Stewart v. Madison

278 N.W.2d 284, 1979 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1086
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedApril 25, 1979
Docket61482
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 278 N.W.2d 284 (Stewart v. Madison) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stewart v. Madison, 278 N.W.2d 284, 1979 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1086 (iowa 1979).

Opinion

LARSON, Justice.

The Chicago and North Western Transportation Company, a railroad, appeals from an order of the district court overruling its alternative motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, following a jury verdict against it in an action brought by an automobile passenger, Joseph A. Stewart. The driver of the car, Justin W. Madison, also appeals following a verdict against him on his cross-petition against the railroad. We affirm on both appeals.

These actions arose out of a collision between a car operated by Madison, in which Stewart was a passenger, and a train owned and operated by the railroad. The collision occurred at the intersection of the railroad *286 tracks and Easton Boulevard in Des Moines at approximately 10:15 P.M. March 24,1973. Easton Boulevard is a paved, four-lane street running in a generally east-west direction and intersecting the tracks.' A reproduction of the railroad’s Exhibit 4, a scale drawing of the scene, is attached to this opinion, showing the intersection, the Freeman Decorating Building adjacent to the tracks, the warning signals, and the street lights illuminating Easton Boulevard.

The train approached the crossing from the north, operated by the engineer who was on the right-hand, or west, side of the lead engine. He was assisted by the head brakeman on his left. The Madison car approached from their left, on Easton Boulevard. The crossing was protected by automatic warning signals. These were operating at the time of the accident according to the witnesses, but Madison, the automobile driver, denied having seen them. The engineer testified that the train had been traveling at approximately thirty miles per hour before it reached the area of the intersection, but had slowed down before reaching the crossing, in compliance with a “slow order” of the railroad to reduce the speed in that area to ten miles per hour. He testified the train was going ten miles per hour at the time of the collision. Neither Stewart nor Madison were able to testify as to the speed of the train, but expert witnesses called by Stewart testified the speed might have been in excess of ten.

Other areas of conflict in the evidence were numerous, including sight distances of each of the operators, whether the train whistle was sounded prior to the collision, and even whether the train struck the car or the car struck the train. However, when considering a motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, regardless of whether it is contradicted, and the verdict must be aided by every reasonable inference from the evidence. Paulsen v. Des Moines Union Railway, 262 N.W.2d 592, 594 (Iowa 1978); Winter v. Honeggers’ & Co., 215 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Iowa 1974). In addition, as to the railroad’s motion for new trial, a mere conflict in the evidence is not sufficient to require the granting of it. If disputes are factual and there is substantial evidence to support the jury’s determination of the facts, a new trial will not be granted “merely because reasonable men might disagree with the jury’s conclusion.” Northrup v. Miles Homes, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 850, 861 (Iowa 1973).

The specific facts, as they bear on each of the issues raised on appeal, will be considered in light of those principles. The issues are as follows, with respect to passenger Stewart’s claim against the railroad: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to submit issues of speed, lookout and warning to the jury; (2) whether the doctrine of “last clear chance” was properly submitted; (3) whether Madison, the driver, was con-tributorily negligent as a matter of law; (4) whether the court erred in refusing to allow evidence of the settlement of Stewart’s suit against Madison and evidence of the receipt by Stewart of “collateral payments”; and (5) whether the court erred in refusing to allow testimony of the train engineer concerning the custom of drivers to maintain their speed until abruptly stopping at railroad crossings.

Madison, the driver of the car, raised one additional issue as to his unsuccessful cross-petition against the railroad: whether the court erred in instructing the jury on contributory negligence as a defense, rather than comparative negligence.

1. Sufficiency of evidence on speed, lookout and warning. The trial court submitted the issue of speed to the jury, as one of the three allegations of primary negligence. The railroad contends there was not sufficient evidence of speed to permit its submission because the only direct evidence as to speed came from the engineer who testified the train was traveling ten miles per hour, and this was a reasonable speed as a matter of law, relying upon Strom v. Des Moines and Central Iowa Railway, 248 Iowa 1052, 1065, 82 N.W.2d 781, 789 (1957). Plaintiff Stewart contends that there was substantial evidence in the form of expert *287 testimony from which the jury could find the train was going over ten miles per hour and that in any event ten miles per hour could be found by the jury to be unreasonable under the circumstances.

In Strom, the court stated that:

We think too there is insufficient testimony to support the second charge of excessive speed. The engineer says the train was going 10 to 12 miles an hour when the emergency brakes were applied at the west edge of the crossing. Although doubt may be thrown on this evidence by the fact the train traveled some 250 feet or more after the brakes were applied (when four of the 14 cars were empty) we are unable to find substantial support for this charge.

248 Iowa at 1065, 82 N.W.2d at 789. In ordering retrial, the court in Strom ordered only issues of warning to be submitted, striking allegations of speed and lookout.

In viewing the evidence concerning speed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the jury could have found the speed to be in excess of ten miles per hour. Expert witnesses called by the plaintiff testified that based upon the braking capabilities of the train, the weather and other conditions existing at the time of the collision, the train could have been stopped in a substantially shorter distance than that actually required if it had been going only ten miles per hour. The jury could conclude from this that the speed was, in fact, in excess of ten. Also, from the evidence the jury could find the crossing was one which required an extra degree of care because of the circumstances.

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Bluebook (online)
278 N.W.2d 284, 1979 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1086, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stewart-v-madison-iowa-1979.