NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 250589-U NOTICE Decision filed 04/29/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0589 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
LORI STEVENS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Petitioner-Appellee, ) St. Clair County. ) v. ) No. 25-OP-190 ) LAWRENCE HARPER, ) Honorable ) Maurché H. Belk, Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SHOLAR delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McHaney and Bollinger concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s grant of petitioner’s plenary stalking no contact order was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 Petitioner, Lori Stevens, filed a verified petition for stalking no contact on February 28,
2025, before the circuit court of St. Clair County. The court issued a default order on April 8, 2025.
Respondent, Lawrence Harper, filed a motion to vacate the default order on May 7, 2025. The
court granted the motion to vacate and heard the petition on June 25, 2025. The court granted the
stalking no contact order on the same date. Respondent appeals, arguing first that the trial court’s
denial of respondent’s motion for directed verdict was an abuse of discretion. Respondent also
argues that the trial court’s granting of the stalking no contact order was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we disagree and affirm.
1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The record established that petitioner, Lori Stevens, resided in Dupo, Illinois, with her
stepchildren, Brianna Duck and Casey Duck. Petitioner’s husband, Randy Duck, was the father of
Brianna and Casey. Randy had custody of the children. Randy died on February 23, 2025.
¶5 Respondent, Lawrence Harper, was the husband of Brianna and Casey’s biological mother,
Crystal Harper. In 2015, respondent pleaded guilty to two counts of statutory sodomy against
Brianna when she was a minor child. Following Randy’s death on February 23, 2025, respondent
attempted to contact Brianna and Casey. The court held a hearing on petitioner’s petition for
stalking no contact on June 25, 2025. The following evidence was adduced at the hearing.
¶6 Petitioner testified that she lived on Louisa Avenue in Dupo, Illinois. Petitioner testified
that Randy passed away on February 23. Petitioner testified that she had not seen respondent since
the court hearings until he drove by her home on February 26. Petitioner stated:
“Brianna was in the yard, and she started screaming, Mom, that’s him; that’s him; that’s
him. I opened the door and they were creeping up in front of the house at the stop sign
sitting there. And after a few moments I yelled and said, Get your butt out of here, and then
they drove off.”
Petitioner testified that respondent was 20 or 25 feet away, and Brianna was frightened. Petitioner
contacted the local police department. She reported that respondent drove by the home. She had
no other contact with him.
¶7 Brianna also testified. Brianna observed respondent in a white SUV at a stop sign in front
of the home. Brianna testified that she was in the yard, and she observed respondent “in his vehicle
by the stop sign.” Brianna felt “intimidated, scared, and uncomfortable.” Brianna testified that she
was fearful of respondent.
2 ¶8 Brian Levin, the school assistant principal, testified that Crystal came to the school and
asked to see Casey. Crystal advised that “she would like to remove her from the school” or to “pick
her up from school.” Casey was not at school that day, and Crystal left. Levin observed Crystal
leave, and noted that she was “picked up” in a white SUV.
¶9 Cameron Cleveland, a patrolman for the Dupo Police Department, next testified. Officer
Cleveland testified that he met with Crystal and respondent at the police station. Crystal wanted to
“talk to her child.” Crystal asked the police to go to the home to retrieve the child. Following the
conversation, Sergeant Fulkerson contacted the Department of Children and Family Services and
the state’s attorney’s office.
¶ 10 Counsel for respondent moved for a “directed judgment.” Counsel argued that petitioner
only established a single incident on February 26. Counsel argued that because there was a single
incident, petitioner failed to establish the threshold of two instances.
¶ 11 In response, petitioner argued:
“[T]his man was a convicted felon, a sex offender, and he was in Dupo, Illinois
where he is not a resident. Resident of Missouri. He’s in Illinois. And I believe the
Court could infer from the evidence that Crystal and Lawrence Harper were in
Dupo for the purpose of getting possession of the minor child. And whether the
principal could identify the person in the white SUV later the same—that day
they’re in the SUV with the police together, Lawrence and Crystal, I think that is
not an improper inference from that evidence showing that there were two
incidents, one at the school and one at the house.”
¶ 12 Counsel for petitioner argued that respondent drove past the home and was within 20 feet
of the victim of his sexual offense conviction. Counsel also noted that Crystal and respondent then
3 went to the police station in an effort to go to the home to “either pick up the child or make contact
with that minor child.” Thus, petitioner contended that there were three incidents that would
establish the basis for the protective order. Following argument of the parties, the trial court denied
the motion for directed judgment.
¶ 13 Respondent testified. He denied driving by petitioner’s home on February 26. Respondent
testified that he and his wife, Crystal, were looking for the police department “to try to contact her
youngest daughter, Casey, she wasn’t at the school, she was told, and so we had to go to the police
department to try to find an officer to further help us to—for her to make contact with her.”
Respondent clarified that he and Crystal went to her attorney’s office. They then went to the school.
¶ 14 Respondent testified that he pulled into the school parking lot, dropped Crystal off, and
left. He waited in a parking lot down the street and waited for Crystal to contact him that she was
“done.” Crystal advised respondent that Casey was not at school, and they returned to the police
station. Respondent testified that he was on parole, and he could interact with “anybody” he chose,
except for Brianna Duck, so long as he was chaperoned by Crystal.
¶ 15 Following the close of evidence, petitioner argued that respondent drove Crystal to the
school with the intention of picking up Casey and removing her from the state of Illinois. Petitioner
also argued that the evidence established that respondent drove by petitioner’s home where
Brianna and petitioner observed him. Petitioner argued that the evidence established that
respondent and Crystal then went to the police station to attempt to obtain possession of the minor
child through the police.
¶ 16 Counsel for respondent argued that there were not multiple actions, because “just because
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 250589-U NOTICE Decision filed 04/29/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0589 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
LORI STEVENS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Petitioner-Appellee, ) St. Clair County. ) v. ) No. 25-OP-190 ) LAWRENCE HARPER, ) Honorable ) Maurché H. Belk, Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SHOLAR delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McHaney and Bollinger concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s grant of petitioner’s plenary stalking no contact order was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 Petitioner, Lori Stevens, filed a verified petition for stalking no contact on February 28,
2025, before the circuit court of St. Clair County. The court issued a default order on April 8, 2025.
Respondent, Lawrence Harper, filed a motion to vacate the default order on May 7, 2025. The
court granted the motion to vacate and heard the petition on June 25, 2025. The court granted the
stalking no contact order on the same date. Respondent appeals, arguing first that the trial court’s
denial of respondent’s motion for directed verdict was an abuse of discretion. Respondent also
argues that the trial court’s granting of the stalking no contact order was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we disagree and affirm.
1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The record established that petitioner, Lori Stevens, resided in Dupo, Illinois, with her
stepchildren, Brianna Duck and Casey Duck. Petitioner’s husband, Randy Duck, was the father of
Brianna and Casey. Randy had custody of the children. Randy died on February 23, 2025.
¶5 Respondent, Lawrence Harper, was the husband of Brianna and Casey’s biological mother,
Crystal Harper. In 2015, respondent pleaded guilty to two counts of statutory sodomy against
Brianna when she was a minor child. Following Randy’s death on February 23, 2025, respondent
attempted to contact Brianna and Casey. The court held a hearing on petitioner’s petition for
stalking no contact on June 25, 2025. The following evidence was adduced at the hearing.
¶6 Petitioner testified that she lived on Louisa Avenue in Dupo, Illinois. Petitioner testified
that Randy passed away on February 23. Petitioner testified that she had not seen respondent since
the court hearings until he drove by her home on February 26. Petitioner stated:
“Brianna was in the yard, and she started screaming, Mom, that’s him; that’s him; that’s
him. I opened the door and they were creeping up in front of the house at the stop sign
sitting there. And after a few moments I yelled and said, Get your butt out of here, and then
they drove off.”
Petitioner testified that respondent was 20 or 25 feet away, and Brianna was frightened. Petitioner
contacted the local police department. She reported that respondent drove by the home. She had
no other contact with him.
¶7 Brianna also testified. Brianna observed respondent in a white SUV at a stop sign in front
of the home. Brianna testified that she was in the yard, and she observed respondent “in his vehicle
by the stop sign.” Brianna felt “intimidated, scared, and uncomfortable.” Brianna testified that she
was fearful of respondent.
2 ¶8 Brian Levin, the school assistant principal, testified that Crystal came to the school and
asked to see Casey. Crystal advised that “she would like to remove her from the school” or to “pick
her up from school.” Casey was not at school that day, and Crystal left. Levin observed Crystal
leave, and noted that she was “picked up” in a white SUV.
¶9 Cameron Cleveland, a patrolman for the Dupo Police Department, next testified. Officer
Cleveland testified that he met with Crystal and respondent at the police station. Crystal wanted to
“talk to her child.” Crystal asked the police to go to the home to retrieve the child. Following the
conversation, Sergeant Fulkerson contacted the Department of Children and Family Services and
the state’s attorney’s office.
¶ 10 Counsel for respondent moved for a “directed judgment.” Counsel argued that petitioner
only established a single incident on February 26. Counsel argued that because there was a single
incident, petitioner failed to establish the threshold of two instances.
¶ 11 In response, petitioner argued:
“[T]his man was a convicted felon, a sex offender, and he was in Dupo, Illinois
where he is not a resident. Resident of Missouri. He’s in Illinois. And I believe the
Court could infer from the evidence that Crystal and Lawrence Harper were in
Dupo for the purpose of getting possession of the minor child. And whether the
principal could identify the person in the white SUV later the same—that day
they’re in the SUV with the police together, Lawrence and Crystal, I think that is
not an improper inference from that evidence showing that there were two
incidents, one at the school and one at the house.”
¶ 12 Counsel for petitioner argued that respondent drove past the home and was within 20 feet
of the victim of his sexual offense conviction. Counsel also noted that Crystal and respondent then
3 went to the police station in an effort to go to the home to “either pick up the child or make contact
with that minor child.” Thus, petitioner contended that there were three incidents that would
establish the basis for the protective order. Following argument of the parties, the trial court denied
the motion for directed judgment.
¶ 13 Respondent testified. He denied driving by petitioner’s home on February 26. Respondent
testified that he and his wife, Crystal, were looking for the police department “to try to contact her
youngest daughter, Casey, she wasn’t at the school, she was told, and so we had to go to the police
department to try to find an officer to further help us to—for her to make contact with her.”
Respondent clarified that he and Crystal went to her attorney’s office. They then went to the school.
¶ 14 Respondent testified that he pulled into the school parking lot, dropped Crystal off, and
left. He waited in a parking lot down the street and waited for Crystal to contact him that she was
“done.” Crystal advised respondent that Casey was not at school, and they returned to the police
station. Respondent testified that he was on parole, and he could interact with “anybody” he chose,
except for Brianna Duck, so long as he was chaperoned by Crystal.
¶ 15 Following the close of evidence, petitioner argued that respondent drove Crystal to the
school with the intention of picking up Casey and removing her from the state of Illinois. Petitioner
also argued that the evidence established that respondent drove by petitioner’s home where
Brianna and petitioner observed him. Petitioner argued that the evidence established that
respondent and Crystal then went to the police station to attempt to obtain possession of the minor
child through the police.
¶ 16 Counsel for respondent argued that there were not multiple actions, because “just because
he transported his wife to the police station to see if the police could help does not constitute a
4 course of conduct, nor is it contact to or toward any of the requested protected parties.” Counsel
argued that respondent did not enter the school or attempt to contact the child at school.
¶ 17 Following argument of the parties, the trial court stated: “I fully believe that Mr. and Mrs.
Harper went to that school in an attempt to pick up the minor child upon news that Mr. Duck had
passed away. There would have been no other reason for her to go to that school on that day.” The
trial court noted that respondent “should have used better judgment.” The court noted that
respondent “chose to get in that car and drive across the river with full knowledge that he is not
allowed around not only just Brianna, it said all kids.” The court next observed that it
“refuse[d] to believe that Mr. Harper was just so ignorant as to he didn’t know what
plan him and his wife had devised before they left that house in Missouri. They left
with the intention of getting that minor child, because, as you just so eloquently
stated, if you don’t believe there’s a parenting plan, I’m sure they don’t believe
there is a parenting plan. Dad died. I want my kid back. Let’s get in the car and go
to the school.”
The court noted, “If she would have gained access to that minor child she would have put that
minor child in the car with Mr. Harper. No doubt in my mind.”
¶ 18 The trial court determined that the first contact was respondent driving to the school. The
court determined that the second contact was respondent driving down the street in front of
petitioner’s home. The court also noted that the school visit was “qualifying” where respondent
should have known that he would cause “emotional distress.” For these reasons, the court granted
the plenary stalking/no contact order for a term of two years. This appeal followed.
5 ¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 20 Respondent appeals, arguing first that the trial court’s denial of respondent’s motion for
directed verdict was an abuse of discretion. Respondent also argues that the trial court’s granting
of the stalking no contact order was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons
that follow, we disagree and affirm. We consider each argument in turn.
¶ 21 Respondent first argues that the trial court’s denial of his motion for directed verdict was
an abuse of discretion. Specifically, respondent argues that he “is not aware of any authority that
would allow one adult to file a Petition for a stalking no contact order for another adult without
showing the Petitioner is the guardian of the other adult.” Petitioner responds, arguing that
respondent waived any objection to standing regarding Brianna. For the following reasons, we find
that respondent forfeited review of this contention of error.
¶ 22 The doctrine of standing “ ‘is designed to preclude persons who have no interest in a
controversy from bringing suit,’ and ‘assures that issues are raised only by those parties with a real
interest in the outcome of the controversy.’ ” Nationwide Advantage Mortgage Co. v. Ortiz, 2012
IL App (1st) 112755, ¶ 24 (quoting Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 221 (1999)). Lack
of standing is an affirmative defense and the defendant’s burden to plead and prove. Id. A
defendant can forfeit the issue of standing if he failed to raise it before the trial court in a timely
manner. Id.
¶ 23 The record demonstrates that respondent failed to object to Brianna’s inclusion in the
petition during his motion for a directed finding or in his closing argument. He also failed to file a
motion to reconsider raising the issue. Succinctly stated, respondent never brought an issue of
standing to the attention of the trial court. As such, we agree with petitioner that respondent
forfeited consideration of this issue.
6 ¶ 24 Second, respondent argues that the trial court’s entry of a stalking no contact order was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, respondent argues that petitioner “only
established one contact” between petitioner and respondent and “one contact” between respondent
and Brianna. Respondent argues that petitioner established “no contact” between respondent and
Casey. Thus, respondent contends that the trial court erred by granting the stalking no contact
order. Petitioner responds, arguing that the entry of the plenary stalking no contact order was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. In support, petitioner argues that the evidence
demonstrated that respondent’s actions caused reasonable fear for the safety of petitioner and the
protected parties. We agree with petitioner.
¶ 25 Pursuant to the Stalking No Contact Order Act (Act), a victim of stalking may seek a civil
remedy requiring the stalker to stay away from the victim. 740 ILCS 21/5 (West 2024). The Act
defines stalking as “engaging in a course of conduct directed at a specific person,” when the
respondent “knows or should know that this course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to
fear for his or her safety, the safety of a workplace, school, or place of worship, or the safety of a
third person or suffer emotional distress.” Id. § 10. A course of conduct means two or more acts
“including but not limited to acts in which a respondent directly, indirectly, or through third parties,
by any action, method, device, or means follows, monitors, observes, surveils, or threatens a
person, workplace, school, or place of worship.” Id.
¶ 26 The stalker’s conduct must be nonconsensual, but the victim need not contact the stalker
to inform the stalker that the contact is unwanted. Piester v. Escobar, 2015 IL App (3d) 140457,
¶ 12. The Act focuses on whether the stalker’s behavior would cause a reasonable person to be
fearful for his safety or to suffer emotional distress. Id.; McNally v. Bredemann, 2015 IL App (1st)
134048, ¶ 14. A reasonable person is “a person in the petitioner’s circumstances with the
7 petitioner’s knowledge of the respondent and the respondent’s prior acts,” while emotional distress
is defined as “significant mental suffering, anxiety or alarm.” 740 ILCS 21/10 (West 2024).
¶ 27 A petitioner seeking a stalking no contact order is required to prove stalking by a
preponderance of the evidence. Piester, 2015 IL App (3d) 140457, ¶ 12; 740 ILCS 21/30(a) (West
2024). This court will not reverse a circuit court’s decision to issue a stalking no contact order
unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Piester, 2015 IL App (3d) 140457, ¶ 12.
A ruling is against the manifest weight of the evidence if it is clearly apparent that the opposite
conclusion should have been reached or the ruling is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based upon
the evidence presented. McNally, 2015 IL App (1st) 134048, ¶ 12. In addition, when reviewing the
circuit court’s judgment, this court will not disturb the circuit court’s determinations regarding
witness credibility, as such questions are for the circuit court to resolve as the trier of fact. Id. ¶ 14.
¶ 28 In the case before us, the evidence demonstrated that respondent attempted to contact
Brianna and Casey following news of their father’s death. Petitioner testified that respondent drove
by her home on February 26, 2025. Brianna was in the front yard and saw respondent. Petitioner
testified that Brianna was “screaming.” Petitioner went outside and also observed respondent at a
stop sign in front of the home. Petitioner testified that respondent was 20 or 25 feet away, and
Brianna was frightened. Petitioner contacted the local police department.
¶ 29 Brianna also testified. Brianna observed respondent in a white SUV at a stop sign in front
of the home. Brianna testified that she was in the yard, and she observed respondent “in his vehicle
by the stop sign.” Brianna felt “intimidated, scared, and uncomfortable.” Brianna testified that she
¶ 30 The evidence also established that respondent drove Crystal to Casey’s school in an attempt
to retrieve Casey from the school. Brian Levin, the school assistant principal, testified that Crystal
8 came to the school and asked to see Casey. Crystal advised that “she would like to remove her
from the school” or to “pick her up from school.” Casey was not at school that day, and Crystal
left. Levin observed Crystal leave, and noted that she was “picked up” in a white SUV. The
testimony of petitioner and Brianna established that respondent drove a white SUV on the date in
dispute.
¶ 31 Next, respondent and Crystal went to the local police station. Officer Cleveland testified
that he met with Crystal and respondent at the police station. Crystal wanted to “talk to her child.”
Crystal asked the police to go to the home to retrieve the child.
¶ 32 Respondent contends that this evidence was insufficient to establish two contacts with each
individual in the petition. However, this evidence establishes an ongoing course of conduct where
respondent both directly and indirectly attempted to contact Brianna, Casey, and petitioner. The
evidence demonstrates that respondent engaged “in a course of conduct directed at a specific
person,” when the respondent “knows or should know that this course of conduct would cause a
reasonable person to fear for his or her safety, the safety of a workplace, school, or place of
worship, or the safety of a third person or suffer emotional distress.” 740 ILCS 21/10 (West 2024).
Respondent engaged in three acts in which “respondent directly, indirectly, or through third
parties, by any action, method, device, or means follows, monitors, observes, surveils, or threatens
a person, workplace, school, or place of worship.” Id. Specifically, respondent went to the family
home, Casey’s school, and even attempted to coerce police to retrieve Casey. Based on our review
of the allegations in the petition, as well as the court’s thorough and well-reasoned order, we
conclude that it is not clearly apparent that the opposite conclusion to that reached by the circuit
court should have been reached. Moreover, the circuit court’s rulings are not unreasonable,
arbitrary, or not based upon the evidence presented. Accordingly, the decision to issue the order
9 was not against the manifest weight of the evidence (see, e.g., McNally, 2015 IL App (1st) 134048,
¶ 12), and we will not reverse it. Piester, 2015 IL App (3d) 140457, ¶ 12. In making this finding,
we are guided in part by the longstanding principle that a reviewing court should not disturb the
circuit court’s determinations regarding witness credibility, as such questions are for the circuit
court to resolve as the trier of fact. McNally, 2015 IL App (1st) 134048, ¶ 14.
¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County is affirmed.
¶ 35 Affirmed.