewed until the mortgage loan was paid. This action was an attempt to show that the expirations in question were a part of the insurance business that is quite different from the bulk of the insurance business.

In our case, we are not concerned with an odd corner of the insurance business, Plaintiffs’ agency stands in midstream. Their allegations and answers to the interrogatories propounded to them by the Government show that the facts of their case fit squarely with the facts of Killian. The affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs of their experts and of themselves do not raise any facts other than those of Killian14 Even if these actions were allowed to go to trial, the Court would be required to direct a verdict by the standard of Killian, Salome and Blaine. In this kind of situation, a summary judgment should be ordered15

II.

DEDUCTIBLE LOSS OF GOODWILL

Plaintiffs’ second contention is that they suffered a deductible loss16 when they removed the name of the agency that they had bought from the name of their partnership and moved their office from the building that had [410]*410been occupied by the agency that they had bought. Plaintiffs wish to deduct the total of $10,800.00 (contractual price of the goodwill and proportionate share of the brokerage fee) as a loss of goodwill for the year 1967.

What Plaintiffs in effect are saying is that they abandoned the goodwill that they bought in 1964.

The important case in this area of tax law is Metropolitan Laundry Co., Limited v. United States.17 Metropolitan had laundry facilities and routes in both San Francisco and Oakland, California, before World War II. During the war, the Federal Government took over its facilities in San Francisco. Metropolitan then found it did not have enough capacity in its Oakland laundry to take care of its routes in San Francisco. It therefore dropped all of its San Francisco routes. The District Court allowed Metropolitan to deduct a sum for goodwill lost because of the abandonment of its business in San Francisco.

The case is important in that it recognized that goodwill can be disposed of in a situation other than when a whole business is disposed of, that is, when either the business is disposed of in one particular geographical area or when one entire product line is abandoned.

The Sleeper-Stewart Insurance Agency situation does not fit within the rule of Metropolitan. Plaintiffs did not abandon either business in any area or any product line. The distance they moved was only a few blocks. Their answer to the interrogatories showed that they continued to use the expirations after the move that they had bought from the Dean Agency. So they cannot say that they dropped a line of business that they acquired from the Dean Agency.18

The goodwill of the Dean Agency is contained in the expirations that were acquired. The business of the Dean Agency was and is contained in the ex-pirations and the covenant not to compete. Plaintiffs used the expirations after 1967, so they continued the business and the goodwill that they had acquired. By this action they signified that they agreed that the goodwill acquired still had life.

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Related

James, Jr. And Glenna Salome v. United States
395 F.2d 990 (Fifth Circuit, 1968)
Super Food Services, Inc. v. United States
416 F.2d 1236 (Seventh Circuit, 1969)
W. Thcker Blaine, Sr. v. United States
441 F.2d 917 (Fifth Circuit, 1971)
Metropolitan Laundry Co. v. United States
100 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. California, 1951)
Strauss v. United States
199 F. Supp. 845 (W.D. Louisiana, 1961)
Miller v. Hoffman
1 F.R.D. 290 (D. New Jersey, 1940)
United States v. Daubendiek
25 F.R.D. 50 (N.D. Ohio, 1959)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
372 F. Supp. 407, 33 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 760, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12560, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stewart-v-united-states-txnd-1974.