UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TRINA STEWART,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 04-1444 (CKK) v.
ST. ELIZABETHS HOSPITAL,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION (January 7, 2009)
Plaintiff Trina Stewart filed the above-captioned lawsuit against her former employer,
Defendant St. Elizabeths Hospital, alleging, inter alia, that Defendant had discriminated against
her on the basis of her disability by failing to accede to her requests for a reasonable
accommodation for her mental disability in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. As set out in this Court’s August 2, 2007 Order and accompanying
Memorandum Opinion and as confirmed by Plaintiff’s counsel in on-the-record discussions with
the Court at trial, Plaintiff’s triable claim was limited to whether Plaintiff made, and Defendant
denied, a request for reasonable accommodation to Facility Administrator Jasper Burnett in the
fall of 2002. See 08/02/07 Order, Docket No. [45]; see also Stewart v. St. Elizabeths Hospital,
2007 WL 2257220, *12, 17-20 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2007).
On January 6, 2009, a jury trial was held in the instant matter. At the close of Plaintiff’s
case-in-chief, Defendant moved for a directed verdict based upon Plaintiff’s failure to provide
evidence as to certain elements of Plaintiff’s claim. After holding two on-the-record discussions
and thoroughly reviewing the parties’ arguments, the relevant case law and the unofficial transcript in this matter, the Court orally granted Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict
finding that Plaintiff had failed to present a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable
jury to find that she had established all elements of her claim under the Rehabilitation Act. The
Court briefly summarizes below its reasons for granting Defendant’s motion and, in so doing,
fully incorporates both on-the-record discussions held by the Court on this issue.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) provides, in relevant part, that a court may issue a
judgment as a matter of law “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and
the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find
for the party on that issue.” FED . R. CIV . P. 50(a). Upon such a finding, the court may “resolve
the issue against the party [and] grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party
on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a
favorable finding on that issue.” Id. “As a general matter, a party has been ‘fully heard’ for
purposes of Rule 50(a) when the party has submitted all of its evidence on the relevant claim or
issue.” See Teneyck v. Omni Shoreham Hotel, 365 F.3d 1139, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing 9
James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 50.20[2] (3d ed. 2004)). “Accordingly, a
defendant may move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence.” Id.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act for failure
to accommodate, Plaintiff must show “(1) that [she] was an individual who had a disability
within the meaning of the statute; (2) that the employer had notice of [her] disability; (3) that
with reasonable accommodation [she] could perform the essential functions of the position; and
(4) that the employer refused to make such accommodations.” Scarborough v. Natosios, 190 F.
Supp. 2d. 5, 19 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 387 n. 11 (4th Cir.
2 2001)). Defendant moved for a directed verdict based upon Plaintiff’s failure to provide
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude: (1) that Defendant refused to
reassign Plaintiff or to provide any other reasonable accommodation; and/or (2) that Plaintiff
could have performed the essential functions of the position, even with a reasonable
accommodation. Although the Court declined to grant a directed verdict based on the latter
argument, the Court agreed that Plaintiff failed to provide a sufficient evidentiary basis from
which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant refused, by inaction or otherwise,
Plaintiff’s request for reasonable accommodation made in the fall of 2002 to Mr. Burnett.1
In reviewing the evidence presented by Plaintiff in her case-in-chief, the Court concluded
that, giving all reasonable inferences to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s evidence demonstrated only that
Plaintiff had made a request to Mr. Burnett for a reasonable accommodation—i.e., reassignment
out of the John Howard Pavilion and into another unit in St. Elizabeths Hospital—and that
Plaintiff and Mr. Burnett had been engaged in ongoing discussions regarding that request.
Plaintiff did not, however, present any evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude
that Defendant actually refused that request by inaction or otherwise.
Specifically, Plaintiff testified that she had two separate conversations with Mr. Burnett
in early October of 2002 concerning her request to be transferred out of the John Howard
Pavilion. According to Plaintiff, the first conversation occurred via telephone, at which time
1 As the Court orally informed the parties in ruling upon Defendant’s motion, Defendant’s second basis for its directed verdict—i.e., whether Plaintiff had failed to provide sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff could have performed the essential functions of the position—was a close question. Accordingly, as the Court indicated to the parties, it would not have granted Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on that basis alone (based on the record before it), but rather would have taken Defendant’s motion as to that question under advisement.
3 Plaintiff told Mr. Burnett that she needed to be reassigned to another unit within St. Elizabeths
Hospital because “she did not feel well.” Plaintiff testified that Mr. Burnett asked her if she had
any documentation and, upon Plaintiff’s affirmative response, instructed Plaintiff to bring the
necessary documentation to his secretary. Although Plaintiff stated that she had provided Mr.
Burnett with documentation about “some events” as well as documentation about a previous
incident she had with a patient, she conceded that she did not provide Mr. Burnett with the
medical documentation he had requested. Plaintiff further testified that, subsequent to her
telephone conversation with Mr. Burnett, she met with him in person on October 15, 2002. At
that time, she repeated her request to be transferred out of the John Howard Pavilion. According
to Plaintiff’s testimony, Mr. Burnett told her to get the paperwork that she needed and he would
help her with her request. Plaintiff again acknowledged that, as of October 15, 2002, she had not
provided Mr. Burnett with the requested medical documentation.
Plaintiff testified that, directly after her October 15, 2002 meeting with Mr. Burnett, she
went back to work. However, at lunchtime that same day, she “put in for a leave slip” and then
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TRINA STEWART,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 04-1444 (CKK) v.
ST. ELIZABETHS HOSPITAL,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION (January 7, 2009)
Plaintiff Trina Stewart filed the above-captioned lawsuit against her former employer,
Defendant St. Elizabeths Hospital, alleging, inter alia, that Defendant had discriminated against
her on the basis of her disability by failing to accede to her requests for a reasonable
accommodation for her mental disability in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. As set out in this Court’s August 2, 2007 Order and accompanying
Memorandum Opinion and as confirmed by Plaintiff’s counsel in on-the-record discussions with
the Court at trial, Plaintiff’s triable claim was limited to whether Plaintiff made, and Defendant
denied, a request for reasonable accommodation to Facility Administrator Jasper Burnett in the
fall of 2002. See 08/02/07 Order, Docket No. [45]; see also Stewart v. St. Elizabeths Hospital,
2007 WL 2257220, *12, 17-20 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2007).
On January 6, 2009, a jury trial was held in the instant matter. At the close of Plaintiff’s
case-in-chief, Defendant moved for a directed verdict based upon Plaintiff’s failure to provide
evidence as to certain elements of Plaintiff’s claim. After holding two on-the-record discussions
and thoroughly reviewing the parties’ arguments, the relevant case law and the unofficial transcript in this matter, the Court orally granted Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict
finding that Plaintiff had failed to present a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable
jury to find that she had established all elements of her claim under the Rehabilitation Act. The
Court briefly summarizes below its reasons for granting Defendant’s motion and, in so doing,
fully incorporates both on-the-record discussions held by the Court on this issue.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) provides, in relevant part, that a court may issue a
judgment as a matter of law “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and
the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find
for the party on that issue.” FED . R. CIV . P. 50(a). Upon such a finding, the court may “resolve
the issue against the party [and] grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party
on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a
favorable finding on that issue.” Id. “As a general matter, a party has been ‘fully heard’ for
purposes of Rule 50(a) when the party has submitted all of its evidence on the relevant claim or
issue.” See Teneyck v. Omni Shoreham Hotel, 365 F.3d 1139, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing 9
James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 50.20[2] (3d ed. 2004)). “Accordingly, a
defendant may move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence.” Id.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act for failure
to accommodate, Plaintiff must show “(1) that [she] was an individual who had a disability
within the meaning of the statute; (2) that the employer had notice of [her] disability; (3) that
with reasonable accommodation [she] could perform the essential functions of the position; and
(4) that the employer refused to make such accommodations.” Scarborough v. Natosios, 190 F.
Supp. 2d. 5, 19 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 387 n. 11 (4th Cir.
2 2001)). Defendant moved for a directed verdict based upon Plaintiff’s failure to provide
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude: (1) that Defendant refused to
reassign Plaintiff or to provide any other reasonable accommodation; and/or (2) that Plaintiff
could have performed the essential functions of the position, even with a reasonable
accommodation. Although the Court declined to grant a directed verdict based on the latter
argument, the Court agreed that Plaintiff failed to provide a sufficient evidentiary basis from
which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant refused, by inaction or otherwise,
Plaintiff’s request for reasonable accommodation made in the fall of 2002 to Mr. Burnett.1
In reviewing the evidence presented by Plaintiff in her case-in-chief, the Court concluded
that, giving all reasonable inferences to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s evidence demonstrated only that
Plaintiff had made a request to Mr. Burnett for a reasonable accommodation—i.e., reassignment
out of the John Howard Pavilion and into another unit in St. Elizabeths Hospital—and that
Plaintiff and Mr. Burnett had been engaged in ongoing discussions regarding that request.
Plaintiff did not, however, present any evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude
that Defendant actually refused that request by inaction or otherwise.
Specifically, Plaintiff testified that she had two separate conversations with Mr. Burnett
in early October of 2002 concerning her request to be transferred out of the John Howard
Pavilion. According to Plaintiff, the first conversation occurred via telephone, at which time
1 As the Court orally informed the parties in ruling upon Defendant’s motion, Defendant’s second basis for its directed verdict—i.e., whether Plaintiff had failed to provide sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff could have performed the essential functions of the position—was a close question. Accordingly, as the Court indicated to the parties, it would not have granted Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on that basis alone (based on the record before it), but rather would have taken Defendant’s motion as to that question under advisement.
3 Plaintiff told Mr. Burnett that she needed to be reassigned to another unit within St. Elizabeths
Hospital because “she did not feel well.” Plaintiff testified that Mr. Burnett asked her if she had
any documentation and, upon Plaintiff’s affirmative response, instructed Plaintiff to bring the
necessary documentation to his secretary. Although Plaintiff stated that she had provided Mr.
Burnett with documentation about “some events” as well as documentation about a previous
incident she had with a patient, she conceded that she did not provide Mr. Burnett with the
medical documentation he had requested. Plaintiff further testified that, subsequent to her
telephone conversation with Mr. Burnett, she met with him in person on October 15, 2002. At
that time, she repeated her request to be transferred out of the John Howard Pavilion. According
to Plaintiff’s testimony, Mr. Burnett told her to get the paperwork that she needed and he would
help her with her request. Plaintiff again acknowledged that, as of October 15, 2002, she had not
provided Mr. Burnett with the requested medical documentation.
Plaintiff testified that, directly after her October 15, 2002 meeting with Mr. Burnett, she
went back to work. However, at lunchtime that same day, she “put in for a leave slip” and then
went home, at which time Plaintiff attempted to commit suicide. She was subsequently
hospitalized for two days and later admitted to a psychiatric ward. Plaintiff’s testimony stops
shortly thereafter. Indeed, Plaintiff testified as to only one additional contact with Defendant
after her October 15, 2002 meeting with Mr. Burnett. Specifically, Plaintiff testified that she
tried to call Mr. Burnett, either while she was still hospitalized or at some point after she was
released, and was informed at that time that Mr. Burnett had been “RIF’ed” (subject to a
“reduction in force”) and was no longer at St. Elizabeths Hospital. Plaintiff did not testify that
she asked to speak to anyone else or that she raised her request for reasonable accommodation at
4 that time. Rather, Plaintiff testified simply that she felt that Mr. Burnett had been “her last
hope.”
Plaintiff’s case-in-chief ended there. Plaintiff provided no evidence as to what happened
with her request for reassignment out of the John Howard Pavilion. There was no evidence that
she followed up further with Defendant or made any other attempts to secure a reasonable
accommodation from Defendant or to discuss her employment at St. Elizabeths Hospital. There
was no evidence as to what actions, if any, Defendant took (or did not take or would have taken)
in regards to Plaintiff’s request for transfer. Put simply, there was absolutely no evidence in the
record from which a reasonable jury could have inferred that Defendant denied, by inaction or
otherwise, Plaintiff’s request for accommodation. Rather, the reasonable inference from
Plaintiff’s evidence was that Plaintiff and Defendant were in mid-discussion of Plaintiff’s request
for accommodation, awaiting Plaintiff’s submission of requested medical documentation, when
Plaintiff attempted suicide on October 15, 2002. Although Plaintiff attempted to call Mr. Burnett
shortly thereafter, she stated only that she was informed that he was no longer with St. Elizabeths
Hospital. Plaintiff provided no evidence that she made any other attempts to follow-up with
Defendant as to her request for reasonable accommodation or her employment at St. Elizabeths
Hospital. Indeed, after that point, Plaintiff provided no evidence whatsoever as to what
actions—or non-actions—either Plaintiff or Defendant took in regards to Plaintiff’s request for
reassignment or her employment at St. Elizabeths Hospital.
Finally, the Court notes that, after apprising Plaintiff of the materiality of the dispositive
fact at issue (i.e., denial of the request for accommodation) and providing Plaintiff the
opportunity to address the lack of evidence on that issue, Plaintiff’s counsel did not move to re-
5 open her case in order to cure this evidentiary deficiency. Rather, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded
during on-the-record discussions with the Court that the decision to limit Plaintiff’s evidence to
events that occurred prior to or shortly after her October 15, 2002 suicide attempt was a tactical
decision. Specifically, Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged that there was a period of approximately
two months after the October 15, 2002 suicide attempt in which Plaintiff would not have been
qualified—i.e., able to perform the essential functions of the position with a reasonable
accommodation—and therefore Plaintiff’s counsel limited Plaintiff’s testimony in an effort to
preclude questioning that may have led to evidence harmful to Plaintiff’s claim. Accordingly, for
these reasons, as well as the reasons set forth by the Court in its on-the-record discussions with
counsel, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the basis that Plaintiff
failed to provide a sufficient evidentiary basis from which a reasonable jury could conclude that
Defendant refused, by inaction or otherwise, Plaintiff’s request for a reasonable accommodation
made in the fall of 2002 to Mr. Burnett.
Accordingly, it is this 7th day of January, 2009, hereby
ORDERED that the Defendant’s oral motion for a directed verdict is hereby GRANTED
pursuant to the Court’s oral order made at trial on January 6, 2009; and it is further
ORDERED that the above-captioned lawsuit shall be DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY.
Date: January 7, 2009
/s/ COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge