Steven Young v. DOWCP

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedJune 8, 2026
Docket24-1299
StatusUnpublished

This text of Steven Young v. DOWCP (Steven Young v. DOWCP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Steven Young v. DOWCP, (4th Cir. 2026).

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1299 Doc: 38 Filed: 06/08/2026 Pg: 1 of 5

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-1299

STEVEN T. YOUNG,

Petitioner,

v.

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; HUNTINGTON INGALLS INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board. (22-0458)

Submitted: April 28, 2026 Decided: June 8, 2026

Before WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, and TRAXLER and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Matthew H. Kraft, MATTHEW H. KRAFT, P.L.C., Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Petitioner. Christopher R. Hedrick, MASON, MASON, WALKER & HEDRICK, PC, Newport News, Virginia, for Respondent Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1299 Doc: 38 Filed: 06/08/2026 Pg: 2 of 5

PER CURIAM:

Steven T. Young petitions for review of the Benefits Review Board’s (BRB)

decision and order affirming the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) denial of his request to

modify his permanent partial disability benefits award under the Longshore and Harbor

Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950. Young sought to convert

his award to one for permanent total disability benefits based on new physical restrictions

imposed by one of his physicians. In this petition for review, Young challenges the ALJ’s

finding that Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company (“Employer”) met its

burden of establish suitable alternative employment for Young in the Hampton Roads,

Virginia, area. We deny the petition, as amended.

“We review BRB decisions for errors of law and to ascertain whether the [BRB]

adhered to its statutorily mandated standard for reviewing the ALJ’s factual findings.”

Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Green, 656 F.3d 235, 239 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted). We will affirm the factual findings of the ALJ “if supported by

substantial evidence,” but “[r]eview of legal questions is de novo.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). “[S]ubstantial evidence . . . mean[s] such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It requires more than a mere

scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Id. (citation modified).

We may not disregard the ALJ’s findings “on the basis that other inferences might

have been more reasonable.” Id. at 240 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather,

“[d]eference must be given to the [ALJ’s] inferences and credibility assessments, and we

have emphasized the scope of review of ALJ findings is limited.” Id. (internal quotation

2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1299 Doc: 38 Filed: 06/08/2026 Pg: 3 of 5

marks omitted). Nevertheless, “[t]he ALJ may not merely credulously accept the assertions

of the parties or their representatives, but must examine the logic of their conclusions and

evaluate the evidence upon which their conclusions are based.” Dir., Off. of Workers’

Comp. Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 138 F.3d 134, 140 (4th

Cir. 1998).

“The Act provides compensation to longshore workers who have experienced on-

the-job injuries for the economic harm suffered as a result of the decreased ability to earn

wages.” Marine Repair Servs., Inc. v. Fifer, 717 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal

quotation marks omitted). As a threshold showing for entitlement to benefits, “a claimant

must first establish a prima facie case by demonstrating an inability to return to prior

employment due to a work-related injury.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the

claimant satisfies this threshold showing, “the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate

the availability of suitable alternative employment which the claimant is capable of

performing.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The employer may meet this standard

by providing suitable alternative employment for the claimant or by “demonstrat[ing] that

such employment is available to the injured worker in the relevant labor market.” Id.

(citation modified). Finally, “[i]f the employer meets this burden, its obligation to pay

disability benefits is either reduced or eliminated, unless the employee shows that he

diligently but unsuccessfully sought appropriate employment.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted).

“As [Young] established disability by showing that he is unable to return to his job

[with Employer], this case turns on whether [Employer] has met its burden of showing

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suitable alternative employment.” Id. “[T]o meet its burden, an employer must present

evidence that a range of jobs exists which is reasonably available and which the disabled

employee is realistically able to secure and perform.” Id. at 336 (internal quotation marks

omitted). That is, “[t]here must be a reasonable likelihood, given the claimant’s age,

education, and vocational background that he would be hired if he diligently sought the

jobs the employer presents.” Id. (citation modified).

It is not enough to “demonstrat[e] a single job opening.” Id. But “[o]nce the

employer has presented a range of appropriate jobs, . . . the employer need not contact

prospective employers to inform them of the qualifications and limitations of the claimant

and to determine if they would in fact consider hiring the candidate for their position.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the employer need not “contact the

prospective employers in [its] survey to obtain their specific job requirements before

determining whether the claimant would be qualified for such work.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). Instead, “if the employer demonstrates the availability of

specific jobs in a local market, [it] may rely on standard occupational descriptions to fill

out the qualifications for performing such jobs.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the ALJ identified nine positions in the Hampton Roads area that Young could

be expected to perform and compete for and found that those positions satisfied Employer’s

burden of demonstrating suitable alternative employment. Young argues that, in so

finding, the ALJ erred by failing to properly account for his advanced age and extended

absence from the workforce. Although Young frames this as a legal challenge, we agree

with Employer that Young is challenging the adequacy of the ALJ’s factfinding. And,

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under that rubric, the ALJ’s findings are entitled to deference if supported by substantial

evidence. See Green, 656 F.3d at 239-40.

Young primarily takes issue with the ALJ’s inference that Employer’s vocational

expert, Barbara Harvey, considered his advanced age and extended absence from the

workforce when compiling her lists of suitable alternative employment. After reviewing

the record, we conclude that this inference is supported by substantial evidence. Notably,

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Related

Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Green
656 F.3d 235 (Fourth Circuit, 2011)

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