Stewart, Gil v. TDCJ-ID Bureau of Internal Affairs

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: September 5, 2002
• Docket: 14-01-00848-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Affirmed and Opinion filed September 5, 2002

Affirmed and Opinion filed September 5, 2002.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-01-00848-CV

GIL STEWART, Appellant

V.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE C INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION ET AL., Appellees

On Appeal from the 12th District Court

Walker County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 21,092

O P I N I O N

Appellant, Gil Stewart, appeals the trial court=s order dismissing his suit against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) and several TDCJ employees pursuant to Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.  We affirm.           

Gil Stewart, an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, sought injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief against appellees for alleged violations of the United States and Texas Constitutions, the Texas Tort Claims Act, and Texas civil statutes.  Specifically, Stewart claims the State utilized defective property, retaliated against members of a prospective class action, concealed such retaliation, and refused to issue Stewart a properly fitting pair of shoes.  The Texas Attorney General filed an amicus curiae motion to dismiss based on Stewart=s failure to disclose previous pro se lawsuits as required by section 14.004 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.  The trial court granted the motion and dismissed Stewart=s claims without prejudice on May 14, 2001.  This appeal followed.         We review a trial court=s dismissal of an inmate=s claims under section 14.004 under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  Clark v. J. W. Estelle Unit, 23 S.W.3d 420, 421 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).  Section 14.004 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code requires an inmate who files an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs to file a separate affidavit or declaration identifying all suits the inmate previously filed as a pro se plaintiff, describing the operative facts for which relief was sought in each suit and stating the result of each suit.  See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.004(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002).  The purpose of section 14.004 is to curb constant, often duplicative, inmate litigation by requiring an inmate to notify the trial court of previous litigation and the outcome.  Bell v. Texas Dep=t of Crim. JusticeCInst. Div., 962 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).  If the inmate has filed a similar claim the trial court may dismiss the suit as frivolous.  Id.  Without stating the operative facts for which relief was sought in prior suits, the trial court is unable to consider whether the current claim is substantially similar to a previous claim.  Clark,  23 S.W.3d at 422.  Thus, the trial court is entitled to assume the suit is substantially similar to a previously filed suit by the inmate and is therefore frivolous.  Id.; Bell, 962 S.W.2d at 158.  Here, Stewart admits his pleadings were not in compliance with the requirements of Chapter 14.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the suit.  See Clark, 23 S.W.3d at 422; Bell, 962 S.W.2d at 158.

Stewart argues that trial courts practice Aautomatic mandatory dismissals@ and that this practice is in conflict with the plain language of section 14.003(a).  Chapter 14 provides that a trial court may dismiss a frivolous claim.  Nothing in the record suggests the trial court believed that dismissal of Stewart=s claims was mandatory and not discretionary.  Furthermore, our review of the record indicates that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the case without prejudice.

Stewart further argues that dismissal of a pro se action under Chapter 14 holds the pleadings of an uneducated prisoner to a higher standard than licensed counsel and that inmates should not be expected to Asubmit papers at the level expected of licensed counsel.@  Chapter 14 specifically applies to inmates, but no language in the statute suggests that an inmate, appearing pro se, is held to a higher standard than an attorney.  While we review a pro se plaintiff=s pleadings by less stringent standards, a pro se litigant is held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure.  See Holt v. F.F. Enters., 990 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tex. App.CAmarillo 1998, no pet.).  If pro se litigants were not required to comply with applicable rules of procedure, they would be given an unfair advantage over those represented by counsel.  Greenstreet v. Heiskell, 940 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex. App.CAmarillo 1997, no writ), reh=g denied, 960 S.W.2d 713 (per curiam).  Accordingly, Stewart=s pleadings must comply with the procedural requirements of Chapter 14; he concedes they do not.

Stewart further claims the term Aoperative facts@ is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous.  We find no authority supporting this claim.  While Chapter 14 does not define Aoperative facts,@ this court has previously stated the Aoperative facts@ requirement is met when a party lists facts underlying a previous suit between the parties.  See Hickman v. Adams, 35 S.W.3d 120, 124 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (holding dismissal was proper where appellant failed to state any operative facts for which relief was sought); see also White v. State, 37 S.W.3d 562, 564-65 (Tex. App.CBeaumont 2001, no pet.) (discussing what constitutes Aoperative facts@ under section 14.004).  To survive a vagueness challenge, a statute need only be Aset out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with.@  Comm=n for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 437 (Tex. 1998) (quoting United States Civil Serv. Comm=n v. Nat=l Ass=n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 579, 93 S. Ct. 2880 (1973)).  We conclude the statute is not unconstitutionally vague.

Stewart next claims the trial court erred when it refused to specifically point out the operative facts Stewart failed to reference.  Having no duty to do so, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refraining from curing Stewart=s pleading deficiencies.  See Clark, 23 S.W.3d at 422 (AWe refuse to hold that a trial court must sift through numerous documents supplied by an inmate in order to find the information required by section 14.004.@). 

Finally, Stewart claims the trial court abused its discretion by signing the Attorney General=s proposed dismissal order, claiming this action does not amount to proper judicial review.  However, Stewart admits he failed to comply with Chapter 14, thus making dismissal of his claims appropriate.  Further, Rule 305 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure states that A[a]ny party may prepare and submit a proposed judgment to the court for signature.@  Tex. R. Civ. P. 305.  The trial court did not err in signing the order as prepared by the Attorney General.  

Finding no error in the trial court=s dismissal without prejudice of Stewart=s claims, we affirm the trial court=s judgment.

/s/            Leslie Brock Yates

Justice

Judgment rendered and Opinion filed September 5, 2002.

Panel consists of Justices Yates, Seymore, and Guzman.

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.3(b).