Stevenson v. Fain

116 F. 147, 53 C.C.A. 467, 1902 U.S. App. LEXIS 4313
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedMay 6, 1902
DocketNo. 987
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 116 F. 147 (Stevenson v. Fain) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stevenson v. Fain, 116 F. 147, 53 C.C.A. 467, 1902 U.S. App. LEXIS 4313 (6th Cir. 1902).

Opinion

BURTON, Circuit Judge,

after making the foregoing statement of the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

That the line claimed by the defendants along what is called the crest of the State Ridge, being the black line 2 between County Corners and Gold Brysons Gap, as shown on the plat heretofore set out, was the line actually run and marked by the joint commission as the dividing line between the two states is established by the great weight [151]*151of evidence in this record. The evidence upon which this fact rests may be briefly summed up thus:

First. Along the State Ridge line are found a number of state-line trees bearing the state-line marks of two chops and a blaze for fore and aft trees and three chops on each side for side line trees. By “blocking,” the annular rings of tree growth show to a demonstration that these trees were marked in 1821.

Second. No such marked line, nor a single marked tree, is shown upon the red or longer line claimed by appellants.

Third. The North Carolina act of 1821, adopting and ratifying the line so run and marked, recites that the line was “mile marked at the end of each mile.” 2 Ired. & B. Rev. St. N. C. 96; Belding v. Hebard, 43 C. C. A. 296, 299, 103 Fed. 532. An ancient holly tree, marked “86 m.,” was found along this State Ridge line, which, by blocking, is shown to have been marked in 1821, and to be 86 miles from the beginning.

Fourth. The distance between “County Corners” and “Gold Brysons Gap,” well-settled points in the boundary line, is 6 miles by the marked line following the State Ridge, and 12 miles if the red line of broken ridges be followed, as claimed by appellants. The distance from the beginning point named in the act of 1821 at the Cataloochee turnpike, to a stone set and marked where the line reaches the Unaka turnpike is 101 miles, and by actual survey following the line marked on the ground this distance is shown to be only ioi}£ miles if the State Ridge line be followed at the disputed place in the line, while the actual distance is increased to something more than 107 miles if the line claimed by appellant is adopted; the whole gain being between the undisputed points in the conceded line, “County Corners” and “Gold Brysons Gap.”

Fifth. Tradition concurs with the other evidence in establishing the line run as the line along State Ridge, for that ridge has been always known as the “State Ridge.”

Sixth. The course of the line given in both the cession acts and the confirmatory acts of 1821 is southwestwardly, and this course is that pursued by the State Ridge line, while to pursue the other line would require a sharp departure from such general course, and the adoption of a southeasterly course for several miles, then a southerly course, then a westerly course, until the well-marked line at “Gold Brysons Gap” is reached again.

Against this evidence establishing the State Ridge line as the line run and marked as the dividing line the appellants say:

First. That the evidence shows that the joint commission ran and marked the State Ridge line by mistake, supposing it to be the main ridge line. That before reporting their survey they discovered their mistake, and abandoned the State Ridge line, and adopted the longer main ridge line, and reported such line by the description in the confirmatory act calling for a line indicated by natural monuments, to wit, the extreme height of the main ridge.

Second. That the line they contend for has been claimed as the line by Tennessee, and that she has from an early date exercised jurisdiction up to that line.

[152]*152Taking these positions in their order, it may be conceded that the average elevation of the ridge claimed by appellants is greater than the average elevation of the State. Ridge and of Jenks Ridge, which also constitutes a part of the line followed by the line called the “State Ridge” line. The claim to be a “ridge” at all is, however, more questionable. It consists in a succession of high peaks and low depressions called gaps by the surveyors, and is lacking in that continuity which, to a much larger degree, constitutes the main ridge theretofore pursued by the marked boundary line. This broken ridge seems to be lacking in any obvious connection with the ridge departed from at “County Corners.” The ridge upon which the dividing line is located at that point continues in a southwestwardly course until it gradually descends to Tellico’ river. Crossing Tellico a spur is ascended which leads onto' Jenks Ridge at Gold Brysons Gap, where the admitted marked line is again picked up. There is nothing noticeable at County Corners or any other point within a mile on the. State Ridge line which would lead an observer to suspect that the succession of ridges now claimed to' be the extreme height of the main ridge was in fact the main ridge theretofore pursued. To take the proposed line an abrupt descent of about 500 feet must be made down the side of the State Ridge, when “Mitchell Ricks” is reached, a flat about one-fourth of a mile wide. Then a sharp high peak is to be ascended and descended to another gap, and a succession of such peaks and depressions is encountered, until finally Jenks Ridge is ascended and the conceded line picked up. The departure from course is marked for at “County Corners,” the main ridge is left, and a southeasterly course taken for about four miles, then a southerly course, then a westerly,, until back on the marked line. Although the average elevation of the line of peaks and gaps claimed to constitute the “main ridge” called for is greater than the average elevation of the State Ridge, yet this is evidently due to the greater number of high peaks over which the line is supposed to go, and not to the elevation from which the peaks arise. Still if the absence or presence of the highest peaks is ol significance in determining what is meant by the main ridge, it is to be observed that Grassy Knob, a high peak arising from the State Ridge, seems to be higher on the evidence in this record than any single peak in the other line. The objection that the State Ridge terminates at Tellico river, and that another ridge, caked “Jenks Knob,” is ascended and followed, is not appreciated. The distinct mass called State Ridge may be said to terminate by a gradual descent to the gap through which the Tellico breaks through. Nevertheless the State Ridge and the ridge which is ascended after crossing Tellico seem to constitute parts of what, for 100 miles, may be properly regarded as the “main ridge” of the Great Smoky Mountains. It is no more just to say that the State Ridge is terminated by the Tellico Gap than to say that every deep gap in the opposing line constitutes the termination of a ridge. The elevation of the depression through which the Tellico runs is not shown, nor have we the .elevation of the many gaps in the other line. The depression of the main ridge through which Tellico finds its way is as much entitled to be regarded as a gap in that ridge as Mitchells Flat, a gap in the other ridge.

[153]*153The field notes of the commissioners and their report of survey are not in existence. Whether they noted the crossing of the Tellico we have no way of knowing. It is not noticed in the confirmatory acts. But the river, where crossed, is little more than a creek, and the stream, short and of little significance. It is doubtful whether the commissioners realized that the small stream crossed was the Tellico.

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Related

McCarty v. Carolina Lumber Co.
134 Tenn. 35 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1915)

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Bluebook (online)
116 F. 147, 53 C.C.A. 467, 1902 U.S. App. LEXIS 4313, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stevenson-v-fain-ca6-1902.