Steven Steptoe and Patricia Carballo v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
This text of Steven Steptoe and Patricia Carballo v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Steven Steptoe and Patricia Carballo v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
ACCEPTED 01-14-00813-CV FIRST COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 1/12/2015 2:34:43 PM CHRISTOPHER PRINE CLERK
No. 01-14-00813-CV _________________________________________________ FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS In the HOUSTON, TEXAS 1/12/2015 2:34:43 PM
First Court of Appeals CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
Houston, Texas _________________________________________________
STEVEN STEPTOE AND PATRICIA CARBALLO, Appellants, v.
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Appellee. _________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 61st District Court of Harris County, Texas, Cause No. 2013-32035 Hon. Al Bennett _________________________________________________
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Robert Y. Petersen Texas Bar No. 24083655 THE LANE LAW FIRM 6200 Savoy, Suite 1150 Houston, Texas 77036 [Tel.] (713) 595-8200 [Fax] (713) 595-8201 Robert.Petersen@lanelaw.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS STEVEN STEPTOE AND PATRICIA CARBALLO
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Index of Authorities ................................................................................................... 3
Argument In Reply..................................................................................................... 4
Certificate of Compliance with Tex. R. App. P. 9 ..................................................... 7
Certificate of Service ................................................................................................. 7
2 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CASES
Douglas v. FNCNB Tex. Nat. Bank, 979 F.2d 1128, 1130 (5th Cir. 1992) ................ 4
in re Albert Morris, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3656, *4-5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2012) ............................................................................................................ 5
in re Erickson, 566 Fed.Appx. 281, 283 (5th Cir. 2014) ............................................ 4
Huston v. U.S. Bank National Association, et al., 2013 WL 6731988 *7 (S.D. Tex. 2013) .............................................................................................. 5
Kaspar v. Keller, 466 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex.App.—Waco 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ............................................................................................................ 5, 6
Steve Thomas v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC et al, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 630, *13 (N.D. Tex. Jan 3, 2013) .................................................................... 5
STATUTES AND RULES
Tex. Const. ART. XVI § 50(a)(6)(D) .................................................................... 4, 5
Tex. R. Civ. P. 735 ..................................................................................................... 5
SECONDARY SOURCES
Black’s Law Dictionary (Abridged Eighth Edition) .................................................. 5
3 ARGUMENT IN REPLY
Appellee’s Response seeks to mischaracterize the law on this issue as clear
and unambiguous in favor of Appellee, yet tellingly, Appellee fails to cite to a
single case that is controlling or precedential in their favor.
Furthermore, Appellants strenuously object to Appellee’s blatant
misattributing of the authority behind their argument. Appellee claims Appellant’s
argument is contrary to relevant legal authority from the Fifth Circuit and that this
exact argument was rejected by the Fifth Circuit; when in fact, the Fifth Circuit has
never rendered an opinion considering this specific issue.
The Fifth Circuit case of Douglas v. NCNB Texas Nat’l Bank did not deal
with a home equity loan, which is a crucial factor in Appellants argument.1
The Fifth Circuit case of Erickson, addressed whether a cause of action for
judicial foreclosure had to be authorized by the loan documents—a position which
the court rejected—which has no direct bearing on Appellants’ argument.2
Appellants’ argument is that because a home equity lien requires “a court
order,”3 the lender has only one remedy available to it: to seek a court order
authorizing foreclosure. It is well settled law that home equity loans in Texas
1 Douglas v. FNCNB Tex. Nat. Bank, 979 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1992) 2 In re Erickson, 566 Fed.Appx. 281, 283 (5th Cir. 2014) 3 See Tex. Const. art XVI Section 50(a)(6)(D).
4 require a judicial foreclosure i.e. a court order.4 A position Appellee never
addresses.
Common sense dictates that a foreclosure requiring a judicial proceeding is a
“judicial foreclosure” whether or not it is performed as part of a constable’s sale or
through a trustee sale.5 Either way, it is occurring under the auspices of the Court’s
authority, hence it is a “judicial foreclosure.”
To the extent a lender could elect either foreclosure through the power of
sale, or foreclosure through a sheriff’s or constable’s sale, the application of the
compulsory counterclaim rule has deprived the lender of nothing. See TEX. R. CIV.
P. 735.6 In other words, the entire justification for invoking the Kaspar rule no
longer applies (i.e. preventing the borrower from forcing the lender’s election of
remedies). Here, the lender has no extra-judicial option.7 Both options are judicial
4 Pursuant to the Texas Constitution, a home equity lien may only be foreclosed judicially. See TEX. CONST. ART XVI § 50(a)(6)(D)(“is secured by a lien that may be foreclosed upon only by a court order”); see also Steve Thomas v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC et al, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 630, *13 (N.D. Tex. Jan 3, 2013)(“It is well settled law that home equity loans in Texas must be foreclosed judicially.”); in re Albert Morris, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3656, *4-5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2012) 5 See Black’s Law Dictionary “Judicial Foreclosure”. 6 In other words, assuming arguendo the elements of a compulsory counterclaim are met, the lender remains free to choose either: an order authorizing foreclosure via trustee through the power of sale granted by the Security Instrument or to seek an order granting a sheriff’s or constable’s sale of the property. 7 “We adopt the logic of the trial court that the mortgagor should not be permitted to destroy or impair the mortgagee's contractual right to foreclosure under the power of sale by the simple expedient of instituting a suit, whether groundless or meritorious, thereby compelling the mortgagee to abandon the extra-judicial foreclosure which he had the right to elect, nullifying his election, and permitting the mortgagor to control the option as to remedies.” Kaspar v. Keller, 466 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex.App.—Waco 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.)
5 and require judicial approval. Furthermore, both options remain available
regardless of the borrower’s action. Therefore, the justification for the Kaspar rule
is no longer present.
All the lender has to do is simply file a counterclaim with the court for
foreclosure seeking either a constable’s sale of trustee’s sale (an action they would
have to take regardless of the borrower’s actions). Instead, Appellee is seeking this
Court’s blessing to multiply litigation for the benefit of the attorneys and servicers
handling the mortgage loans.
Ironically, the application of the Kaspar rule to home equity loans would
result in the lien with the most constitutional protections being the only lien on a
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