Steven Whitfield v. Clinica Sierra Vista, Inc.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: May 15, 2026
• Docket: 1:25-cv-01808
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 STEVEN WHITFIELD, Case No. 1:25-cv-01808-KES-CDB

9 Plaintiff, ORDER VACATING FEBRUARY 5, 2026, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10 v. (Doc. 13) 11 CLINICA SIERRA VISTA, INC.,1 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 Defendant.2 TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S 13 MOTION TO REMAND AS MOOT

14 (Docs. 4, 7)

15 14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

16 17 Pending before the undersigned is the motion of Defendant United States of America3 18 (“Defendant”) to dismiss Plaintiff’s Steven Whitfield’s (“Plaintiff”) first amended complaint 19 (“FAC”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, filed on December 18, 2025.4 (Doc. 4). Plaintiff 20 filed an untimely opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss on March 13, 2026, and Defendant

21 1 Defendant Clinica Sierra Vista, Inc. (“CSV”) notes in the notice of removal that it is 22 erroneously sued as “Sierra Clinica Vista, Inc.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 1). 23 2 CSV notes that Plaintiff has not served named Defendant physician assistant nurse “Nancy” and it is understood that Plaintiff is pursuing his claims only against CSV. Id. ¶ 3. 24 3 On December 11, 2025, the federal government filed a notice of substitution indicating 25 that it is substituted in this action in place of CSV pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 233(c) as CSV “was a deemed employee of the Public Health Service and was[] acting within the scope of such 26 employment at the time of the incidents giving rise to this action[.]” (Doc. 2 at 1). 27 4 On December 19, 2025, the presiding district judge referred the pending motion to dismiss to the undersigned for the preparation of findings and recommendations and/or other appropriate 1 filed a reply on March 23, 2026. (Docs. 20, 21). Plaintiff separately filed a motion to remand (Doc. 2 7) and Defendant opposed. (Doc. 12). The undersigned deems the motions suitable for the 3 preparation of findings and recommendations without hearing and oral argument. See Local Rule 4 230(g). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned will recommend Defendant’s motion to 5 dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction be granted and that Plaintiff’s motion to remand be 6 denied as moot. 7 I. Background 8 A. Procedural History 9 Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the operative FAC on August 15, 2025, in state court 10 before Defendant removed the case to this Court on December 11, 2025. (Doc. 1). On January 5, 11 2026, approximately three weeks after Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed a motion 12 to remand.5 13 After Plaintiff failed to timely respond to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, on February 5, 14 2026, the undersigned issued findings and recommendations to dismiss the action without prejudice 15 for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute and to obey Court orders and the Local Rules. (Doc. 13). On 16 February 11, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to file a response 17 to Defendant’s motion to dismiss and ordered Plaintiff to file any opposition or statement of non- 18 opposition thereto no later than March 4, 2026. (Doc. 17). 19 On March 9, 2026, Plaintiff lodged a purported amended complaint. (Doc. 19). Because 20 Plaintiff filed the proposed amended complaint only after the time for such filing as a matter of 21 right had lapsed and because Defendant did not stipulate to its filing and Plaintiff otherwise did not 22 seek leave of Court to make the filing (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15), the undersigned considers Plaintiff’s 23 proposed amended pleading for the limited purpose of determining whether granting leave to 24 amend would be futile. 25 On April 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed without leave a “sur-reply” to Defendant’s reply. (Doc. 26 22). Because Plaintiff’s filing of a sur-reply is not authorized by the Local Rules, Plaintiff has not 27

5 The presiding district judge referred both Defendant’s motion to dismiss and Plaintiff’s 1 obtained leave of Court for its filing, and there does not appear to be a valid reason for the filing 2 (such as, for instance, the raising of new arguments by Defendant in its reply), the undersigned 3 disregards the filing for purposes of these findings and recommendations. See Local Rule 230(m); 4 Warren v. City of Chico, No. 2:21-CV-00640-DAD-DMC, 2024 WL 4803960, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 5 Nov. 15, 2024). 6 B. Order Vacating February 5, 2026, Findings and Recommendations 7 Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s opposition was untimely filed on March 13, 2026 (Doc. 20), the 8 undersigned finds it appropriate to consider the filing in reviewing Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 9 Accordingly, the undersigned will vacate the findings and recommendations to dismiss the action 10 as a sanction for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute, issued on February 5, 2026. (Doc. 13). 11 C. Plaintiff’s FAC6 12 Plaintiff alleges in the FAC that he was a patient of Dr. Uy of CSV, who had been treating 13 him for all healthcare needs “before the incident giving rise to this litigation.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff 14 alleges he was informed that in instances Dr. Uy was absent from regularly scheduled work, Nurse 15 Nancy “would substitute for her” and provide Plaintiff’s prescription medications including “Norco 16 10mg [four] times a day … as needed.” Id. He alleges that during an interview with Nancy, she 17 acknowledged that she was aware of Plaintiff’s regularly prescribed controlled medication, and that 18 she “had on at least [two to three] other times prior to the incident … had properly prescribed 19 [P]laintiff his regularly prescribed medications.” Id. He alleges that “in spite of being verbally 20 informed/reminded” of Plaintiff’s prescribed medication, Nancy sent to Rite Aid pharmacy a 21 prescription consisting of only “5mg[] of Norco [four]-times a day as needed.” Id. Plaintiff asserts 22 Nancy “breached the applicable standards of care under both [f]ederal and California law.” Id. 23 In the FAC, Plaintiff asserts six claims for relief, including: (1) professional negligence 24 under Cal. Civ. Code § 304.5; (2) a non-physical impact theory claim; (3) a statutory violation of 25 Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b); (4) a claim for willful misconduct/intentional misconduct under Cal. Civ. 26 Code § 733; (5) a statutory violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1979; and (6) a statutory violation 27 of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Doc. 1 at 8-9). In his prayer for relief, Plaintiff seeks 1 declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at 10. The 2 FAC is signed and dated August 6, 2025. Id. 3 II. Governing Authority 4 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests a complaint’s 5 sufficiency and asks a court to dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for failing “to state a claim upon 6 which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n., 720 7 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Peck v. Hoff, 660 F.2d 371, 374 (8th Cir. 1981)). A complaint 8 may be dismissed as a matter of law either for lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 9 sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 10 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533- 11 34 (9th Cir. 1984)). 12 To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must provide sufficient 13 factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 14 678 (2009); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the 15 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief). A complaint satisfies the plausibility 16 requirement if it contains sufficient facts for the court to “draw [a] reasonable inference that the 17 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 18 (2007). 19 When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court 20 must accept as true all factual allegations put forth in the complaint and construe all facts and 21 inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations 22 omitted); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 2010). The complaint need not include 23 “detailed factual allegations,” but must include “more than an unadorned, the-defendant- 24 unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). The Court is “not 25 ‘required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint or matters 26 properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted 27 deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.’” Seven Arts Filmed Entm’t, Ltd. v. Content Media 1 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010)). 2 Finally, courts must construe pro se pleadings liberally and hold such pleadings to a less 3 stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) 4 (per curiam); see Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (“It is settled law that the allegations of [a 5 pro se litigant’s complaint] ‘however inartfully pleaded’ are held ‘to less stringent standards than 6 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers . . .’” (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972))). 7 A court should dismiss a pro se complaint if “it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the 8 complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 9 2012). 10 III. Parties’ Contentions 11 Defendant argues dismissal of Plaintiff’s FAC is warranted because he failed to exhaust his 12 administrative remedies as required by the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), 13 and the Court thus lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 4 at 1) (citing McNeil v. United States, 14 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“The FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they 15 have exhausted their administrative remedies.”)). Defendant contends that because it is deemed to 16 be a covered person/federal employee, claims against CSV for personal injury resulting from the 17 performance of medical or related functions must be brought against the United States pursuant to 18 the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80. (Doc. 4-1 at 2). Defendant argues that because Plaintiff 19 did not complete the FTCA’s administrative claims process before filing suit, his claims against the 20 United States must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 21 2675(a)). 22 In opposition to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff contends that he did not receive notice that 23 there was “a federal employee with respect to the medical services rendered” by CSV. (Doc. 20 at 24 1). In essence, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has failed to establish that it is a covered entity such 25 that the FTCA’s exhaustion requirements attach. 26 Defendant contends in reply that Plaintiff’s action should be dismissed “because it is 27 undisputed that [he] has never submitted an administrative claim necessary to file a lawsuit against 1 exhaust his administrative remedies, thereby depriving this Court of jurisdiction.” (Doc. 21 at 1). 2 IV. Defendant’s Unopposed Request for Judicial Notice 3 Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of state court filings and records, including 4 of CSV’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s FAC filed on October 6, 2025, and of the state court judge’s ruling 5 on the demurrer filed on November 21, 2025. (Doc. 4-3 at 1). Plaintiff does not object to 6 Defendant’s request for judicial notice. See (Doc. 20). 7 The Court may take judicial notice of court records. See United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 8 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[A] court may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases, as 9 well as the records of an inferior court in other cases.”) (citations omitted). Therefore, the 10 undersigned takes judicial notice of Defendant’s exhibits in support of its motion of CSV’s state 11 court demurrer and the state court’s ruling thereto. See (Doc. 4-3 at 3-15). 12 V. Discussion 13 A. FTCA Exhaustion 14 1. Governing Authority 15 “The FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671–80, waives the United States’ sovereign immunity 16 for tort actions and vests the federal district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over suits arising 17 from the negligence of government employees.” D.L by and through Junio v. Vassilev, 858 F.3d 18 1242, 1244 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Jerves v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 518 (9th Cir. 1992)). 19 “Before a plaintiff can file an FTCA action in federal court, however, he must exhaust the 20 administrative remedies for his claim.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)). This requires the plaintiff 21 to file “(1) a written statement sufficiently describing the injury to enable the agency to begin its 22 own investigation, and (2) a sum certain damages claim.” Warren v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior Bureau 23 of Land Mgmt., 724 F.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc)). “An administrative claim is deemed 24 exhausted once the relevant agency finally denies it in writing, or if the agency fails to make a final 25 disposition of the claim within six months of the claim's filing.” D.L by and through Junio, 858 26 F.3d at 1244. “The FTCA’s exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional and may not be waived.” Id. 27 (citing Jerves, 966 F.2d at 519). In other words, exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite and 1 Any such waiver must be strictly construed in favor of the United States.” Brady v. United States, 2 211 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Jerves, 966 F.2d at 521). 3 “The Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (FSHCAA) provides that the 4 exclusive remedy for damages resulting from the performance of medical functions by employees 5 of the U.S. Public Health Service acting within the scope of their employment is a claim against 6 the United States under the FTCA.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)). “Upon certification that the 7 defendant employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the incident 8 giving rise to the suit, the case must be removed and the proceeding deemed a tort action brought 9 against the United States under the FTCA.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 233(c)). 10 2. Analysis 11 To administratively exhaust his claim under the FTCA, Plaintiff needed to file his 12 administrative claim against CSV with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and 13 wait for the claim to be denied in writing or following the expiration of the six-month statutory 14 waiting period. Warren, 724 F.2d 776, 780; e.g., Flores v. United States, No. 1:23-cv-01742-KES- 15 CDB, 2024 WL 3202946, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2024). 16 Because the government relies on evidence extrinsic to the FAC to support its argument 17 that Plaintiff filed this action prematurely, evidence which the undersigned judicially noticed as 18 noted above, the government’s jurisdictional argument is a factual challenge. See St. Clair of City 19 of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989) (a factual challenge “rel[ies] on affidavits or any other 20 evidence properly before the court” to challenge the operative complaint’s allegations). Therefore, 21 Plaintiff must present “affidavits or any other evidence necessary to satisfy [his] burden of 22 establishing that the court, in fact, possesses subject matter jurisdiction.” Edison v. United States, 23 822 F.3d 510, 517 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 24 Since this action was initiated in state court and removed to this Court, Plaintiff has not 25 submitted an administrative claim regarding his allegations against CSV with the U.S. Department 26 of Health and Human Services. Cf. Staple v. United States, 740 F.2d 766, 768 (9th Cir. 1984) 27 (holding district court had jurisdiction over a case that was removed from state court after plaintiff 1 in state court). Defendant’s exhibits to its motion to dismiss establish that Plaintiff did not exhaust 2 his administrative remedies under the FTCA in state court. See (Doc. 4-3 at 6). Plaintiff has not 3 proffered any affidavits or any other evidence to demonstrate that he exhausted his administrative 4 remedies in compliance with the FTCA. See (Docs. 1, 4, 20). To the contrary, Plaintiff effectively 5 concedes that he did not file any administrative claim with the proper federal agency in arguing he 6 did not receive notice that CSV is a covered person/federal employee triggering FTCA claims 7 presentation prior to filing suit. See (Doc. 20 at 1); Boudousquie v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, No. 8 2:23-cv-00948-DAD-SCR, 2024 WL 5247185, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2024) (finding motion to 9 dismiss should be granted on basis that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to 10 filing FTCA action), recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 808086, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2025). 11 In his proposed/lodged amended complaint (Doc. 16), which Plaintiff filed after receiving 12 Defendant’s motion to dismiss and arguments concerning his failure to comply with the FTCA’s 13 exhaustion requirement, he likewise does not allege exhausting his administrative remedies. 14 Given the uncontested evidence regarding Plaintiff’s premature filing of this action, and 15 because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the FTCA, the 16 undersigned will recommend this case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 17 without leave to amend, as Plaintiff is unable to cure this defect. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 18 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (a court should dismiss a pro se complaint if “it is absolutely clear that 19 the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”); e.g., Corrales v. Dutschke, 20 760 F. Supp. 3d 1053, 1069 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (dismissing FTCA claims without prejudice and 21 without leave to amend as “the claims cannot be cured by amendment because Plaintiff … had not 22 yet exhausted his administrative remedies.”) (citation omitted). Furthermore, because this Court is 23 without subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, the undersigned will recommend that 24 Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. 7) be denied as moot. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 1 | IV. Conclusion, Order, and Recommendation 2 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 3 1. The findings and recommendations issued on February 5, 2026 (Doc. 13) are 4 VACATED. 5 And it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 6 1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 4) be GRANTED. 7 2. Plaintiff's claims (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 8 without leave to amend and without prejudice. 9 3. Plaintiff's motion to remand (Doc. 7) be DENIED as moot. 10 4. The Clerk of the Court be DIRECTED to close this case. 11 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the U.S. District Judge assigned 12 | to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days after being served 13 | with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written objections with 14 | the Court. Local Rule 304(b). 15 The document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 16 | Recommendations” and shall not exceed 15 pages without leave of Court and good cause shown. 17 | The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent any party wishes to 18 | refer to any exhibit(s), that party should reference the exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document 19 | and page number, when possible, or otherwise reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages 20 | filed in excess of the 15-page limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing 21 | these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A party’s failure to file any 22 || objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson 23 | v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). 24 | ITIS SO ORDERED. | Dated: _ May 15, 2026 | by 26 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 27 28