Stevens v. Seher

11 App. D.C. 245, 1897 U.S. App. LEXIS 3123
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedOctober 4, 1897
DocketNo. 54
StatusPublished

This text of 11 App. D.C. 245 (Stevens v. Seher) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stevens v. Seher, 11 App. D.C. 245, 1897 U.S. App. LEXIS 3123 (D.C. Cir. 1897).

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Alvey

delivered the opinion of the Court:

This case is brought here by an appeal from the Commissioner of Patents. The appeal is taken by John H. Stevens and the Celluloid Company, as assignee, from the decision of the Acting Commissioner of Patents in a matter of alleged interference of the claim of the appellant Stevens with an existing patent granted to the appellee, August Seller, relating to certain solvents of pyroxyline. The issue of the interference, as defined in the Patent Office, is as follows:

“A pyroxyline compound consisting of pyroxyline and one or more members of the group of herein-described ketone solvents.”

This issue constitutes the second claim of the appellant and involves his first claim, as made in his specifications, and it also involves the first and second claims of an application of Walter D. Field for a patent for pyroxyline solution or compound, and the claim in Patent No. 470,451, granted to August Seher, the appellee, for the manufacture of compounds of pyroxyline.

The Field claim is not involved on this appeal. There was no attempt to support that claim to priority by proof, and Field has not joined in this appeal and has not had his record printed. His claim must therefore be considered as withdrawn, at least so far as this appeal is concerned. The record of the case of Field’s application was, upon the motion of Seher, the appellee, allowed to be filed in this case, upon the assurance of counsel that it would appear to have some material bearing upon the question of the issue presented by this appeal; but that record would seem to have no material [248]*248relation to the question here involved, and the record thus introduced must therefore be at the cost of the appellee.

Before proceeding to consider the main question of the appeal, that of priority of discovery, there is a question of practice of the Patent Office presented and insisted upon that is proper to be noticed, because of its great importance, as it may affect the integrity and good faith of the proceedings of the Patent Office and the interest of the public.

To state fully this question of practice, it may be proper to state the course of proceeding as it occurred in the Patent Office in this case, and this can be best done by stating such course of proceeding in the language of the Acting Commissioner of Patents. He says, in the final opinion in that office, stating the facts of the case, that—

“The interference was originally declared July 25, 1892, between the application of Stevens and the patent of Seher. The time for filing preliminary statements was fixed for August 16, 1892. Stevens filed a statement August 6, 1892, and Seher August 15, 1892. Both statements were opened August 20, 1892, and both were immediately sealed against inspection, and on August 22, 1892, a letter was written to each party calling for an amended preliminary statement, in view of certain defects in the original, on or before September 7, 1892. On that day Seher filed an amended statement. On September 10, 1892, Seller’s second statement was opened and immediately sealed against inspection, and a letter calling for an additional amended statement and extending the time for filing such statement to September 28, 1892, was sent to Seher. On the same day another letter was sent to Stevens, notifying him of that extension. September 16,1892, the primary examiner requested a suspension of the interference for the purpose of adding a new party—Field. The interference was suspended September 17, 1892, and redeclared October 7, 1892. The time for filing stateménts was fixed in the new notices for November [249]*2492, 1892. Seher and Field filed their statements November 1, and Stevens filed no further statement, but relied upon the one filed August 6, notwithstanding the objections made to it by the examiner of interferences and the restrictions which, in view of such objections, it imposed upon him (Stevens) as to the date of conception and disclosure. In his first and second statements Seher gave as the date of his disclosure September 35, 1890. In his third statement the date of disclosure was given as ‘on or about the 15th day of August, 1889.’ Stevens was restricted by the examiner of interferences to January, 1890, as to conception and disclosure.

“Counsel for Stevens contends that Seller should be restricted to September 15, 1890, as the date of his disclosure, and a motion to strike out Seller’s third statement was made by Stevens at the hearing, notice of his intention to make such motion having been given orally before the taking of any testimony, and also on March 13,1895, in writing. He states in his brief that ‘it does not seem equitable or just that he (Seher) should be allowed to alter these dates and make a difference of nearij a year in his favor in his third statement after he or his attorneys or his attorneys’ correspondents in Washington had an opportunity of inspecting the preliminary statement of his adversary, and there is nothing in the testimony to repel the presumption that when the third preliminary statement of Seller’s was filed he or his attorneys had at least some information of the dates given by Stevens in his preliminary statement.’

“Seher contends that the motion should not be entertained, because he gave notice to Stevens that unless such motion was brought before any testimony was taken he would consider the objection to his third statement waived. His attorney has also stated that at the time he first discovered the error in his first and second statements the interference had been suspended, and that he could not therefore bring a motion to correct such error, and that when another party was added the interference became a new interference. His [250]*250third contention is that ‘neither Seher nor . . . anyone in any way connected with Seher had any knowledge or information whatsoever of the contents of Stevens’ preliminary statement.’

“The examiner of interferences adjudicated priority in favor of Stevens, and stated in his decision that ‘the conclusion herein reached renders it unnecessary to pass upon Stevens’ motion to strike out the third preliminary statement filed by Seller.’ ” “ This,” says the Acting Commissioner,“would have been good practice had the examiner of interferences been the final tribunal, but under the circumstances it would have been better to havepassed that motion. Theexaminersin-chief sustained the examiner of interferences, and hence there was no direct need for them to consider this question, and in fact their decision contains no reference to it. ■ There may be no necessity for the Commissioner to decide the question, and again it may be of vital importance; for, if admitted, the statement changes the chronological relation of Seher and Stevens as to alleged disclosure. The best and strictest practice,” says the Acting Commissioner, “would require me to remand the case to the examiner of interferences for consideration of this question, with permission for the usual recourse by appeal, and Seher’s counsel should then have insisted upon the determination of this question by the examiner of interferences before his first appeal. The examiners-in-chief, if they had considered the question one over which they had jurisdiction, might have remanded the case before their decision.

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Bluebook (online)
11 App. D.C. 245, 1897 U.S. App. LEXIS 3123, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stevens-v-seher-cadc-1897.