NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0748-24
STEVEN RINCK,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent. ___________________________
Submitted October 28, 2025 – Decided November 26, 2025
Before Judges Sumners and Augostini.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.
Steven Rinck, self-represented appellant.
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Elizabeth Merrill, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Steven Rinck appeals the final agency decision of the New Jersey
Department of Corrections (DOC) that denied his request for a reduction in
custody status from gang minimum to full minimum custody status. We reverse
and remand for consideration of the applicable regulatory factors and for the
DOC to make appropriate findings and conclusions.
I.
Rinck was convicted by a jury in December 2015 of impersonation of a
law enforcement officer, armed robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault
with a firearm, and sentenced in March 2016. He is an inmate at Northern State
Prison, serving a maximum of twenty years.
In August 2024, an Institutional Classification Committee (ICC) at
Northern State Prison denied Rinck's request to reduce his custody classification
status from gang minimum custody status to full minimum custody status. The
ICC specifically cited the following reasoning for its decision:
[1] [incarcerated person] has a prior hostage situation in Union County and he has a [parole eligibility date] [] in five years; [2] previous multiple violent offense[s]; [3] impulsive behavior exhibited in the offense; [4] kidnapping and impersonate public servant; and [5] field account of the offense.
A-0748-24 2 The ICC report noted Rinck's objective classification score of zero; the prior
hostage situation from his previous incarceration in 1997; his parole eligibility
date of October 21, 2029; a psychological evaluation dated July 18, 2024; his
lack of a "[d]isciplinary [h]istory (violent)"; and a positive professional report
from social work staff regarding full minimum status.
On September 14, 2024, Rinck filed a grievance with the DOC, stating
that he was appealing the denial of his request for full minimum status because
"the ICC indicated that the denial was specifically [based] on the 'circumstances
of the [offense].'" Because the circumstances of his offense "can never change,"
Rinck contended that to deny a reduction in custody status on the offense
circumstances alone is a "violation." The ICC responded "that reduced custody
status is a privilege not a right and at the discretion of Administration and the
[ICC]." It further stated that "the ICC shall take into consideration all relevant
factors" when making custody status decisions. Rinck appealed.
II.
Our review of an administrative agency's final decision is limited.
Kadonsky v. Lee, 452 N.J. Super. 198, 201-02 (App. Div. 2017) (citing In re
Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)). "We will not reverse an agency's
judgment unless we find the decision to be 'arbitrary, capricious, or
A-0748-24 3 unreasonable, or [] or not supported by substantial credible evidence in the
record as a whole.'" Id. at 202 (quoting Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194). "When an
agency's decision meets those criteria, then a court owes substantial deference
to the agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field." In re
Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007). We recognize that the Legislature has
provided for the broad exercise of the DOC's discretion in all matters regarding
the administration of a prison facility. Russo v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 324 N.J.
Super. 576, 583 (App. Div. 1999).
The "classification of prisoners and the decision as to what privileges they
will receive rest solely within the discretion of the commissioner of the
department of corrections." Smith v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 346 N.J. Super. 24, 30
(App. Div. 2001). Although an inmate has no liberty interest in a particular
custody level and the DOC has broad authority in making such determinations,
the DOC's decision to deny a reduced custody status must not be arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable, and must be support by substantial, credible
evidence in the record. See Hluchan v. Fauver, 480 F. Supp. 103, 108 (D.N.J.
1979); Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980); White v.
Fauver, 219 N.J. Super. 170, 180 (App. Div. 1987). Moreover, an agency's
discretion is "not unbounded and must be exercised in a manner that will
A-0748-24 4 facilitate judicial review." In re Vey, 124 N.J. 534, 543-44 (1991). The agency
must "articulate the standards and principles that govern their discretionary
decisions in as much detail as possible." Van Holten Group v. Elizabethtown
Water Co., 121 N.J. 48, 67 (1990).
Under the DOC regulations, "[c]hanges in inmate custody status within a
particular correctional facility shall be made by the [ICC], " and the ICC reviews
all inmate applications for a change in custody status. N.J.A.C. 10A:9-4.4(a);
N.J.A.C. 10A: 9-3.1(a)(3). In reviewing such applications, the ICC applies the
criteria set forth in the regulations and the "objective classification instrument
score . . . to determine whether an inmate is eligible for reduced custody
consideration." N.J.A.C. 10A:9-4.1(b).
When deciding whether an inmate's custody status should be reduced, the
ICC "shall take into consideration all relevant factors." N.J.A.C. 10A:9-
4.5(a)(1) to (9). The regulation lists nine factors that must be considered, which
are:
(1) field account of the present offense; (2) [p]rior criminal record; (3) [p]revious incarcerations; (4) [c]orrectional facility adjustment; (5) [r]esidential community program adjustment; (6) [t]he objective classification score; (7) [r]eports from professional custody staff;
A-0748-24 5 (8) [a] conviction for a present or prior offense that resulted in a life sentence; and (9) [a]ny reason which, in the opinion of the Administrator and the ICC, relates to the best interests of the inmate or the safe, orderly operation of the correctional facility or the safety of the community or public at large.
[Ibid.]
Rinck contends there is no evidence that the ICC considered any relevant factors
other than the "field account of [his] current offense," and its explanation for the
denial was insufficient. The DOC counters that it properly exercised its
discretion in denying Rinck's request for reduced custody status and
appropriately expressed its reasoning for its decision, citing not only to the field
account of Rinck's present offense, but also, his prior criminal record, the
impulsive behavior exhibited at the time of the present offense, and his prior
hostage history while previously incarcerated in Union County.
In the present case, the record clearly demonstrates that the ICC's decision
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0748-24
STEVEN RINCK,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent. ___________________________
Submitted October 28, 2025 – Decided November 26, 2025
Before Judges Sumners and Augostini.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.
Steven Rinck, self-represented appellant.
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Elizabeth Merrill, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Steven Rinck appeals the final agency decision of the New Jersey
Department of Corrections (DOC) that denied his request for a reduction in
custody status from gang minimum to full minimum custody status. We reverse
and remand for consideration of the applicable regulatory factors and for the
DOC to make appropriate findings and conclusions.
I.
Rinck was convicted by a jury in December 2015 of impersonation of a
law enforcement officer, armed robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault
with a firearm, and sentenced in March 2016. He is an inmate at Northern State
Prison, serving a maximum of twenty years.
In August 2024, an Institutional Classification Committee (ICC) at
Northern State Prison denied Rinck's request to reduce his custody classification
status from gang minimum custody status to full minimum custody status. The
ICC specifically cited the following reasoning for its decision:
[1] [incarcerated person] has a prior hostage situation in Union County and he has a [parole eligibility date] [] in five years; [2] previous multiple violent offense[s]; [3] impulsive behavior exhibited in the offense; [4] kidnapping and impersonate public servant; and [5] field account of the offense.
A-0748-24 2 The ICC report noted Rinck's objective classification score of zero; the prior
hostage situation from his previous incarceration in 1997; his parole eligibility
date of October 21, 2029; a psychological evaluation dated July 18, 2024; his
lack of a "[d]isciplinary [h]istory (violent)"; and a positive professional report
from social work staff regarding full minimum status.
On September 14, 2024, Rinck filed a grievance with the DOC, stating
that he was appealing the denial of his request for full minimum status because
"the ICC indicated that the denial was specifically [based] on the 'circumstances
of the [offense].'" Because the circumstances of his offense "can never change,"
Rinck contended that to deny a reduction in custody status on the offense
circumstances alone is a "violation." The ICC responded "that reduced custody
status is a privilege not a right and at the discretion of Administration and the
[ICC]." It further stated that "the ICC shall take into consideration all relevant
factors" when making custody status decisions. Rinck appealed.
II.
Our review of an administrative agency's final decision is limited.
Kadonsky v. Lee, 452 N.J. Super. 198, 201-02 (App. Div. 2017) (citing In re
Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)). "We will not reverse an agency's
judgment unless we find the decision to be 'arbitrary, capricious, or
A-0748-24 3 unreasonable, or [] or not supported by substantial credible evidence in the
record as a whole.'" Id. at 202 (quoting Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194). "When an
agency's decision meets those criteria, then a court owes substantial deference
to the agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field." In re
Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007). We recognize that the Legislature has
provided for the broad exercise of the DOC's discretion in all matters regarding
the administration of a prison facility. Russo v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 324 N.J.
Super. 576, 583 (App. Div. 1999).
The "classification of prisoners and the decision as to what privileges they
will receive rest solely within the discretion of the commissioner of the
department of corrections." Smith v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 346 N.J. Super. 24, 30
(App. Div. 2001). Although an inmate has no liberty interest in a particular
custody level and the DOC has broad authority in making such determinations,
the DOC's decision to deny a reduced custody status must not be arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable, and must be support by substantial, credible
evidence in the record. See Hluchan v. Fauver, 480 F. Supp. 103, 108 (D.N.J.
1979); Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980); White v.
Fauver, 219 N.J. Super. 170, 180 (App. Div. 1987). Moreover, an agency's
discretion is "not unbounded and must be exercised in a manner that will
A-0748-24 4 facilitate judicial review." In re Vey, 124 N.J. 534, 543-44 (1991). The agency
must "articulate the standards and principles that govern their discretionary
decisions in as much detail as possible." Van Holten Group v. Elizabethtown
Water Co., 121 N.J. 48, 67 (1990).
Under the DOC regulations, "[c]hanges in inmate custody status within a
particular correctional facility shall be made by the [ICC], " and the ICC reviews
all inmate applications for a change in custody status. N.J.A.C. 10A:9-4.4(a);
N.J.A.C. 10A: 9-3.1(a)(3). In reviewing such applications, the ICC applies the
criteria set forth in the regulations and the "objective classification instrument
score . . . to determine whether an inmate is eligible for reduced custody
consideration." N.J.A.C. 10A:9-4.1(b).
When deciding whether an inmate's custody status should be reduced, the
ICC "shall take into consideration all relevant factors." N.J.A.C. 10A:9-
4.5(a)(1) to (9). The regulation lists nine factors that must be considered, which
are:
(1) field account of the present offense; (2) [p]rior criminal record; (3) [p]revious incarcerations; (4) [c]orrectional facility adjustment; (5) [r]esidential community program adjustment; (6) [t]he objective classification score; (7) [r]eports from professional custody staff;
A-0748-24 5 (8) [a] conviction for a present or prior offense that resulted in a life sentence; and (9) [a]ny reason which, in the opinion of the Administrator and the ICC, relates to the best interests of the inmate or the safe, orderly operation of the correctional facility or the safety of the community or public at large.
[Ibid.]
Rinck contends there is no evidence that the ICC considered any relevant factors
other than the "field account of [his] current offense," and its explanation for the
denial was insufficient. The DOC counters that it properly exercised its
discretion in denying Rinck's request for reduced custody status and
appropriately expressed its reasoning for its decision, citing not only to the field
account of Rinck's present offense, but also, his prior criminal record, the
impulsive behavior exhibited at the time of the present offense, and his prior
hostage history while previously incarcerated in Union County.
In the present case, the record clearly demonstrates that the ICC's decision
to deny full minimum status was based primarily on factors that remain
unchangeable, such as the offense circumstances and Rinck's prior incarceration
history dating from 1997. Rinck raises for the first time in his reply brief that
the DOC improperly considered his multiple prior violent offenses and prior
hostage situation while incarcerated which were beyond the time limitations set
A-0748-24 6 forth in N.J.A.C. 10A:9-2.6(b)2 and 4. Because we generally do not consider
claims or arguments asserted for the first time in a party's reply brief, we decline
to address this argument, as it was not properly raised. See Bacon v. N.J. State
Dep't of Educ., 443 N.J. Super. 24, 38 (App. Div. 2015).
DOC contends it "took note" of current information regarding Rinck such
as his classification score of zero; his July 18, 2024 psychological evaluation
that found him to be "psychologically stable;" his lack of any violent
disciplinary history; and a positive report from the social work staff. We are
unable to discern, however, whether this positive information was indeed
considered and how it factored in to the ICC's determination to reject Rinck's
request. We agree with Rinck that the DOC's lack of specificity in evaluating
all relevant factors impedes meaningful appellate review. In the "absence of
particular findings," our review is hindered, and we are unable to give deference
to the agency's discretionary decisions. In re Vey, 124 N.J. at 544 (citing
Application of Howard Sav. Inst., 32 N.J. 29, 53 (1960)). Therefore, we reverse
and remand for full consideration of the factors set forth in DOC's classification
regulations and for DOC to make more detailed findings and conclusions based
on those factors.
A-0748-24 7 Reversed and remanded for further consideration consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-0748-24 8