Stewart v. Neely
This text of 20 A. 1002 (Stewart v. Neely) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The authorities cited on behalf of the appellants were not necessary to sustain the familiar rule of the common law, that a contingent remainder must have an estate of freehold to support it. The application of this rule to the ease in hand is unique. [316]*316It may be concisely stated thus: The tenant for life purchases, and has conveyed to her by deed, the interest of the contingent remainder-man, — the one furthest removed from the succession. The life-tenant then claims that her life-estate is merged into the remainder, that intermediate contingent remainders are thereby destroyed, and that by reason thereof the life-estate has been enlarged into a fee. The idea of a life-estate being merged into a contingent remainder is a novel proposition. Aside from this, a contingent remainder can only be conveyed by a devise; a deed purporting to convey it operates only as an estoppel, unless the conveyance is after the contingency happens: 4 Kent Com., 260; Williams, R. P., 215; 1 Washb., R. P., 264. We think judgment was properly entered for the defendant on the case stated.
Affirmed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
20 A. 1002, 139 Pa. 309, 1891 Pa. LEXIS 993, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stewart-v-neely-pa-1891.