UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
FENYANG AJAMU STEWART,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 25-cv-1288 (CRC)
ELON MUSK, et. al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Fenyang Ajamu Stewart adjudicates civil rights complaints at the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (“USDA” or “Department”). The Department permits him to work
remotely as a reasonable accommodation for several disabilities. Proceeding pro se, Stewart
claims that USDA officials, motivated by discriminatory animus on the part of Elon Musk, have
adopted a policy of reevaluating existing remote-work arrangements for disabled employees.
This policy, Stewart asserts, puts him at risk of losing his accommodation. He further alleges
that Department officials have tried to force him to resign his position as a part of a campaign
against personnel with responsibilities related to diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DEI”).
Stewart has sued Mr. Musk, USDA Secretary Brook Rollins, and five other agency
officials (“Defendants”). His complaint brings nine counts packaged under the Rehabilitation
Act and other federal civil rights statutes, the Fifth Amendment, and the Administrative
Procedure Act. The government moves to dismiss the complaint for insufficient service of
process, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. Excusing relatively
insignificant errors in service in light of Stewart’s pro se status but finding that he has not
established this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over certain of his claims and has failed to
state others, the Court will grant the government’s motion on those grounds as to all Defendants. I. Background
Fenyang Ajamu Stewart is an Equal Employment Specialist within the USDA’s Office of
the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights. Compl. ¶ 41. Since 2022, he has worked remotely as a
reasonable accommodation for post-traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder, and back pain. Id.
¶¶ 3, 43. Stewart generally alleges that following the creation of the Department of Government
Efficiency, Elon Musk, Secretary Rollins, and several other officials at the Department instituted
a variety of policies with the aim of eliminating remote work as a reasonable accommodation for
disabled employees like him. Id. ¶¶ 5; 96–100, 111–13. The agency’s goal, Stewart claims, was
inspired by documented animus against disabled people on the part of Mr. Musk. Id. ¶¶ 101–02.
Stewart further alleges that a variety of other policies instituted by USDA threatened his job
position due to both its relationship to DEI work and reductions in force that targeted disabled
employees. Id. ¶¶ 80–82, 114. Finally, he claims that employees at USDA tried to force him to
resign from his position. Id. ¶¶ 147–52.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for improper service of process, lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. Stewart opposes. He moves separately to
strike the motion to dismiss and for entry of default on the ground that the government did not
initially include a certificate of service along with the motion as required by local rules.
II. Legal Standards
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a district court must dismiss a claim if it
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the claim. In evaluating whether it has subject
matter jurisdiction, a court must “accept facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences from those facts in plaintiffs’ favor.” Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v.
2 Vilsack, 797 F.3d 4, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2015). If a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it “cannot
proceed at all in any cause.” Hancock v. Urb. Outfitters, Inc., 830 F.3d 511, 513 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (citation omitted).
A court deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) must
“assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and ‘construe the complaint
liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts
alleged.’” Am. Nat. Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir 2011) (quoting Thomas v.
Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A
claim is plausible if the pleaded facts allow the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While a court must take the
complaint's factual allegations as true, it need not accept legal conclusions, and mere “labels” or
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action . . . do not suffice.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
C. Pro Se Pleading Standards
“The pleadings of pro se parties are to be ‘liberally construed’ and ‘held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]’” Tyson v. Brennan, 277 F. Supp. 3d 28,
35 (D.D.C. 2017) (second alteration in original) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (per curiam)). Courts assess pro se litigants’ complaints “in light of all filings, including
filings responsive to a motion to dismiss,” such as the opposition to the motion and any attached
documents. Ho v. Garland, 106 F.4th 47, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quotation marks omitted)
3 (quoting Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per
curiam)).
III. Analysis
Stewart’s complaint distributes his grievances over the following nine counts:
• Count I: Civil Conspiracy to Violate Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act;
• Count II: Failure to Prevent Civil Rights Violations;
• Count III: Conspiracy to Violate Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment Rights;
• Count V: Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act;
• Count VI: Civil Conspiracy to Violate Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act;
• Count VII: Violation of Equal Protection under the Fifth Amendment;
• Count VIII: Conspiracy to Coerce, Intimidate, and Retaliate in Violation of
42 U.S.C. § 12203;
• Count IX: Bivens Claim – Violation of Fifth Amend Right to Continued
Employment; and
• Count X: Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 – Intentional Racial Discrimination. 1
Rather than proceed count-by-count, the Court can group Stewart’s claims into four
subject-matter categories. First are claims that relate to the Department’s purported effort to
eliminate his reasonable accommodation (Count I, Count II, Count III, Count V, Count VI,
Count VII, and Count VIII). Second is a claim alleging he was retaliated against for speaking
out about USDA’s treatment of him and other disabled employees (Count VIII). Third are
claims pertaining to what he characterizes as an agency plot to force him from his job (Counts I-
1 The complaint does not contain a Count IV.
4 III and VI, in passing). And last are a Bivens claim against Musk and Rollins in their individual
capacities (Count IX) and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Musk in his individual
capacity (Count X).
After looking past relatively minor errors in service in view of Stewart’s pro se status, the
Court will analyze each of the four categories of claims, concluding that it lacks jurisdiction over
those claims related to Stewart’s reasonable accommodation and anticipatory removal and that
Stewart has failed to state claims under Bivens and § 1981. Finally, the Court will deny
Stewart’s motion to strike the government’s motion to dismiss and his motion for entry of
default.
A. Service of Process
Though its motion is not a paragon of clarity, the government appears to object to service
on all Defendants, in whatever capacity, on the ground that Stewart improperly served the United
States by mailing a copy of the complaint and summons to the Attorney General himself rather
than using a non-party to do so. See Defs.’ Mot. at 4–5. It also suggests that Stewart committed
the same blunder when he personally mailed the service materials to Secretary Rollins in her
official capacity. Id.
Some background is in order. Different rules apply to serving federal officers and
employees in their official and personal capacities. See FRCP 4(i)(2), (i)(3). Serving an officer
or employee in her official capacity entails two steps: First, the plaintiff must serve the “United
States” by providing the summons and complaint to both the Attorney General and the U.S.
Attorney’s office for the district where the complaint is brought. See FRCP 4(i)(2) (requiring
compliance with Rule 4(i)(1)). Second, the plaintiff must serve the official at her agency
address. Id. Both steps may be accomplished by mail. See FRCP 4(i)(1), (i)(2). But there’s
5 wrinkle: the mailing must be made by a non-party, not the plaintiff. See Smith v. United States,
475 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2006) (collecting cases holding that service of the United States
and its officials under Rule 4(i) must also comply with Rule 4(c)(2), which requires service by a
non-party). And here, it appears that in attempting to serve Secretary Rollins in her official
capacity, Stewart mailed the service package to the Attorney General and to Secretary Rollins’s
agency address himself — thus stumbling at both steps of the process of serving the United
States. See ECF No. 19.
As for service on federal officers in their individual capacities, a plaintiff must likewise
serve the United States through the Attorney General and the applicable U.S. Attorney’s
office. 2 See FRCP 4(i)(3). As previously noted, Stewart sent his service package to the
Attorney General himself, rather than having another individual do so. See ECF No. 19.
Therefore, one of the mistakes he made when serving Secretary Rollins in her official capacity
applies to service of the individual capacity defendants as well.
The government is thus correct that service in this case was not entirely proper. But the
Court will excuse the lapses in service because Stewart is representing himself. Pro se plaintiffs
are “allowed more latitude than litigants represented by counsel to correct defects in service of
process and pleadings.” Moore v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 994 F.2d 874, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1993). As
such, service requirements “should not be enforced with draconian rigidity where courts have not
first informed pro se plaintiffs of the consequences of failing to effect proper service and where
defendants are in no material way prejudiced by a minor defect in the manner in which service of
process was attempted.” Zavadovsky v. Rabl, No. 24-cv-1997 (RC), 2025 WL 2466024, at *12
2 A plaintiff must also serve the official by means authorized for service of non- government officials under Rules 4(e), 4(f), or 4(g). See FRCP 4(i)(3). Stewart appears to have complied with this requirement. See ECF No. 16, 17, 18.
6 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2025) (quoting Lindsey v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 2d 37, 47 n.6 (D.D.C.
2006)). 3
Applying these standards, the Court declines to dismiss the case for improper service.
First, the Court did not advise Stewart to correct the means of service. Second, any error was
relatively minor and did not prejudice any Defendant. While Stewart may not have enlisted a
non-party to mail the summons and complaint to the Attorney General and Secretary Rollins, he
did use a non-party to mail the service materials to the U.S. Attorney. See ECF No. 11. On top
of that, he used a process server to personally serve materials to the individual capacity
defendants, including Secretary Rollins. See ECF No. 16, 17, 18. 4 All Defendants were
therefore on notice of the claims against them, and the government has appeared to ably assert
their defenses.
3 The Court will extend these liberal pro se standards to Mr. Stewart even though, as the government notes, his LinkedIn profile and an internet search indicate that he graduated from law school. See Defs.’ Mot. at 3. While experienced lawyers typically are not given leeway when they chose to represent themselves, see, e.g., Richards v. Duke Univ., 480 F. Supp. 2d 222, 235 (D.D.C 2007), there is no evidence before the Court that Stewart has ever practiced law or been licensed to do so. Indeed, an on-line search reveals that he is not barred in either the District of Columbia or Virginia, where he resides. As a result, he is entitled to some degree of solicitude. See, e.g., Stankevich v. Kaplan, 156 F. Supp. 3d. 86, 98 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[A]though [the plaintiff] holds a law degree, he is still a pro se litigant and cannot be held to the same standard as a [licensed] lawyer[.]”); Newman v. Howard University of Law, 715 F. Supp. 3d. 86, 101 (D.D.C. 2024) (extending pro se standards to law-student plaintiff). 4 One exception may be Defendant Patricia St. Clair, who is an Associate Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights at USDA. The Court permitted Stewart to provide the service package to her by alternative means, which he appears to have done by US mail. See Minute Order, September 4, 2025; ECF No. 22, Ex. 1 at 2 (providing proof of delivery). But it is not exactly clear from the docket if service was ultimately accomplished.
7 B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
1. Reasonable Accommodation Claims
Turning to the substance of the complaint, Stewart brings several claims related to
Defendants’ alleged effort to eliminate his remote work accommodation, as well as a claim
concerning purported retaliation against him for speaking out against Department policies that he
claims targeted disabled employees like himself. Because Stewart has not administratively
exhausted any of these claims, this Court cannot hear them.
As a threshold matter, although Stewart styles some of his claims as violations of the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the Constitution, and various torts, these claims
fundamentally concern his reasonable accommodation. See e.g., Compl. ¶ 189 (discussing
policies to undo Rehabilitation Act accommodations writ large); id. ¶ 221 (similar). And the
Rehabilitation Act “provides the exclusive judicial remedy for federal employees who allege that
they are victims of workplace discrimination based on disabilities.” Husain v. Smith, No. 15-cv-
708 (RDM), 2016 WL 4435177, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2016) (collecting cases). As a result,
“[p]arties cannot simply rename Rehabilitation Act claims” as APA claims, torts, or
Constitutional violations. Welch v. Powell, No. 16-cv-0509 (RC), 2016 WL 6806211, at *5
(D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2016) (cleaned up) (dismissing tort claims based on violations of the
Rehabilitation Act); see also Grant v. Dep’t of Treasury, 194 F. Supp. 3d 25, 30 (D.D.C. 2016)
(dismissing a would-be APA claim because the Rehabilitation Act provided an adequate
remedy); Paegle v. Dep’t of Interior, 813 F. Supp. 61, 67 (D.D.C. 1993) (same for Constitutional
claims). “To determine whether claims are preempted by the Rehabilitation Act, courts must
determine whether the party is ‘seeking to redress the violation of rights guaranteed by’” the act.
Welch, 2016 WL 6806211, at *5 (brackets omitted, quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,
8 247 n.26 (1979)). Here, Stewart leaves little doubt: he is primarily concerned with his rights as
a disabled employee of the federal government and in particular with his reasonable
accommodation to work from home due to his disabilities. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 188, 199, 221,
243. The Rehabilitation Act precludes the consideration of these claims insofar as they are
brought in tort or pursuant to the APA or the Constitution. See Welch, 2016 WL 6806211, at *5;
Grant, 194 F. Supp. 3d at 30; Paegle, 813 F. Supp. at 67.
To the extent Stewart brings claims under the Rehabilitation Act itself, whether related to
his accommodation or to the alleged retaliation he suffered for speaking out against various
policies, he has failed to exhaust those claims. “The Rehabilitation Act requires individuals to
exhaust administrative remedies before they can file suit to enforce the Act’s protections.” Doak
v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1096, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1)). And
while not every “procedural misstep” in the administrative process is jurisdictional under the
Rehabilitation Act, the absence of a “final administrative disposition of a complaint, or any
reviewable final administrative action at all” poses a jurisdictional bar. Id. at 1104. Stewart
acknowledges he has not exhausted his remedies, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 10–11, and points to no final
administrative action. This Court therefore cannot at this juncture consider the claims related to
his reasonable accommodation or the agency’s purported retaliation against him.
Stewart counters that the Rehabilitation Act’s exhaustion requirements are prudential
rather than jurisdictional. See id. at 11. But, again, a failure to obtain a final decision from the
agency is a jurisdictional defect for claims under the Rehabilitation Act. See Al ‘Zaiem v.
Mayorkas, No. 22-civ-3804 (JEB), 2023 WL 4999177, at *7 (D.D.C. Aug. 4, 2023) (quoting
Doak, 798 F.3d at 1103). Stewart similarly argues that availing himself of the administrative
scheme would have been “futile” because he had been told that he enrolled in the Deferred
9 Resignation Program, participation in which apparently required employees to waive all pending
claims against the agency. Pl.’s Opp’n at 11. But Stewart insists he did not sign up for the
program, which an agency designee later confirmed. Compl. ¶ 160. Therefore, raising these
claims would not have been futile, as Stewart does not contend that he waived his right to bring
the claims (and indeed remained employed at the agency).
2. Anticipated Removal Claims
Stewart also brings claims related to his anticipated removal (or forced resignation) via
agency reductions in force and other policies that purportedly targeted disabled employees and
employees who perform work related to DEI. See e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 147–50.
But, as the government points out, these claims are channeled to forums other than this
Court by the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”). The CSRA is “comprehensive and
exclusive.” Grosdidier v. Broad. Bd. of Govs., 560 F.3d 495, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009). It “regulates
virtually every aspect of federal employment” and “constitutes the remedial regime for federal
employment and personnel complaints.” Nyunt v. Broad. Bd. of Gov., 589 F.3d 445, 448 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). And central to the CSRA’s framework is “the primacy” of the Merit
System Protection Board (“MSPB”) “for administrative resolution of disputes over adverse
personnel action, . . . and the primacy of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit for judicial review[.]” United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 449 (1998). The CSRA
accordingly divests this court of jurisdiction except under certain limited exceptions that are not
applicable here. 5 U.S.C § 7703(a), (b)(1)(A). Stewart’s claims of a managerial conspiracy to
drive him from his job clearly relate to his employment at a federal agency and accordingly fall
within the scope of the CSRA. See Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2012); Nyunt,
10 589 F.3d at 448; 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(a)(2)(A)(iii), 7512(1). The Court therefore is powerless to
consider them.
Stewart offers several counterarguments, but all come up short. First, he claims that
because there has been no adverse action (i.e., he has not actually been fired), the CSRA does not
govern. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 13. That argument taken at face value would mean that the case is
not ripe, because Stewart still has his job. More fundamentally, the D.C. Circuit has been clear
that plaintiffs who challenge actions within the context of their federal employment that the
CSRA does not cover may not be given “greater rights than were available under the CSRA.”
Graham v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 931, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing Fausto at 449–50). And
“[g]ranting [Stewart] a right of direct judicial review” for a theoretical resignation and potential
termination “would give him greater rights than the CSRA affords” to individuals who suffer
actual, completed adverse actions. Id. at 128.
Next, Stewart suggests that his constitutional and conspiracy claims fall outside the
CSRA’s coverage. But the case he cites, Pope v. Bond, 641 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1986), did not
consider CSRA preclusion, the broad sweep of which the D.C. Circuit has more recently
confirmed, see Ashcroft, 358 F.3d. at 934–35. And critically, the plaintiff in Pope was no longer
employed by the agency after it placed him on disability retirement, which he claimed was part
of an effort to silence him. 641 F. Supp at 492. As noted above, Stewart was employed at the
agency when he filed suit, confirming the applicability of the CSRA. And Stewart’s
constitutional claims are not for this Court’s consideration, either. See Elgin, 567 U.S. at 12
(“[C]onstitutional claims, such as claims that an agency took adverse employment action in
violation of an employee’s [constitutional] rights, . . . must be brought within the CSRA
scheme.”).
11 Stewart similarly argues that this Court may hear his civil rights challenges, citing Spence
v. Straw, 54 F.3d 196 (3rd Cir. 1995). But in that case—which did not implicate the CSRA—the
Third Circuit held that exhaustion was required before bringing a claim under the Rehabilitation
Act. Id. at 202–03. Therefore, to the extent Spence applies to Stewart’s case at all, it only
confirms that his Rehabilitation Act claims must be exhausted, not that his general challenge to
the agency’s policies concerning disabled employees may bypass both the Rehabilitation Act and
the CSRA. 5
C. Failure to State a Claim
Next up are Stewart’s Bivens claim for violations of his Fifth Amendment rights against
Musk and Rollins in their individual capacities and his claim against Musk under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981. Neither states a valid claim.
1. Bivens Claim
A “court may not fashion a Bivens remedy if Congress already has provided . . . an
alternative remedial structure.” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 493 (2022) (quotation marks
omitted). Here, the CSRA and Rehabilitation Act qualify as sufficient remedial structures. See
e.g., Stewart v. Raimondo, No. 23-civ-1525, 2024 WL 150229, at *5 (E.D. Va. Jan. 12, 2024)
(“[S]pecial factors counsel against granting an extension of Bivens because plaintiff has
available to him other forms of relief through his . . . Rehabilitation Act claims.”); Davis v.
Billington, 681 F.3d 377, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he CSRA’s lack of relief for [plaintiff] does
not prevent it from being a comprehensive remedial scheme that precludes us from creating a
5 Stewart does not argue that administrative channeling would have been futile given the current functioning of the MSPB. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr. Judges v. Owen, 139 F.4th 293, 305 (4th Cir. 2025). The Court therefore expresses no view on that argument.
12 Bivens remedy.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Stewart therefore cannot bring a Bivens
claim.
2. Section 1981 Claim
Stewart’s § 1981 count likewise fails. This claim again appears to be a Rehabilitation
Act claim pleaded under a different mantle, as Stewart asserts that as “a qualified Black disabled
employee,” he “has the right to equitable and affirmative action . . . to continued employment via
reasonable accommodations[.]” Compl. ¶ 263. But even if the claim could be read to extend
beyond his Rehabilitation Act claims, the complaint nowhere alleges that Stewart suffered an
adverse employment action, such as a lack of promotion or termination, on account of his race.
See Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.) (“The initial
problem for [plaintiff’s] legal argument is that he was not fired or denied a job or promotion, and
he did not suffer any reductions in salary or benefits, which are the typical adverse actions in
employment discrimination cases.”). Stewart’s § 1981 claim therefore must be dismissed as
well.
D. Motion to Strike and Motion for Entry of Default
Finally, Stewart moves to strike the government’s motion to dismiss for failure to include
a certificate of service, as required by the local and federal rules, and he moves for entry of
default on the same ground. See ECF No. 25, No. 26. As to the former, Stewart argues that
because he is not an electronic filer, the absence of a certificate of service means there is “no
proof that [he] was ever served.” ECF No. 25 at 1. This argument is rich coming from a
plaintiff who asks to be excused from strict service requirements. In any case, as Defendants
note, Stewart had notice of the filings, in no small part because the Court ordered him to respond
to the motion to dismiss, which he did a day later. Defs.’ Reply at 8. Further, the government
13 quickly corrected its mistake. See ECF No. 28. Stewart’s motion for entry of default for failure
to provide a certificate of service is also a dead letter, as Defendants have plainly “plead[ed] or
otherwise defend[ed]” themselves in response to Stewart’s complaint. FRCP 55(a). The Court
accordingly denies both motions.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and
dismiss the complaint and the case. A separate Order shall accompany this Memorandum
Opinion.
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge
Date: February 11, 2026