NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3643-23
STEVEN WRONKO,
Plaintiff-Appellant, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION v. January 9, 2026 APPELLATE DIVISION MONMOUTH COUNTY SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, a domestic New Jersey non-profit corporation, and the RECORDS CUSTODIAN OF THE MONMOUTH COUNTY SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS,1
Defendants-Respondents.
Argued December 4, 2025 – Decided January 9, 2026
Before Judges Marczyk, Bishop-Thompson, and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. L-0696-23.
Christina N. Stripp argued the cause for appellant (Cohn Lifland Pearlman Herrmann & Knopf LLP,
1 Improperly pled as Society for the Prevention of Cruelty of Animals. attorneys; Walter M. Luers and Christina N. Stripp, on the briefs).
John F. Byrnes argued the cause for respondents (Byrnes O'Hern & Heugle, LLC, attorneys; John F. Byrnes and Sean F. Byrnes, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MARCZYK, J.A.D.
Plaintiff Steven Wronko appeals from the trial court's June 27, 2024
order finding defendant Monmouth County Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals (MCSPCA) is not a public agency under the Open Public
Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13.
The question before us is whether the MCSPCA—a non-profit
organization that provides humane law enforcement services for the
Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office (MCPO) under a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU)—is a public agency required to disclose public records
under OPRA. We conclude the MCSPCA is not a public agency subject to the
requirements of OPRA because the MCPO is not a political subdivision under
N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, but rather is an office. Therefore, the MCSPCA is an
instrumentality of an office, analogous to the volunteer fire company in Verry
v. Franklin Fire District No. 1, 230 N.J. 285, 301 (2017), which our Supreme
Court held did not fall within OPRA's definition of a public agency.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order.
A-3643-23 2 I.
A.
In 2018, the Legislature modified the statutory scheme governing the
enforcement of animal cruelty crimes. L. 2017, c. 331. Before the
amendments, the New Jersey Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
(NJSPCA) served as "a parent corporation for the purposes of coordinating the
functions of county societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals
[(SPCA)], and of promoting the interests of, protecting and caring for, and
doing any and all things to benefit or that tend to benefit animals." N.J.S.A.
4:22-11.2(a)(1) (2006). The NJSPCA was required to "prepare an annual
report" detailing the "law enforcement activity of the [NJSPCA] and the
county societies," N.J.S.A. 4:22-11.2(b) (2006), and submit statistical data to
the Attorney General's office every quarter, N.J.S.A. 4:22-11.2(c) (2006). The
previous statutory scheme contained procedures for the appointment and
maintenance of a "board of trustees consisting of [fifteen] persons, of whom
[twelve] shall be members of the society elected by the membership thereof
and three shall be persons appointed by the Governor with the advice and
consent of the Senate." N.J.S.A. 4:22-11.2(a)(1) (2006).
In 2018, the Legislature's various enactments, amendments, and repeals
under L. 2017, c. 331, §§ 27-35 removed the NJSPCA from its role as a
A-3643-23 3 "parent corporation" of county societies and transferred humane law
enforcement functions to county prosecutors. For instance, L. 2017, c. 331, §
28(a)(1) directed "[e]ach county prosecutor" to designate a county-wide animal
cruelty prosecutor. It also authorized the county prosecutors to "enter into a[n
MOU] with the county [SPCA]" and permitted those county societies to assist
with "enforcement of [A]rticle 2 of [C]hapter 22 of Title 4 . . . , and to
designate humane law enforcement officers [(HLEOs)] . . . to assist with
investigations, arrest violators, and otherwise act as an officer for detection,
apprehension, and arrest of offenders." L. 2017, c. 331, § 28(a)(2)(b) (codified
at N.J.S.A. 4:22-14.4(a)(2)(b)). L. 2017, c. 331, § 27 (codified at N.J.S.A.
4:22-14.3) specified any existing HLEO, under either a county society or the
NJSPCA, "shall be eligible for designation as a" HLEO for either a
municipality or a county society. Under L. 2017, c. 331, § 29(c) (codified as
N.J.S.A. 4:22-14.5(c)), "[a] county prosecutor may authorize a [HLEO] to
possess, carry, and use a firearm . . . ." Notably, county prosecutors are
responsible to supervise all humane law enforcement activities under the Act.
L. 2017, c. 331, § 28(a)(2)(b) (codified as N.J.S.A. 4:22-14.4(a)(2)(b)).
The county societies in existence at the time of the enactment were
permitted to elect whether to participate in the new scheme and "be designated
as the county [SPCA]." L. 2017, c. 331, § 32 (codified as N.J.S.A. 4:22-14.8).
A-3643-23 4 When a county society elects to be designated as the county animal society, it
"shall be responsible for efficiently providing or locating humane shelter and
care for any animals at the request of the county prosecutor, the county sheriff,
or a municipal [HLEO]." Ibid. The legislation also specified fines and
penalties collected in the course of the HLEO's duties would be proportionally
paid to counties and municipalities as opposed to being paid to the county
SPCA or NJSPCA. L. 2017, c. 331, § 22 (codified as N.J.S.A. 4:22-55).
The Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee released a statement
explaining the enactment abolished "[t]he charter system applicable to county
societies under current law" and replaced it with a new scheme under which
each county prosecutor must appoint a chief humane law enforcement officer
(CHLEO) to oversee animal cruelty enforcement at the county level. S.
Budget & Appropriations Comm. Statement to S. 3558, at 1-2 (Dec. 14, 2017).
It required each municipality "to designate at least one municipal [HLEO]" and
allowed a HLEO to hold appointments to that position in multiple
municipalities within the county. Id. at 2. The statement also explained the
enactment allowed for the automatic conversion of existing county societies
chartered by the NJSPCA into the "county society designated by the county
prosecutor" and included measures for establishing an independent county
society in counties where one was not already established. Id. at 1-2.
A-3643-23 5 B.
After the enactment of the 2018 legislation, the MCPO and the
MCSPCA entered into an MOU. The agreement: established the MCSPCA as
the county SPCA and required it, in coordination with the county prosecutor
and county sheriff, to "coordinate shelter and care for animals"; authorized the
MCSPCA to "assist with [the] enforcement of Title 4, Chapter 22, Article 2 of
the New Jersey Statutes"; authorized the county prosecutor to designate
MCSPCA members as HLEOs; and provided it was "the exclusive mechanism
by which non-sworn law enforcement personnel may exercise law enforcement
powers pursuant to Title 4, Chapter 22, Article 2, within the County of
Monmouth."
Section I of the MOU details the MCSPCA's rights under the agreement
and specifies its provisions "shall apply only to the exercise of law
enforcement functions by the MCSPCA and its members in Monmouth County
. . . [and] shall not affect, alter, or in any way impair any other activities of the
MCSPCA (fundraising, adoptions, veterinary services, etc.)." Section I goes
on to state "[t]he MCSPCA is not a department, office, or agency of the
County of Monmouth." It also notes the MCPO's only connection to the
MCSPCA is the "granting of and the supervisory authority over the MCSPCA's
exercise of Title 4 law enforcement powers as set forth in this directive."
A-3643-23 6 The MOU requires an applicant for the HLEO position must be a
member of the MCSPCA and provides it "is solely within the discretion of the
MCPO" to decide whether to approve or deny a member's application. Section
XI of the agreement restricts the CHLEO's and HLEOs' ability to directly
communicate with the press, requiring they coordinate with the MCPO's public
information officer. The remaining relevant provisions of the MOU concern:
training of the CHLEO and HLEOs; uniforms and vehicles; the ability for the
CHLEO and HLEOs to carry a firearm; reporting requirements; and
agreements related to investigation, evidence retention, and other law
enforcement functions.
C.
On April 14, 2023, the MCSPCA's executive director executed a
certification related to the underlying litigation. He stated the MCSPCA is a
"501([c])(3) tax-exempt charitable organization" with a mission to "protect,
care[,] and advocate for all animals." The executive director certified that the
MCSPCA receives its funding from donations, adoption proceeds, and
proceeds from the veterinary office. He explained, since the adoption of L.
2017, c. 331 in 2018, the MCSPCA "no longer receives the proceeds from"
citations resulting in "animal cruelty convictions" and noted the MCSPCA was
A-3643-23 7 authorized to "exercise law enforcement functions" under the MOU with the
MCPO.
D.
On January 19, 2023, plaintiff emailed the MCSPCA "a public records
request under [OPRA] and [the] common law." He sought "all contracts that
are active and current as of January 19, 2023" and "the latest payroll records
for all [MCSPCA] employees." On January 20, counsel for the MCSPCA
replied, informing plaintiff the MCSPCA was "no longer considered a 'public
agency'" after the 2018 legislative amendments and therefore not obligated to
provide the requested records.
On March 6, 2023, plaintiff filed an action seeking the disclosure of the
requested documents under OPRA. He argued the MCSPCA is a public
agency subject to OPRA because it engages in "law enforcement" activities.
The MCSPCA answered, asserting the fact that animal cruelty conviction fines
and penalties were now remitted to the County—not the MCSPCA—
demonstrates it is no longer a public agency.
Following oral argument, 2 the trial court determined the MCSPCA was a
public agency subject to OPRA and set a supplemental briefing schedule to
2 The judge originally assigned to the case died prior to issuing a decision, and the matter was subsequently reassigned to a new judge.
A-3643-23 8 determine whether any privileges applied to the documents plaintiff requested.
It also ordered the MCSPCA to produce the contested records for an in camera
review. The MCSPCA moved for reconsideration, and the court agreed to stay
the previous order pending adjudication of the motion.
On June 27, 2024, the trial court rendered an oral decision on the
MCSPCA's motion. It found there was a proper basis for reconsideration in
light of our Supreme Court's ruling in American Civil Liberties Union of New
Jersey v. County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey, 257 N.J. 87 (2024),
which had been issued after its initial ruling. The trial court ultimately found
the MCSPCA was not a "public agency," concluding it instead was "an
instrumentality of an instrumentality and, therefore, it does not fall within the
scope of OPRA."
II.
Plaintiff contends the MCSPCA is a public agency within the meaning
of OPRA because it employs law enforcement officers and enforces animal
cruelty laws. He asserts the trial court erred in granting reconsideration and
finding the MCSPCA was not subject to OPRA.
A "trial court's determinations with respect to the applicability of OPRA
are legal conclusions subject to de novo review." K.L. v. Evesham Twp. Bd.
of Educ., 423 N.J. Super. 337, 349 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting O'Shea v. Twp.
A-3643-23 9 of W. Milford, 410 N.J. Super. 371, 379 (App. Div. 2009)); accord MAG Ent.,
LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534, 543 (App.
Div. 2005). We exercise plenary review regarding a trial court's interpretation
of OPRA and its exclusions. Cnty. Prosecutors Ass'n of N.J., 257 N.J. at 101.
"OPRA is designed to give members of the public 'ready access to
government records' unless the statute exempts them from disclosure." Rivera
v. Union Cnty. Prosecutor's Off., 250 N.J. 124, 140-41 (2022) (quoting Burnett
v. Cnty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 421 (2009)). The purpose of OPRA is "to
maximize public knowledge about public affairs in order to ensure an informed
citizenry and to minimize the evils inherent in a secluded process." O'Boyle v.
Borough of Longport, 218 N.J. 168, 184 (2014) (quoting Mason v. City of
Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 64 (2008)); see also Rivera, 250 N.J. at 141 (stating
OPRA's "core concern is to promote transparency in government"). However,
although the public's right to disclosure is broad, it is "not unlimited." Bozzi
v. City of Jersey City, 248 N.J. 274, 284 (2021).
Plaintiff argues the MCSPCA is a public agency under OPRA because it
exercises law enforcement powers, and its law enforcement officers operate
under the supervision of the MCPO. In support of his contention, he points to
the MCSPCA's, CHLEO's, and HLEOs' use of firearms, authority to conduct
criminal investigations, and arrest powers. Plaintiff asserts the MCSPCA "also
A-3643-23 10 acts as the [HLEO] for many [other] municipalities" in Monmouth County. He
further contends the MCSPCA is not an instrumentality of the MCPO but
rather a direct creation of the Legislature, averring its powers come directly
from statutory authority under N.J.S.A. 4:22-14.4(a)(2)(b).
OPRA is only implicated if the entity served with a document request
meets the definition of a "public agency" under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, -6. Cnty.
Prosecutors Ass'n of N.J., 257 N.J. at 102. The issue before us is whether the
MCSPCA is a public agency under OPRA, which requires we first address
whether the MCPO is a political subdivision pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.
OPRA defines a "[p]ublic agency" or "agency" as:
any of the principal departments in the Executive Branch of State Government, and any division, board, bureau, office, commission[,] or other instrumentality within or created by such department; the Legislature of the State and any office, board, bureau[,] or commission within or created by the Legislative Branch; and any independent State authority, commission, instrumentality[,] or agency. The terms also mean any political subdivision of the State or combination of political subdivisions, and any division, board, bureau, office, commission[,] or other instrumentality within or created by a political subdivision of the State or combination of political subdivisions, and any independent authority, commission, instrumentality[,] or agency created by a political subdivision or combination of political subdivisions.
[N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.]
A-3643-23 11 In County Prosecutors, our Supreme Court addressed whether "the
County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey (CPANJ), a nonprofit
organization" was a public agency pursuant to OPRA. 257 N.J. at 93. It also
considered whether a county prosecutor "constitutes a 'political subdivision'
for purposes of OPRA." Id. at 106.
The ACLU argued the CPANJ was a public entity based on a 1985 joint
policy statement with the Attorney General's office "regarding prosecutorial
review of search warrant applications" as well as its participation "in a 2018
initiative to stop violence against women." Id. at 94. According to the ACLU,
the CPANJ was acting as a "partner in implementing statewide criminal justice
policy." Ibid. It further noted the CPANJ, by statute, was entitled to have a
representative on both the Department of Law and Public Safety's Police
Training Commission and the Parole Advisory Board, and it highlighted the
CPANJ "regularly sends copies of its meeting minutes and agendas to the
Office of the Attorney General." Id. at 94-95 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The ACLU also alleged the prosecutors themselves were utilizing the
CPANJ to affect state policy, using its resources to coordinate agendas and
meetings, as well as participate in litigation as amicus curiae. Id. at 95. The
ACLU requested records from the CPANJ's meetings, funding details, briefs
A-3643-23 12 filed in federal and state courts by the CPANJ, and policies or practices
generated by the CPANJ and sent to county prosecutors. Ibid. It "urge[d the
Court] to find that [the] CPANJ [wa]s an instrumentality of the county
prosecutors, 'state actors' who together comprise a 'combination of political
subdivisions' under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1." Id. at 106.
The Supreme Court observed, "OPRA applies only if the entity to which
a request is directed meets the statutory definition of a public agency." Id. at
102. It proceeded to discuss its prior decision in Verry. Id. at 105-07. In
Verry, the plaintiff filed records requests regarding two fire departments in
Franklin: Franklin Fire District No. 1 (FFD1) and the Millstone Valley Fire
Department (MVFD). 230 N.J. at 288. FFD1 was part of the municipality's
professional fire-fighting force, and MVFD was a volunteer department under
the supervision of FFD1. Id. at 287-89. The plaintiff sought records including
the MVFD's constitution and bylaws. Id. at 289. The County Prosecutors
Court made the following observations regarding Verry:
We found in Verry that [FFD1] constituted a public agency under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1 because it was the "creation of a municipality," which in turn was "undoubtedly a political subdivision" that had exercised statutory authority to form the [FFD1]. Id. at 298-99. We therefore deemed the [FFD1] to be "an instrumentality of a political subdivision," thus satisfying "the definition of public agency under the second sentence of OPRA's definition." Id. at 299 (citing N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1).
A-3643-23 13 We reached the opposite conclusion with respect to the [MVFD], however. Id. at 299-302. Noting that N.J.S.A. 40A:14-70.1 authorizes a fire district to create or contract with volunteer fire companies, we concluded that "a volunteer squad may be regarded as an instrumentality of a fire district." Id. at 300-01. We observed that
because the [FFD1] itself is not a political subdivision, but rather the instrumentality of one, the volunteer company is only the instrumentality of an instrumentality. Although OPRA provides that an instrumentality of a political subdivision constitutes a public agency, it does not provide that an instrumentality of an instrumentality constitutes a public agency. OPRA requires a direct connection to a political subdivision.
[Id. at 301 (citing N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1).]
[257 N.J. at 105.]
The Court concluded a county prosecutor is not "a 'political subdivision' under
N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1's plain language" and the CPANJ was not a public agency
"within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1." Id. at 108-09.
The Court did not specifically address how county prosecutor's offices
should be classified under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. Therefore, we look to our
decision in County Prosecutors for guidance, in which we noted:
[T]he offices of the county prosecutors are better characterized as "office[s] . . . created by the Legislative Branch," N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, for while a county prosecutor is a constitutional officer, "the task
A-3643-23 14 of defini[ng]" their "powers, rights, duties and responsibilities" was "left to the Legislature." Morss v. Forbes, 24 N.J. 341, 369 (1957); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:158-1 (providing for the appointment of county prosecutors and assigning them "all of the powers and . . . all of the duties formerly had and performed by the prosecutor[s] of the pleas of such count[ies]").
[Am. Civ. Liberties Union of N.J. v. Cnty. Prosecutors Ass'n of N.J., 474 N.J. Super. 243, 263 (App. Div. 2022) (all but first alteration in original) (citations reformatted).]
We further stated:
[Entities such as the CPANJ do] not constitute a public agency, because an "instrumentality" only qualifies as a "public agency" if it is "within or created by" a "principal department[ ] in the Executive Branch," "the Legislative Branch," or "a political subdivision . . . or combination of political subdivisions," or if it is an "independent State . . . instrumentality." N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. OPRA "does not provide that an instrumentality of an instrumentality constitutes a public agency," Verry, 230 N.J. at 301, or that an instrumentality of offices constitutes a public agency, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.
[Id. at 263-64 (second alteration in original).]
Consistent with our holding in County Prosecutors, we conclude the
MCPO is an office created by the Legislature. We further determine the
MCSPCA was not created by a political subdivision and derives its authority
to perform law enforcement functions solely from the MCPO through an MOU
A-3643-23 15 pursuant to N.J.S.A. 4:22-14.4(a)(2)(b). 3 The MCPO had the discretion to
appoint the MCSPCA but was not required to do so and, alternatively, could
have "designate[d] . . . a county law enforcement officer to serve as the
[CHLEO]" and enforce the provisions of "[A]rticle 2 of [C]hapter 22 of Title
4." See N.J.S.A. 4:22-14.4(a)(2)(a), (b).
Although the MCPO is responsible for supervising the MCSPCA's law
enforcement functions, see N.J.S.A. 4:22-14.4(a)(2)(b), this delegation of
authority does not transform the MCSPCA into a public agency for the purpose
of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. Because the MCSPCA's relationship to any political
subdivision is indirect, the MCSPCA is, at most, an instrumentality of an
office and, therefore, not a public agency under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.
Accordingly, the court did not err in denying plaintiff's request for records
given it determined the MCSPCA was not a public agency.
We are mindful the MCSPCA's law enforcement responsibilities are
regarded as traditional government functions. However, that is not dispositive
of whether the MCSPCA is a public agency subject to OPRA under our
jurisprudence, as volunteer fire companies "performing fire duty" are also
3 The MCPO designated the MCSPCA to enforce animal cruelty laws under N.J.S.A. 4:22-14.4(a)(2)(b) in much the same way as the FFD1 contracted with the MVFD in Verry, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-70.1. See 230 N.J. at 300- 01. Thus, we are unpersuaded by plaintiff's argument the MCSPCA is a direct creation of the Legislature.
A-3643-23 16 "deemed to be exercising a governmental function" but have nevertheless been
held to not be public agencies under OPRA. See Verry, 230 N.J. at 300, 302;
N.J.S.A. 40A:14-70.1(b). The Verry Court observed:
To the extent our prior decisions have discussed "creation" or "governmental-function" tests when demarcating the boundaries of what qualifies as a public agency, see, e.g., Fair Share Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. N.J. State League of Muns., 207 N.J. 489, 507 (2011), such tests are useful only insomuch as they effectuate application of the statutory language. Because the [FFD1] is an instrumentality of a political subdivision, it falls within the plain language of the statutory definition of public agency. By contrast, the MVFD is a non-profit association and, while it is supervised by the [FFD1], the volunteer company is not a public agency as defined by OPRA.
[230 N.J. at 302 (citation reformatted).]
The MCSPCA is analogous to the fire company in Verry. It was not
created by a political subdivision but was authorized to perform a government
function by an office. Thus, the government-function test does not control
when the entity at issue—like the MCSPCA—is not itself considered a public
agency under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. Likewise, the Court's decision in County
Prosecutors indicates the definition of a public agency depends less on the
subject organization's function and more on its relationship to an established
political subdivision or instrumentality. See 257 N.J. at 108.
A-3643-23 17 Lastly, plaintiff here, as the plaintiff in Verry, is not without recourse.
Law enforcement-related documents may be requested through the MCPO,
based on its supervisory authority over the MCSPCA, as set forth in N.J.S.A.
4:22-14.4(a)(2)(b) and the MOU.
Affirmed.
A-3643-23 18