Affirmed in part; Reversed and Rendered in part; and Opinion Filed December 8, 2023
In the Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00080-CV
STEVEN WILLIAMS, AS INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF COURTNEY WILLIAMS, DECEASED, Appellant V. ANNE TANNER, Appellee
On Appeal from the Collin County Probate Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. PB1-1601-2020
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Breedlove Opinion by Justice Carlyle Steven Williams sued Anne Tanner for allegedly breaching a Rule 11
settlement agreement. After a jury found in his favor, the trial court signed a final
judgment awarding Williams his damages but granting Tanner’s motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict concerning attorney’s fees. Williams asks us
to reinstate the jury’s attorney’s fees award. We affirm in part and reverse and render
in part in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4. Williams sued Tanner to enforce a settlement agreement and alleged several
causes of action, including breach of contract. Counsel represented Williams and
Tanner appeared pro se. During trial, Williams’s counsel presented evidence
concerning his attorney’s fees and Tanner neither objected, conducted any cross-
examination, nor presented any controverting evidence. The proposed jury charge
focused on Tanner’s alleged breach of contract and contained questions concerning
Williams’s attorney’s fees; again, Tanner did not object.
The jury found Tanner committed a material breach of the underlying Rule 11
settlement agreement and awarded $6,338.39 in damages, $37,811 in attorney’s fees,
$30,000 in appellate attorney’s fees, and another $45,000 for representation at the
Supreme Court of Texas through oral argument and the completion of proceedings.
Tanner then acquired counsel, filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, and argued Williams should take nothing based on (1) an ambiguity in the
Rule 11 agreement, (2) the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction because a person
necessary for the just adjudication of the dispute was not involved, and (3)
Williams’s failure to segregate his attorney’s fees.
The trial court granted Tanner’s motion only with respect to Williams’s
attorney’s fees because the evidence “was insufficient to support a judgment” and
Williams failed to segregate recoverable fees from unrecoverable fees. Williams
timely appealed and, in three issues, argues the trial court erred because (1) Tanner
waived her objections and Williams sufficiently segregated his fees, (2) some
–2– evidence supports the jury’s fee award, and (3) the trial court granted relief Tanner
did not request.
In his first issue, Williams argues the trial court erred when it granted Tanner’s
motion because Tanner waived her arguments concerning attorney’s fees. The
record shows Tanner failed to object to Williams’s evidence concerning attorney’s
fees in a timely manner and failed to object to the jury charge; instead, her first
complaint about his fees appeared in her motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. Tanner’s untimely complaint is therefore waived. See Green Int’l, Inc. v.
Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 389–90 (Tex. 1997); In re A.M.W., 313 S.W.3d 887, 893
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.); Ogden v. Ryals, No. 14-10-01052-CV, 2012 WL
3016856, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 24, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).
As a result, the trial court erred when it granted Tanner’s motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict based on a failure to segregate attorney’s fees.
In his second issue, Williams argues the evidence sufficiently supports the
jury’s verdict as to fees. Though the segregation complaint is waivable, evidence
must still sufficiently support the jury’s verdict, and a trial court can properly
disregard a jury’s answer if it does not. See Green Int’l Inc., 951 S.W.2d at 389–90
(citing Spencer v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. of Am., 876 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1994)). A
trial court may disregard a jury finding only if it is unsupported by evidence or if the
issue is immaterial. Spencer, 876 S.W.2d at 157. Our review of the trial court’s ruling
employs the well-settled legal sufficiency or “no evidence” standard. Del Bosque v.
–3– Barbosa, No. 05-22-00230-CV, 2023 WL 1097556, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan.
30, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).
“Generally, the evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding and a
JNOV must be granted when the record demonstrates: (1) the complete absence of
evidence on a vital fact; (2) a rule of law or evidence precluded according weight to
the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a
vital fact amounted to no more than a scintilla; or (4) the evidence conclusively
established the opposite of a vital fact.” Id. The record lacks evidence conclusively
establishing that Williams was not entitled to attorney’s fees and neither the trial
court nor the parties have identified any rule of law or evidence that precluded
according weight to Williams’s evidence.
Instead, the record reveals that Williams’s attorney testified as to the specific
legal services he performed on his client’s behalf, the general reasons he needed to
perform those services, when he performed those services, the amount of time it took
him to perform those services, his hourly rates through the years he performed
relevant services, the reasonableness of the amount of time it took him to complete
those services, and the reasonableness of his hourly rate as it increased over the
years. Counsel specifically prefaced each explanation of fees by limiting it to those
fees caused by Tanner’s breach. The evidence sufficiently supports the jury’s
verdict. See Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 427 (Tex. 2017); Rohrmoos Venture
v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 498 (Tex. 2019). This evidence is
–4– also more than a scintilla concerning vital facts. Del Bosque, 2023 WL 1097556, at
*2. As a result, the trial court erred when it granted Tanner’s motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict based on the insufficiency of the evidence supporting
Williams’s attorney’s fees.
Finally, Tanner attempts to raise cross-points challenging the remaining
portions of the jury’s verdict but has not filed a notice of appeal. In the absence of a
notice of appeal, we cannot grant her more favorable relief than the trial court
granted except for just cause. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(c); City of Austin v.
Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766, 789 (Tex. 2012); Dean v. Lafeyette Place (Section
One) Council of Co-Owners, Inc., 999 S.W.2d 814, 817–18 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Tanner has not addressed, nor do we find just cause in the
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Affirmed in part; Reversed and Rendered in part; and Opinion Filed December 8, 2023
In the Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00080-CV
STEVEN WILLIAMS, AS INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF COURTNEY WILLIAMS, DECEASED, Appellant V. ANNE TANNER, Appellee
On Appeal from the Collin County Probate Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. PB1-1601-2020
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Breedlove Opinion by Justice Carlyle Steven Williams sued Anne Tanner for allegedly breaching a Rule 11
settlement agreement. After a jury found in his favor, the trial court signed a final
judgment awarding Williams his damages but granting Tanner’s motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict concerning attorney’s fees. Williams asks us
to reinstate the jury’s attorney’s fees award. We affirm in part and reverse and render
in part in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4. Williams sued Tanner to enforce a settlement agreement and alleged several
causes of action, including breach of contract. Counsel represented Williams and
Tanner appeared pro se. During trial, Williams’s counsel presented evidence
concerning his attorney’s fees and Tanner neither objected, conducted any cross-
examination, nor presented any controverting evidence. The proposed jury charge
focused on Tanner’s alleged breach of contract and contained questions concerning
Williams’s attorney’s fees; again, Tanner did not object.
The jury found Tanner committed a material breach of the underlying Rule 11
settlement agreement and awarded $6,338.39 in damages, $37,811 in attorney’s fees,
$30,000 in appellate attorney’s fees, and another $45,000 for representation at the
Supreme Court of Texas through oral argument and the completion of proceedings.
Tanner then acquired counsel, filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, and argued Williams should take nothing based on (1) an ambiguity in the
Rule 11 agreement, (2) the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction because a person
necessary for the just adjudication of the dispute was not involved, and (3)
Williams’s failure to segregate his attorney’s fees.
The trial court granted Tanner’s motion only with respect to Williams’s
attorney’s fees because the evidence “was insufficient to support a judgment” and
Williams failed to segregate recoverable fees from unrecoverable fees. Williams
timely appealed and, in three issues, argues the trial court erred because (1) Tanner
waived her objections and Williams sufficiently segregated his fees, (2) some
–2– evidence supports the jury’s fee award, and (3) the trial court granted relief Tanner
did not request.
In his first issue, Williams argues the trial court erred when it granted Tanner’s
motion because Tanner waived her arguments concerning attorney’s fees. The
record shows Tanner failed to object to Williams’s evidence concerning attorney’s
fees in a timely manner and failed to object to the jury charge; instead, her first
complaint about his fees appeared in her motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. Tanner’s untimely complaint is therefore waived. See Green Int’l, Inc. v.
Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 389–90 (Tex. 1997); In re A.M.W., 313 S.W.3d 887, 893
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.); Ogden v. Ryals, No. 14-10-01052-CV, 2012 WL
3016856, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 24, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).
As a result, the trial court erred when it granted Tanner’s motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict based on a failure to segregate attorney’s fees.
In his second issue, Williams argues the evidence sufficiently supports the
jury’s verdict as to fees. Though the segregation complaint is waivable, evidence
must still sufficiently support the jury’s verdict, and a trial court can properly
disregard a jury’s answer if it does not. See Green Int’l Inc., 951 S.W.2d at 389–90
(citing Spencer v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. of Am., 876 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1994)). A
trial court may disregard a jury finding only if it is unsupported by evidence or if the
issue is immaterial. Spencer, 876 S.W.2d at 157. Our review of the trial court’s ruling
employs the well-settled legal sufficiency or “no evidence” standard. Del Bosque v.
–3– Barbosa, No. 05-22-00230-CV, 2023 WL 1097556, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan.
30, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).
“Generally, the evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding and a
JNOV must be granted when the record demonstrates: (1) the complete absence of
evidence on a vital fact; (2) a rule of law or evidence precluded according weight to
the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a
vital fact amounted to no more than a scintilla; or (4) the evidence conclusively
established the opposite of a vital fact.” Id. The record lacks evidence conclusively
establishing that Williams was not entitled to attorney’s fees and neither the trial
court nor the parties have identified any rule of law or evidence that precluded
according weight to Williams’s evidence.
Instead, the record reveals that Williams’s attorney testified as to the specific
legal services he performed on his client’s behalf, the general reasons he needed to
perform those services, when he performed those services, the amount of time it took
him to perform those services, his hourly rates through the years he performed
relevant services, the reasonableness of the amount of time it took him to complete
those services, and the reasonableness of his hourly rate as it increased over the
years. Counsel specifically prefaced each explanation of fees by limiting it to those
fees caused by Tanner’s breach. The evidence sufficiently supports the jury’s
verdict. See Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 427 (Tex. 2017); Rohrmoos Venture
v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 498 (Tex. 2019). This evidence is
–4– also more than a scintilla concerning vital facts. Del Bosque, 2023 WL 1097556, at
*2. As a result, the trial court erred when it granted Tanner’s motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict based on the insufficiency of the evidence supporting
Williams’s attorney’s fees.
Finally, Tanner attempts to raise cross-points challenging the remaining
portions of the jury’s verdict but has not filed a notice of appeal. In the absence of a
notice of appeal, we cannot grant her more favorable relief than the trial court
granted except for just cause. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(c); City of Austin v.
Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766, 789 (Tex. 2012); Dean v. Lafeyette Place (Section
One) Council of Co-Owners, Inc., 999 S.W.2d 814, 817–18 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Tanner has not addressed, nor do we find just cause in the
record to grant greater relief than the trial court granted. Thus, the absence of a notice
of appeal waives Tanner’s cross-points. See id.; Lubbock Cnty., Texas v. Trammel’s
Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 584 (Tex. 2002); Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. GE Capital Corp., 58 S.W.3d 290, 292 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.).
Accordingly, without reaching Williams’s third issue, see TEX. R. APP. P.
47.1, we reverse the trial court’s judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to
Williams’s attorney’s fees, render judgment including Williams’s attorney’s fees,
and affirm the remaining portions of the judgment. /Cory L. Carlyle/ CORY L. CARLYLE JUSTICE 230080f.p05 –5– Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
STEVEN WILLIAMS, AS On Appeal from the Collin County INDEPENDENT Probate, Collin County, Texas ADMINISTRATOR OF THE Trial Court Cause No. PB1-1601- ESTATE OF COURTNEY 2020. WILLIAMS, DECEASED, Appellant Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle. Justices Goldstein and Breedlove No. 05-23-00080-CV V. participating.
ANNE TANNER, Appellee
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is REVERSED in part and judgment is RENDERED reinstating the jury’s award of Williams’s attorney’s fees. In all other respects, the trial court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellant STEVEN WILLIAMS, AS INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF COURTNEY WILLIAMS, DECEASED recover his costs of this appeal from appellee ANNE TANNER.
Judgment entered this 8th day of December, 2023.
–6–