Steven Tull v. Brooke Jenkins, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 6 7 STEVEN TULL, Case No. 24-cv-06599-SK

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S 9 v. STATE LAW CLAIM

10 BROOKE JENKINS, et al., Regarding Docket No. 88 11 Defendants.

12 On July 24, 2026, the Court granted in part and denied in part the motion for summary 13 judgment filed by Defendants the City and County of San Francisco (the “City”) and San 14 Francisco District Attorney Brooke Jenkins (collectively, “Defendants”). (Dkt. No. 65.) The 15 Court denied summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims that the City violated the Public Safety 16 Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (“POBR”), Cal. Govt. Code §§ 3303(g), 3305, and 3306. 17 The Court granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action for violation of 18 California Labor Code § 1050 against both Defendants, Second Cause of Action for denial of 19 procedural due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both Defendants, Third Cause of Action for denial of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both Defendants, Fourth Cause of 20 Action for violation of POBR § 3304(b) against the City, and Sixth Cause of Action for violation 21 of FEHA against the City. The Court also granted summary judgment to Defendants on the claims 22 that Plaintiff abandoned: Fourth Cause of Action for POBR violations against Jenkins; Fifth Cause 23 of Action for Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy against both Defendants; Sixth 24 Cause of Action for violation of FEHA against Jenkins; and Seventh Cause of Action for 25 Retaliation under Government Code § 12653 against both Defendants. Thus, the sole remaining 26 claim is Plaintiff’s state claim under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act, Cal. 27 Govt. Code §§ 3303(g), 3305, and 3306. 1 Defendants move to remand Plaintiff’s remaining state law claim to state court. (Dkt. No. 2 88.) Plaintiff filed a statement of non-opposition to Defendants’ motion to remand. (Dkt. No. 92.) 3 A district court may decline exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state claims when “the 4 district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 5 1367(c)(3). In deciding whether to remand, courts should “consider and weigh ... the values of 6 judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity[.]” Carnegie–Mellon University v. Cohill, 7 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). The Court concludes that exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the sole remaining state claim is not appropriate. See Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 8 651 (9th Cir. 1984) (usually dismissal of federal claims before trial dictates that the pendent state 9 claims should be dismissed) (citation omitted). 10 First, the comity and fairness factors do not weigh in favor of the Court’s exercising 11 supplemental jurisdiction over the sole remaining state law claim. The only remaining questions 12 in this case involve unsettled questions of state law that implicate POBR. The unsettled questions 13 of state law before this Court properly belong before a state court. See Millar v. Bay Area Rapid 14 Transit Dist., 236 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (it is “preferable as a matter of comity 15 (respect for our sister state institutions) for state court judges to apply state law to plaintiff’s state- 16 law claims.”); Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir.), supplemented, 121 F.3d 17 714 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended (Oct. 1, 1997) (“The Supreme Court has stated, and we have 18 often repeated, that in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the 19 balance of factors ... will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state- 20 law claims.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 21 The factor of judicial economy weighs slightly in favor of the Court’s retaining jurisdiction 22 over the sole remaining state law claim. The Court, though, finds that the other factors outweigh 23 this factor and thus declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the sole remaining state law 24 claim. See, e.g., Otto v. Heckler, 802 F.2d 337, 338 (9th Cir.1986) (“The district court, of course, 25 has the discretion to determine whether its investment of judicial energy justifies retention of 26 jurisdiction or if it should more properly dismiss the claims without prejudice.”) (internal citation 27 omitted). ] Although the City moved to remand the case, the Court notes that, because Plaintiff did not 2 remove this action from state court, dismissal without prejudice, instead of remand, is appropriate. 3 Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs sole remaining claim that the City violated the Public 4 Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act, Cal. Govt. Code §§ 3303(g), 3305, and 3306 5 WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling this claim in state court within thirty days. 7 Dated: August 13, 2026 f ( □ la, . 8 SALLIE KIM 9 United States Magistrate Judge 10 1] a 12

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