Steven N. Hyland v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 4, 2017
• Docket: 02A05-1605-CR-1166
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 04 2017, 8:16 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Nicholas F. Wallace Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Leonard, Hammond, Thoma & Terrill Attorney General of Indiana Fort Wayne, Indiana Lyubov Gore Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Steven N. Hyland, April 4, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 02A05-1605-CR-1166 v. Appeal from the Allen Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Wendy W. Davis, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge The Honorable Samuel R. Keirns, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 02D04-1510-F6-1040

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1605-CR-1166 | April 4, 2017 Page 1 of 9 [1] Steven N. Hyland appeals his conviction of Level 6 felony resisting law

enforcement. 1 He appeals the admission of evidence he claims was obtained

unconstitutionally. He also argues the State did not provide sufficient evidence

at trial to prove he committed Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement. We

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] At approximately 2:15 a.m. on October 27, 2015, Officer Lisa Woods

responded to a hit and run accident. When she arrived on the scene, Officer

Woods observed the victim, who had sustained serious but non-fatal head

injuries, on the ground. The vehicle that had struck the victim was gone.

Officer Woods spoke with several witnesses, one of whom indicated a silver

Pontiac hit the victim, and a maroon station wagon “pulled in and picked up

people and drove off.” (Suppression Tr. at 21.) Another witness indicated a

person named “[C]lick [C]lack” or “Neal 2” was involved in the incident. (Id.)

(footnote added). While Officer Woods was interviewing a witness at the gas

station across the street from the scene of the accident, another witness

indicated the maroon station wagon had just passed the scene and “Neal’s in

the car.” (Id. at 26.)

1 Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(b)(1) (2014). 2 Officer Woods testified she knew the name “[C]lick [C]lack” from her time working in the neighborhood and knew Hyland’s middle name was Neal.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1605-CR-1166 | April 4, 2017 Page 2 of 9 [3] Officer Woods left the scene in her marked police vehicle and followed the

maroon station wagon (“Hyland’s vehicle”). Hyland’s vehicle left the

immediate commercial area where the hit and run occurred and entered a

residential area, where he made thirteen turns in a span of five square blocks.

Officer Woods testified she believed Hyland’s vehicle exceeded the speed limit

for a residential area based on her experience as an officer and “was attempting

to get away from [her].” (Id. at 40.) At least once, Officer Woods observed

Hyland’s vehicle make a turn without a turn signal. After that observation, she

activated her emergency lights. Hyland kept driving and made another turn

without using his turn signal. Officer Woods then activated her siren. Hyland

made another turn without using his turn signal. Officer Woods finally caught

up with Hyland when he stopped at a stop sign. She then arrested Hyland.

[4] On October 30, 2015, the State charged Hyland with Level 6 felony resisting

law enforcement. On January 14, 2016, Hyland filed a motion to suppress

evidence or dismiss the charge, arguing the stop of his vehicle was

unconstitutional. The trial court denied Hyland’s motions on February 22,

2016, after a hearing on the matter. Hyland’s jury trial occurred on April 19,

2016, and the jury found him guilty as charged.

Discussion and Decision Motion to Suppress

[5] Hyland did not seek interlocutory review of the denial of his motion to suppress

but instead appeals following trial. This issue is therefore “appropriately

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1605-CR-1166 | April 4, 2017 Page 3 of 9 framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence

at trial.” Lundquist v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1061, 1067 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Our

review of rulings on the admissibility of evidence is essentially the same

whether the challenge is made by a pre-trial motion to suppress or by trial

objection. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting

evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. However, we must also

consider the uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. Id.

[6] The record reflects Hyland did not object at trial to the admission of the video

recording from Officer Woods’ car, which contained the evidence Hyland

sought to suppress, specifically what happened during Officer Woods’ pursuit

of Hyland’s vehicle. “To preserve a suppression claim a defendant must make a

contemporaneous objection that is sufficiently specific to alert the trial judge

fully of the legal issue. Where a defendant fails to object to the introduction of

evidence . . . the defendant waives the suppression claim.” Moore v. State, 669

N.E.2d 733, 742 (Ind. 1996) (internal citations and emphasis omitted), reh’g

denied. We address Hyland’s argument, waiver notwithstanding.

[7] Hyland was charged with Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, which

required the State to prove he knowingly or intentionally used a vehicle to flee

from Officer Woods after she identified herself as a law enforcement officer and

ordered him to stop. See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(b)(1) (2014) (elements of

Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement). In Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249

(Ind. 2014), our Indiana Supreme Court held, “the statutory element ‘after the

officer has . . . ordered the person to stop’ must be understood to require that

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1605-CR-1166 | April 4, 2017 Page 4 of 9 such order to stop rest on probable cause or reasonable suspicion, that is,

specific, articulable facts that would lead the officer to reasonably suspect that

criminal activity is afoot.” Id. at 1255. We determine whether reasonable

suspicion existed on a case-by-case basis by considering the totality of the

circumstances. Person v. State, 764 N.E.2d 743, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans.

denied.

[8] Based on Gaddie, Hyland contends Officer Woods’ stop of his vehicle violated

his Fourth Amendment 3 right under the United States Constitution to be free of

unreasonable search and seizure because Officer Woods did not have

reasonable suspicion to stop Hyland’s vehicle. In Gaddie, our Indiana Supreme

Court decided the State had not proven the officer who arrested Gaddie had

reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop Gaddie after receiving a report of

a disturbance because “a report of a disturbance, without more, is not a

sufficient basis upon which to conduct an investigatory stop.” Id. at 1255.

However, in this case, the totality of the circumstances created reasonable

suspicion to justify Officer Woods’ stop of Hyland.

[9] At the scene of the accident, a witness told Officer Woods a maroon station

wagon had “pulled in and pick[ed] up people and drove off,” (Suppression Tr.

at 20), following the collision between the victim and another vehicle. The

witness indicated Hyland’s vehicle was involved in the accident, and the person

3 At the hearing on his motion to suppress evidence, Hyland also argued the stop violated his rights under the Indiana Constitution. He does not make that argument on appeal.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1605-CR-1166 | April 4, 2017 Page 5 of 9 who was driving the maroon station wagon was known as “[C]lick [C]lack” or

“Neal.” (Id. at 21.) Officer Woods was interviewing another witness when she

was told the maroon station wagon, with Hyland driving, passed the scene of

the accident. She followed Hyland into a residential area in her marked police

car, where the vehicle made multiple turns, weaving from street to street.

Officer Woods testified she believed, based on her experience as an officer, that

Hyland’s vehicle exceeded the speed limit for a residential area and “was

attempting to get away from [her].” (Id. at 40.) Officer Woods activated her

emergency lights after observing Hyland fail to activate his turn signal prior to

turning. Hyland made another turn, and Officer Woods activated her siren.

Hyland turned again, and Officer Woods caught up with him at a stop sign.

[10] Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude Officer Woods had

reasonable suspicion to stop Hyland. A witness at the scene of an accident

identified Hyland as a person involved in the accident, Officer Woods described

his driving as “very erratic,” (Trial Tr. at 27), and he failed to use a turn signal

multiple times. See McKnight v. State, 612 N.E.2d 586, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)

(reasonable suspicion existed when vehicle stopped matched the description of

a vehicle that a witness indicated was involved in crime, vehicle was driving in

the vicinity of the crime, vehicle was travelling over the speed limit, and driver

had committed traffic infraction), reh’g denied, trans. denied. Hyland’s argument

is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See

Lundquist, 834 N.E.2d at 1067 (appellate court does not reweigh evidence when

considering admission of evidence). The trial court did not abuse its discretion

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1605-CR-1166 | April 4, 2017 Page 6 of 9 when it admitted evidence collected during Officer Woods’ stop of Hyland’s

vehicle.

Sufficiency of Evidence

[11] When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence in support of a conviction, we will

consider only probative evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s

judgment. Binkley v. State, 654 N.E.2d 736, 737 (Ind. 1995), reh’g denied. The

decision comes before us with a presumption of legitimacy, and we will not

substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Id. We do not assess the

credibility of the witnesses or reweigh the evidence in determining whether the

evidence is sufficient. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). Reversal

is appropriate only when no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of

the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Thus, the evidence is not

required to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and is sufficient

if an inference reasonably may be drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. at

147.

[12] To prove Hyland committed Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, the State

had to prove Hyland knowingly or intentionally used a vehicle to flee from

Officer Woods after she identified herself as a law enforcement officer and

ordered him to stop. See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(b)(1) (2014) (elements of

Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement). Hyland argues the State did not

present sufficient evidence he knowingly or intentionally fled from Officer

Woods once she activated her emergency lights and siren because he was

unaware she intended to pull him over until right before he stopped. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1605-CR-1166 | April 4, 2017 Page 7 of 9 [13] Hyland points to what he claims are discrepancies in the video from the

dashboard camera in Officer Woods’ car. Officer Woods testified she activated

her emergency lights after she observed Hyland turn without using a turn

signal. The video shows Officer Woods activating her lights, but Hyland’s

vehicle was not visible at that time. The taillights of his vehicle were visible on

the video shortly thereafter, as Hyland made a quick turn onto a side street

without using his turn signal. Officer Woods activated her siren. He made

another quick turn without using his turn signal before Officer Woods caught

up with him at a stop sign. Hyland’s argument he was unaware of Officer

Woods’ intention to stop him is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and

judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d

at 146 (appellate court will not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of

witnesses).

[14] Hyland also argues Officer Woods did not have reasonable suspicion to stop

him, an argument we rejected in our analysis of the constitutionality of Officer

Woods’ stop of Hyland’s vehicle. As Officer Woods had reasonable suspicion

to stop Hyland and he fled from her after she identified herself as a law

enforcement officer by activating her emergency lights and siren, we conclude

the State presented sufficient evidence to prove Hyland committed Level 6

felony resisting law enforcement. See Woodward v. State, 770 N.E.2d 897, 901

(Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (State presented sufficient evidence to support conviction

of felony resisting law enforcement where the defendant continued to drive after

the officer activated his lights and siren), reh’g denied, trans. denied.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1605-CR-1166 | April 4, 2017 Page 8 of 9 Conclusion [15] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of Officer

Woods’ stop of Hyland’s vehicle because Officer Woods had reasonable

suspicion to stop Hyland based on the totality of the circumstances. The State

also presented sufficient evidence Hyland committed Level 6 felony resisting

law enforcement. Accordingly, we affirm.

[16] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Bailey, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1605-CR-1166 | April 4, 2017 Page 9 of 9