Stewart v. Mary Hitchcock Hospital

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: October 17, 1997
• Docket: CV-95-597-M
• Status: Published

Opinion

Stewart v . Mary Hitchcock Hospital CV-95-597-M 10/17/97 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Betty S . Stewart, Plaintiff v. Civil N o . 95-597-M

Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital, Thomas Ozahowski, and Beth Wolf, Defendants

O R D E R

By order dated July 1 , 1997, the court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment with regard to plaintiff’s claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. In accordance with the terms of that order, on July 1 , 1997, the clerk entered judgment in favor of defendants. On July 2 5 , 1997, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the court failed to appreciate both the nature and legal significance of defendants’ alleged misconduct. In short, she asserts that the court misunderstood her arguments and the applicable law and erroneously concluded that she was subjected to neither a hostile work environment nor unlawful retaliation. Accordingly, she moves the court to vacate its earlier order and deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff has not, however, based her motion to reconsider

on any specific Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (nor has she invoked the arguably applicable Local Rule). Nevertheless, it

would seem that Rule 59(e) governs this situation.

It is settled law in this circuit that a motion which asks the court to modify its earlier disposition of a case solely because of an ostensibly erroneous legal result is brought under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Such a motion, without more, does not invoke Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). See Silk v . Sandoval, 435 F.2d 1266, 1267 (1st Cir. 1971) (“If the court merely wrongly decides a point of law, that is not ‘inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect’”) (quoting Rule 6 0 ) .

Rodriguez-Antuna v . Chase Manhattan Bank Corp., 871 F.2d 1 , 2

(1st Cir. 1989).

Having found that plaintiff’s motion is governed by the

provisions of Rule 59(e), the court must necessarily deny it as

untimely. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) (requiring the filing of a

motion to alter or amend judgement within 10 days of the entry of

judgment). See also Local Rule 7.2(d) (motions for

reconsideration not otherwise governed by Rule 59 or 60 must be filed within 10 days of the date of the court’s order).

Moreover, even if plaintiff’s motion had been filed in a

timely fashion (or if the court were able to characterize it as

one properly filed pursuant to Rule 6 0 ) , the court would still

deny the motion on its merits. Nothing in plaintiff’s motion to

reconsider persuades the court that its earlier ruling was

erroneous, either factually or legally. One of her claims does,

however, merit brief discussion. In her motion to reconsider,

2 plaintiff argues, for the first time, that two of the comments

attributed to Ozahowski were not merely crude, insulting,

hostile, and offensive, but were in fact actual “uninvited

solicitations to perform sexual acts,” intended as such.

Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration at 2 . Once again,

however, plaintiff (through counsel) seems to have taken

inordinate license with the factual record. See also Stewart v .

Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hosp, N o . 95-597-M, slip o p . at 3 n.1

(D.N.H. July 1 , 1997).

Contrary to plaintiff’s repeated assertions, the statements attributed to Ozahowski cannot reasonably be considered actual “sexual solicitations” or “solicitations to perform sexual acts.” Among other things, the context in which the statements were made and the tone with which they were delivered (as described by plaintiff herself) make that abundantly clear. See, e.g., Stewart Deposition at 213-16 (describing Ozahowski as angry, “having a bad day,” and probably upset with D r . Greenberg when he made the statement involving D r . Greenberg); Stewart Affidavit at ¶ 28 (stating that Ozahowski lost his temper and made the second vulgar statement attributed to him “[a]s an explanation for his lengthy absences [from the lab].”)

There is nothing in the record which suggests that plaintiff

actually viewed (or could reasonably have viewed) Ozahowski’s

statements as genuine sexual solicitations, rather than as the

3 crass expressions of frustration or insult she herself previously

described. Whether purposeful or merely the exaggerations of

overly zealous advocacy, plaintiff’s new assertions that

Ozahowski’s statements were in fact actual “sexual solicitations”

appear to be not only unsupported, but frivolous and of recent

invention, designed merely to create post-decisional claims which

she neither recognized nor advanced before the adverse ruling on

summary judgment.

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration (document n o . 30) is denied as untimely. And,

even if the court were to view her pleading as timely, it would

deny the relief she seeks on the grounds discussed.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

October 1 7 , 1997

cc: Joni N . Esperian, Esq. Julie Ann Moore, Esq.